LEVELS OF INTERPRETATION:
LINGUISTIC MEANING AND INFERENCES

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By

Marit Sternau

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This work was carried out under the supervision of

Prof. Mira Ariel

Prof. Rachel Giora
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Abstract

This study investigates the psychological reality and pragmatic status of four meanings of interpretation: linguistic meaning, strong implicature, weak implicature, and the controversial level of explicatures, concentrating on the latter. All these levels of interpretation are examined with regard to their potential to constitute the Privileged Interactional Interpretation, or the PII, which is the primary interpretation of an utterance as intended by the speaker and understood by the addressee (Ariel, 2008; Jaszczolt, 2010). Two models, the Minimalist model (Grice and neo-Griceans), and the Maximalist model (Relevance Theory and Contextualism) are compared, each having different predictions regarding this potential:

1. The Minimalist (neo)-Gricean model advocates the inclusion of some basic inferences alongside the linguistic meaning in ‘what is said\textsubscript{min}’ (Bach, 1994; Horn, 1972; Levinson, 2000).

2. The Maximalist Relevance theoretic model or a Contextualist model (Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004; and mainly Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995), based on the concept of explicature, promotes ‘what is said\textsubscript{max}’. ‘What is said\textsubscript{max}’ consists of more types of inferences alongside the linguistic meaning.

Four experiments are performed, using three tests, each measuring a different parameter. All experiments contain materials taken from natural discourse (and mildly changed):

1. A Discourse-Coherence test, which aims to rate the level of coherence of the texts preceding the inferences constituting the various levels of interpretation
2. A PII Confirmability test, which examines which of the levels of interpretation is most likely to be taken as the PII. This test is accompanied by a Confidence test, which measures the degree of confidence the participants have in the decision they make in the Confirmability test.

3. A Deniability test, which measures how easy (or difficult) it is for a speaker to deny his/her commitment to some interpretation potentially associated with her utterance.

All tests (Coherence, Confirmability and Deniability) are found to distinguish between stronger and weaker aspects of the speaker’s communicated message. These differences could pertain to whole representations (e.g., explicatures vs. implicatures) or to aspects of one representation (e.g., different inferences included in the explicature and considered stronger than others, or the bare linguistic meaning, as a level separated from the inferences contributing to the explicature).

The results of these tests support the Maximalist model, as they reinforce the distinct status of Explicature. The results also yielded an Interpretation Strength Scale, which promotes a strength continuum, along which all levels (and sub-levels: different explicated pragmatic contributions and strong/weak implicatures) of interpretation are ordered based on their relative degrees of strength:

Linguistic meaning > Explicated_{saturation} > Explicated_{enrichment} > Implicated_{[strong]} > Implicated_{[weak]} \textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1} The terms 'saturation' and 'enrichment' are used here in the spirit of Recanati (2004 and onwards).
This continuum aims to portray the overall picture of the status of various levels of interpretation. Some levels of interpretation along this continuum are stronger than others in that they raise the degree of coherence of the context preceding them, more likely to constitute the PII, and more hardly deniable. Focusing on the explicature, we also examine the products of five of the pragmatic processes yielding the explicature, which were also ordered on the continuum.

This study also suggests a methodological new tool – the Deniability test, which, being the pragmatic parallel of Grice’s semantic Cancelability criterion, can measure strength of different levels of interpretation, based on their deniability degree within discourse.

The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 1 presents the various models addressed here and some of the prominent experiments in the literature, which serve to support each of them. Chapter 2 introduces the strength criteria, according to which the strength continuum is built. This Chapter also explains the rationale of the three tests used here, while predicting the results according to each of the models. Chapter 3 includes the description of the experiments themselves. The general discussion is found in Chapter 4.

In sum, this study not only supports the psychological reality of the Maximalists' Explicature, but it also shows that as long as they are analyzed within discourse, the various inferences included in the Explicature, alongside other levels of interpretation, may play the role of the PII, while some are more likely to do that than others.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Philosophers and linguists have long assumed that utterance meaning in the broad sense of the word (the message it conveys) is not a single concept. Rather, it is an amalgam of interpretations linguistically expressed and pragmatically inferred. Although the speaker’s goal in uttering some utterance is that all his/her intended meanings - the conveyed meaning be processed by the addressee, different meanings, referred to here as levels of interpretation, are distinguished by theoreticians, and are said to reflect different psychological processes of naïve speakers.

This study aims to shed light on a variety of levels of interpretation: the bare linguistic (semantic) meaning, the implicature, and the intermediate meaning level (or levels) between these two: the Relevance-theoretic concept of explicature and the neo-Gricean ‘what is said’. We set out to examine which, if any, of these levels is taken by interlocutors to be the Privileged Interactional Interpretation (henceforth PII) of an utterance within discourse. The notion of PII was first introduced in Ariel (2002).

Ariel defines Privileged Interactional Interpretation as follows:

This is the meaning which the speaker is seen as minimally and necessarily committed to, i.e., the one by which s/he is judged as telling the truth or being sincere. It is also the meaning which contains the message that the addressee should take to be the relevant contribution made by the speaker...

(Ariel, 2002: 1006).

Here we examine which of the levels of interpretation mentioned above is taken by interlocutors to be Ariel's PII - the interactional message the speaker is committed to. Although we assume that in fact any of these levels may, at times, be
considered the PII, we predict a hierarchy of meaning representations, where some levels constitute the PII less often than others. Specifically, we anticipate the following interpretation hierarchy, whereby left-hand representations are more likely PII candidates than right-hand ones:

(1) Bare linguistic meanings > Explicatures \(\text{[including Bare linguistic meanings]} \) > Implicatures \(\text{[strong]} \) > Implicatures \(\text{[weak]} \)

The scale in (1) is referred to hereafter as the Interpretation Strength Scale.

To establish the psychological reality of these distinctions, 4 experiments were designed, employing both psycholinguistic and pragmatic measures. Whereas psycholinguistic measures test on-line processes an addressee undergoes when s/he encounters a verbal stimulus, pragmatic measures seek to establish what the addressee regards as the ‘PII’, that is, the representation the addressee takes the speaker to be committed to, which is also the most relevant one in the given context.

In Experiment 1, using a Discourse Coherence test, this interpretation hierarchy is tested by rating the coherence of each context to be used later on to induce the target sentences (Experiments 2, 3 and 4). In Experiment 2, this hierarchy is examined by measuring response times to targets using a Confirmability and Confidence test. Experiments 3 and 4 examine the degree to which a speaker is viewed as committed to the PII using a Deniability test. In all, results show that when what is taken to be the PII is tested in discourses based on naturally-occurring
instances, determining the boundaries of what is taken to be the PII is more complex than has been assumed so far (see 1-5):¹

1. The interactionally-relevant concept of PII is very sensitive to discourse relevance. Interlocutors routinely include pragmatically derived inferences in their construal of the PII. In addition, not only truth-conditionally relevant inferences (the relevance-theoretic explicated inferences) may be considered PII, but also strong, and even weak, implicatures (Experiments 2-3).

2. At the same time, not all inferences are equally likely to be considered the PII. In terms of response speed, interlocutors distinguish between stronger and weaker inferences (Experiment 2). Pragmatically, that is, in terms of strength of commitment to the PII, differences are found even at the explicature level. Different aspects of the explicature pattern differentially with respect to PII status (Experiment 4).

3. Interactionally (i.e., pragmatically), explicatures are found to be derived from the most coherent contexts, in which the last utterance coheres better with the preceding context. By contrast, weak implicatures are derived from least (but still) coherent contexts (Experiment 1).

4. All levels of interpretation, i.e., bare linguistic meanings, explicatures, and implicatures (and sub-categories of these representations) are distinguishable. Furthermore, they constitute a gradable continuum of strength. Explicatures are the strongest; they are most readily confirmed as the PII (Experiment 2) and are least likely to be denied as having been intended by the speaker (Experiment 3). Weak implicatures are the weakest; they are least likely to be confirmed as the PII (Experiment 2), and easiest to deny (Experiment 3). Bare linguistic meanings

¹ All our materials are based on natural discourses taken from Maschler (2011), Internet chats or everyday personal conversations. Naturally, some modifications had to be inserted to the raw materials.
alone, which constitute a part of the explicatures, demonstrate an even stronger
degree of undeniability (Experiment 3). Strong implicatures occupy an in-
between level (Experiment 3).

5. Differences between various pragmatic contributions to the level known as
'Explicature' are also demonstrated. Findings distinguish between inferences
which are Explicated\textsubscript{min} and inferences which are Explicated\textsubscript{max}. This distinction
is based on Grice and neo-Griceans, on the one hand and Relevance Theory on
the other. Grice and neo-Griceans restricted their 'what is said\textsubscript{min}' (=Explicated\textsubscript{min}
in our terminology) to include only reference resolution, lexical disambiguation,
and later on – Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs), in addition to the
linguistic meaning. Relevance Theory allows for many more pragmatic
inferences in their explicatures, such as Explicated\textsubscript{max} in our terminology, or
enriched meanings of conjunction, and higher-level explicated meanings. Our
findings support the psychological reality of Explicated\textsubscript{max} notion, rather than that
of the Explicated\textsubscript{min} (Experiment 4).

The Interpretation Strength Scale (1 above) reflects Ariel’s (2002, 2008) and
Jaszczolt’s (2009, 2010) claim that what interlocutors consider the PII is a message
very strongly communicated, regardless of interpretation level, e.g., explicature,
implicature etc. At the same time, this scale reinforces the hierarchy predicted by
Relevance theory (and Ariel), according to which the Explicated\textsubscript{max} is the level taken
as the PII most frequently. In other words, we find evidence for the following two
strength scales, which interact with each other in establishing the strength of some
representation within some specific context:
(2) Strongly communicated message $>$ Weakly communicated message

(3) Bare Linguistic meaning $>$ Explicated$_{\text{max}}$ $>$ Implicature$_{\text{[strong]}}$ $>$ Implicature$_{\text{[weak]}}$

### 1.1 Outline of the study

Chapter 1 presents the theoretical background for the study. We define all the relevant terms as they are used in this study, and explain the purpose of the study. The definitions are given through an overview of different theoretical frameworks that have introduced these different levels of interpretation. These include two models: The Minimalists (Gricean and neo-Gricean frameworks), and the Maximalists' explicated content (e.g. Relevance theory). In addition, following Ariel (2002), we elaborate on the notion of the Privileged Interactional Interpretation. This notion is used throughout this study to test the psychological reality of various levels of interpretation within a given discourse. The level we focus on is the more contentious level: the Explicature. The chapter concludes by describing previous experiments regarding levels of interpretation.

Chapter 2 presents the questions that have arisen from existing approaches, and outlines the way this study attempts to answer them. Chapter 3 describes the experimental work, which consists of four experiments. Experiment 2 focuses on the psycholinguistic aspects of the levels of interpretation, and Experiments 1, 3 and 4 test their pragmatic status. A general discussion is found in Chapter 4.

### 1.2 Theoretical background

While disagreeing on numerous points, all approaches to meaning, whether linguistic or philosophical, are in agreement about three distinct levels of interpretation: (a) a purely linguistic meaning level; (b) an implicature level, as well
as (c) a conveyed meaning level, where all meaning types (semantic and pragmatic) are integrated into one whole. This agreement does not mean, however, that researchers would necessarily classify the same interpretations in the same way, but at least these meaning concepts are universally recognized as distinct. This is not the case for a concept of an intermediate-level meaning. While all researchers assume the need for such an intermediate level, its nature is very much in dispute. We find two major divisions into different levels of interpretation in the literature. First, there is the original distinction between the truth conditional Linguistic Meaning on the one hand, and (all) pragmatic inferences on the other hand. According to Grice this is tantamount to the distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ (1.2.1). This division was later on refined by some researchers into a trichotomy (e.g. Carston, 1993 and onwards; Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995), which is the second major division of interpretation levels currently held in linguistics (1.2.2). Introducing a rather rich intermediate level (the explicature/impliciture) required modifications to the definitions of the other levels as well.

The difference between the earlier and the later approaches concerns the nature of the basic truth-conditional (and everywhere) meaning representation, which all agree is richer than the linguistic meaning, but not as rich as the conveyed meaning. Griceans are Minimalists. They advocate a minimally enriched linguistic meaning, often referred to as ‘what is said\textsubscript{min}, which we prefer to term ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}.’ Relevance-theoreticians are Maximalists. They have promoted a representation whereby the linguistic meaning is extensively enriched by pragmatic inferences, an explicature, which we here refer to as ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}.’\textsuperscript{2} The controversy revolves around the role of contextual inferences in determining the truth-conditional content.
of the proposition. Proponents of ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’ find that they need to incorporate only a few types of contextual inferences into their ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’. Proponents of ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ argue that more contextual enrichments are needed for the utterance to express a truth-verifiable proposition, which is also discourse-relevant. Each of these divisions has different predictions with regard to the content of the PII, and by implication for what are taken as implicatures. But the debate is not limited to the content that should be considered as 'explicated'. The debate also concerns the semantics-pragmatics division of labor, and more generally – the question of what constitutes full propositional truth-evaluable content. The minimalists wish to limit the explicated to automatically-processed contents alone. Relevance theoreticians include under explicatures other interpretations, not necessarily grammatically-mandated, provided they are a development of the Logical Form, and play a role in determining the truth-value of the proposition.

To recapitulate, all researchers agree that we have a minimal linguistic level (the conventional, compositional meaning) and an all-inclusive meaning level (the conveyed meaning, including in addition all inferences). It is the nature of the intermediate level which constitutes the main controversy in the field, and it is this controversy that we focus on below.

1.2.1 The original dual division into ‘what is said’ versus implicatures

1.2.1.1 Grice’s ‘what is said’

Grice (1968, 1975, 1981, 1989) set out from an observation about the difference between the linguistic meaning of an utterance and the use made of the utterance. For example:
Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, Oh, quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and **he hasn’t been to prison yet**. (Grice, 1989: 24)

According to Grice, “It is clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant in this example is distinct from what B said, **which was simply that C has not been to prison yet.**” (Ibid, emphasis added). For Grice, this is the difference between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’. An important characteristic of semantic meanings is that they are uncancelable (Grice’s Cancelability criterion). An attempt to cancel them should result in an anomaly. In this, the semantic meaning is different from implicated interpretations, which are cancelable.

However, in another example, Grice shows that the level of ‘what is said’ is not necessarily equivalent to the conventional meaning of the words that were uttered, but may be only ‘closely related’ to it:

(4) He is in the grip of a vice. (Grice, 1989: 25)

Here, in addition to the linguistic meaning of the utterance, reference assignment (of *he*) and disambiguation (of *in the grip of a vice*) are needed in order to understand ‘what was said’. Despite the clearly pragmatic nature of these enrichments, Grice considers ‘what is said’ as very close to the bare linguistic meaning of an utterance, so much so, that the difference between the two does not render ‘what is said’ a different meaning level for him.
1.2.1.2 Gricean and Neo-Gricean Implicatures

As noted above, Grice (1975, 1989) introduced the level of ‘what is implicated’ as a different level from the level of ‘what is said’. According to Grice, a major part of human communication relies upon speaker-intended inferences, implicatures, although these are not part of the semantic content expressed by the speaker. Implicatures, in turn, were divided into Conventional Implicatures and Conversational Implicatures. Only the latter are relevant to our study. Conversational Implicatures are pragmatic inferences\(^3\) that fall under the communicative intention of the speaker within a certain context. For the most part, the implicature inferred by the addressee is an attempt to remedy an apparent violation of some maxim by the speaker. Whenever the speaker seems to violate one of the four Gricean maxims, the addressee, who assumes that the speaker obeys the maxims, as well as the Cooperative Principle, reasons that the violation must have been deliberate and that some additional interpretation must be retrieved.\(^4\)

Grice proposed a few criteria to distinguish between conversational implicatures and semantic meanings. Most notably, the former are cancelable without giving rise to contradiction.\(^5\) This is because they are not part of the intrinsic meaning of an utterance and they have no impact on the truth conditions specified by ‘what is said’.

Conversational Implicatures come in two types: Generalized Conversational Implicature (GCI) and Particularized Conversational Implicature (PCI). The GCIs are the cases in which “one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would \textbf{normally} (in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature” (Grice, 1975, 1989: 37, emphasis added), whereas

\(^3\) As opposed to entailments.
\(^4\) We assume that Grice's Cooperative Principle and four Maxims need no introduction here.
\(^5\) They can be either explicitly canceled or contextually canceled.
the PCIs are defined as “…cases in which an implicature is carried by saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context, cases in which there is no room for the idea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that p” (Grice, 1975, 1989: 37, emphasis added).

GCIs may be derived from a certain combination of words with or without supporting context (although they may be cancelled in certain “abnormal” contexts). Inferring the PCI, on the other hand, crucially depends upon the context in which the specific combination of words occurs. In other words, without this context, the PCI cannot be inferred from the same combination of words.6 Here is an example of a GCI found in Grice (1989: 37):

(5) X is meeting a woman this evening.

Grice argues that even in the absence of contextual support, anyone who uses a sentence of the form in (5) would normally implicate that the woman to be met is other than X’s wife/cousin, etc. An example of Grice’s PCIs (among many others) is given in Grice (1989: 32):

(6) A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B; the following exchange takes place:

A: I am out of petrol.

B: There is a garage round the corner.

6 Note, however, that some have disputed Grice’s division of conversational implicatures into PCIs versus GCIs, arguing that all the implicatures are context-dependent, although to varying degrees. See, for example, Carston (2002), Hirschberg (1991), Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995).
The implicature is that the garage round the corner is open and sells petrol. Here, claims Grice, it is the obvious connection between A’s utterance and B’s utterance, which yields the ‘what is implicated’.7

Although our study tests understanding levels of interpretation only when non-figurative language is involved, some place should be given to cases where figurative uses of language are employed. Grice (1989) analyzed figurative language as mediated by implicature, as the outcome of the flouting of a maxim (or maxims). He attributes the understanding of irony, metaphors and hyperboles to flouting the first maxim of quality ("do not say what you believe to be false" p. 27).

The innovations of the Neo-Griceans can be seen as amounting to two major contributions: reducing the number of maxims and sub-maxims into two or three (Atlas and Levinson 1981; Horn 1972, 1992; Levinson 1998, 2000), which is not relevant to our study, and will therefore not be discussed here, and broadening the definition of the term GCI, especially by Levinson (2000), which is relevant to the current study.

This broadening has created a level which is said to be automatically and unconsciously understood, and yet, still counts as implicated. Here we will address this level as 'Explicated_{min}'.

1.2.1.3 Neo-Griceans’ Explicated_{min}^{8}

The Neo-Griceans (Horn, 1972, 1984, 2004; Levinson, 1998, 2000; Saul, 2002b) adopted Grice’s basic division into ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’, but they did refine these levels, mainly by subjecting more content to a minimal concept

7 It should be noted that most of Grice’s instances of PCIs result from flouting one or more of his Maxims. However, as this study does not concern each of the Maxims as a unique concept, we chose to exemplify Grice’s PCIs by an example in which, apparently, no maxim is violated.

8 Note that we are here using our terminology rather than that of neo-Griceans.
of ‘what is said’, here named - ‘Explicated$_{min}$’. They follow Grice, arguing that the grammatical level of a meaning representation is much narrower than the level of inferred content, which is then augmented by implicatures in order to arrive at what is conveyed. Minimalists try to characterize the components which constitute ‘Explicated$_{min}$’ on the assumption that minimal inferencing suffices to define a useful ‘Explicated$_{min}$’ representation.

The only inferred aspects allowed by Grice (1989) are assigned references and disambiguation, which, according to Grice, are needed in order to get to "a full identification of what the speaker had said" (Grice, 1989: 25). This adds a rationale for these enrichments: they are said to be mandated by the grammar. In other words, they are necessary for conveying a truth-evaluable proposition on the one hand, and they are grammatically obligatory on the other hand. At the same time, some Minimalists agree with Maximalists that it is rarely the case that the bare semantic content of a sentence equals the proposition uttered (see, for example, Cappelen and Lepore, 2005; Horn, 2006).

Following Recanati (1989, 1993), Neo-Griceans assume that addressees are not actually consciously aware of the level of ‘Explicated$_{min}$’ (Bach, 1994; Berg, 2002). The function of this level is to account for the interlocutors’ basic linguistic competence (so it need not then be truth-evaluable even). Borg (2005), for example, argues against the necessity of reaching a fully truth-evaluated propositional content at that level.

Following Grice (1989), Levinson (2000) argues that GCIs should be taken as presumptive (or default) interpretations:
(7) A: "What time is it?"
B: "Some of the guests are already leaving."

(8) A: "Where’s John?"
B: "Some of the guests are already leaving." (Levinson, 2000: 16-17)

According to Levinson (2000), the GCIs in both contexts are the same: ‘Not all the guests are already leaving’ (Levinson's shared-inference concept), but the PCIs in these two contexts are quite different: ‘It must be late’, and ‘Perhaps John has already left’, respectively (Ibid). It is the formula ‘some x are G’ that has the default interpretation of ‘not all x are G’, regardless of context, unlike PCIs, which are, as shown above, highly context-dependent.9

Note that these GCIs or presumptive meanings are almost automatically derived, and hence, suggests Levinson (2000), they are actually located between the coded grammatical end of meaning and the inferred implicature end of meaning. For Levinson, GCIs are thereby a part of ‘what is said’, yet, they are cancelable.10 According to Levinson, the process of understanding begins when the semantic representation derived from the syntactic structure and lexical items is derived. This representation may turn out to be underspecified. In such a case the need for pragmatic intervention arises ("Gricean pragmatics I"). This stage in the process of interpretation includes the contribution of GCIs as well as reference resolutions and disambiguation. The output received from this stage is the input of a second pragmatic intervention ("Gricean pragmatics II"), which ultimately leads to inferring the PCIs.

Characterizing a set of generalized pragmatic restrictions which constitute a systematic tendency to interpret an expression in one univocal way regardless of

9 But see Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006) for a different view.
10 Regarding cancelability of GCIs, see Levinson (2000) and Bach (2006b).
context, Levinson (2000) offers a detailed new typology of GCIs. This typology is based on what he calls different ‘classes of utterances’ or ‘utterance-types’ (p. 25). These, in turn, are categorized by three heuristics he offers.\footnote{Levinson's Heuristics, just like Grice's Maxims, will not be discussed here, as they are well known and not directly relevant to this study. However, whenever a Levinson's Heuristics is relevant, it will be briefly addressed. See the study of Larson et al. (2009), section 1.3.5 below.}

Borg (2009) points to a problem that Levinson's (2000) theory encounters. She argues that Levinson ultimately presents two separate divisions. The first consists of linguistic meanings and GCIs, both processed automatically, versus PCIs, which are interpreted based on the context. The second comprises linguistic meanings on the one hand, and GCIs and PCIs, which include implicated materials, on the other hand. These two different divisions, claims Borg, blur the overall differences between all three categories, as the category of GCIs behaves differently in each division. She proposes another minimalist model for implicatures. According to her model, the output of processing linguistic semantic meanings serves as the input for two separate cognitive systems. The system responsible for recovering GCIs is a relatively limited system, which operates on the basis of statistical calculations of the speakers’ accumulated linguistic experiences. PCIs, on the other hand, are inferred by a more general (or holistic) system, which enables access to the context the speaker is encountered with.

A unique version of Minimalism is presented by Bach (1994 and onwards). Bach (1994) adopts Grice’s minimalist approach to ‘what is said’, but while adopting the Gricean dichotomous distribution, he adds his own intermediate level: the conversational impliciture. Bach (1994, 2006a,b) claims that it is this middle level that completes the linguistic meaning into a full proposition.\footnote{And see Arseneault's (2008) Austere Account, which, following Bach, argues that ‘what is said’ does not have to be based on a complete proposition.} Bach distinguishes between two processes that lead from the indeterminate linguistically-specified...
content to implicitures: completion and expansion. Completion is a grammatical process whereby a grammatically incomplete utterance is enriched to form a full proposition. Expansions complete a grammatically complete sentence by reference to world knowledge in order to make it relevant. In (3a), for example, an act of completion turned the proposition full and determinate, whereas in (3b) it is an act of expansion which does the job:

(9) a. The lamp is cheap. [relative to other lamps] (Bach, 1994: 128)
    b. I have eaten breakfast. [today] (Ibid. 134)

In (9a), since ‘cheap’ is a relative term, it is said to grammatically require an enrichment such as is specified in square brackets. In (9b) the sentence is grammatical, yet not conceptually complete, hence the enrichment. Bach’s impliciture is an enriched version of Grice’s ‘what is said’, and similar in many aspects to the Relevance-theoretic explicature (see 1.2.2.1 below).

In sum, for this study Explicated_{\text{min}} is understood to include only inferences which involve reference assignment, disambiguation (Grice, 1981), or GCIs (Bach, 1994; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000), whereas Explicated_{\text{max}} consists of all explicated contributions. Most of our experiments (1-3) treat the explicature as a monolithic category. In other words, we do not differentiate between Explicated_{\text{min}} and Explicated_{\text{max}}. Experiment 4 is the only experiment where these three categories are compared to one another.

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13 Bach's expansion-type impliciture is very similar to Recanati's (2004) enrichment (see 1.2.2.1 below).
14 It should be noted, however, that there are differences between the two. Carston's (2002) higher-level explicatures, for example, are not considered implicitures by Bach. According to Bach, they do not convey the speaker's intentions. In general, Bach claims, the locutionary content does not include the illocutionary act as a part of its meaning (Austin, 1962). This type of explication will not be discussed here.
15 Most of our experiments (1-3) treat the explicature as a monolithic category. In other words, we do not differentiate between Explicated_{\text{min}} and Explicated_{\text{max}}. Experiment 4 is the only experiment where these three categories are compared to one another.
1.2.2 A trichotomous division into linguistic meaning, explicature, implicature

Sperber and Wilson's Relevance theory (1986/1995) proposes an alternative view. They argue that comprehension of each level of interpretation must rely on inferred pragmatic contributions, as words cannot directly encode thoughts. When it is done in natural discourse, pragmatic processing is then involved in recovering not only what is implicated, but also what is said. Ascribing greater importance to pragmatic contributions in determining what is said, Sperber and Wilson extended Grice’s dichotomous division into a trichotomy. Since the notion of 'Relevance' plays a major role in this theory as well as in our study, we will address this concept first.

Whenever the term 'Relevance' is mentioned in this thesis, it refers to Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) definition. Sperber and Wilson have presented a framework, within which the degree of relevance the inferred content bears to the addressee plays a major role in understanding 'what is meant'. They argue that in order to understand any aspect of 'what is meant', the addressee must retrieve a set of assumptions from her/his cognitive environment. The inferred content will be based on these assumptions, which, combined with the content of the new utterance, will yield some contextual implications. Which assumptions are chosen? Those that ensure that the presumption of ‘optimal relevance’ implicitly communicated by all utterances (ostensive stimuli) is satisfied.

The relevance of any input to cognitive processing, whether communicated or not, depends on two factors: the processing effort the receiver has to undertake in retrieving the suitable set of assumptions in order to derive the contextual effects, and the amount of contextual effects gained. A greater number of contextual effects means a higher degree of Relevance, while a greater degree of effort lowers relevance.
Hence, according to Relevance Theory, the degree of relevance of a stimulus depends on the following two conditions:

*Extent condition 1*: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its contextual effects in this context are large.

*Extent condition 2*: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the effort required to process it in this context is small. (p. 125)

The addressee of an utterance follows a path of least effort in accessing interpretations and stops when he arrives at the ‘optimally relevant’ interpretation, that is, the first one accessed which satisfies his occasion-specific expectations of relevance (in particular, which has sufficient contextual implications, or contextual effects more generally).

This thesis is especially interested in the importance of the contextual effects and the influence they have on the relative degree of the Relevance of an inference within a specific context. As noted above, in using the term 'relevance' throughout this thesis, we adopt Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) definition. Thus, when we later refer to degrees of deniability, for instance, a less relevant inference, i.e., an inference carrying relatively minor effects (in quantity or in quality), is predicted to be more easily deniable.

We have already mentioned Bach’s (1994 and onwards) proposal for an intermediate representation, his impliciture. Whereas for Bach this is proposed in addition to Grice’s ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’, Sperber and Wilson do away with ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’. They have introduced an intermediate level, which is supposed to consist of both
grammatical and (only some) inferred materials. This representation is richer than ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’, and is hence called ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’.\(^\text{16}\)

1.2.2.1 \textit{Explicature}

Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) introduced a new level of interpretation - the explicature. Like the original ‘what is said’, the explicature is an intermediate level of interpretation, which includes linguistic meanings alongside certain pragmatically inferred interpretations.\(^\text{17}\) The rationale behind the concept of the explicature is the need to turn the linguistic meaning, often too poor to express a complete proposition, into a truth-evaluable proposition. The explicature is said to be explicit (to different degrees) despite the fact that it contains inferred elements. Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) definition of explicitness is as follows:

\begin{quote}
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a development of the logical form encoded by U.” (p. 182)
\end{quote}

Hence, “an Explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually inferred conceptual features. (Ibid)

Sperber and Wilson insist that the linguistic meaning is very strictly the ‘logical form’, which is often far from a complete truth-evaluable proposition.\(^\text{18}\) Hence, the linguistic meaning actually underdetermines what is said.

Unlike Grice, for them the gap between the linguistic meaning and the truth-evaluable proposition (‘what is said’ for him, the Explicature for them) is taken to be

\(^{16}\)It should be noted that this study treats the dichotomic and trichotomic divisions as rivalry models, yet some, e.g. Saul (2002a), claim they are not necessarily in competition.\(^{17}\) See also Carston (2004b) and Wharton (2003).\(^{18}\) See Stanley (2000) for a different view with regard to the logical form.
quite substantial. Pragmatics has a far more important role in determining the speaker’s intended proposition (see especially Wilson and Sperber, 2002). At the same time, not all pragmatic inferences are considered explicated. Only inferences which have an effect on the truth conditions of the proposition form part of the explicature. Truth conditions are therefore defined, according to Relevance theory, at the pragmatic level, which is why Recanati (2010) refers to Truth-Conditional Pragmatics, rather than semantics (in short, TCP). It follows that Sperber and Wilson assume that inferences contribute more to creating what constitutes a full propositional content than does Grice. In other words, compared to ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’, ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ includes much more inferred content, and is based on a much more considerable influence of context and speakers’ intentions. In addition to bare semantic meanings, this level includes specific types of pragmatic inferences which, alongside the semantic meanings, are supposed to create the full, truth-evaluable proposition intended by the speaker. Thus, the distinction between explicatures and implicatures is not equated with the semantic/pragmatic distinction (Carston, 2001; Hall and Carston, 2012). Moreover, the pragmatic inferences included are not necessarily grammatically triggered.\(^\text{19}\) For example, the utterance in (10) may give rise to several explicatures:

\[(10)\] Mary has said to Peter, ‘It will get cold’.

a. The dinner will get cold very soon.

b. Mary has said that the dinner will get cold.

c. Mary believes that the dinner will get cold very soon.

\(^{19}\) But note that some of the inferences which are not considered grammatical by Relevance theoreticians are grammatical for Recanati (2004). And see Carston (2002) for a different view.
Whereas its implicature (or rather, one of the possible implicatures) is:

(11) Mary wants Peter to come and eat dinner at once. (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 178-181)

As can be seen in (10) and (11) above, the logical relation between explicatures and implicatures is asymmetric: only the first can entail the latter. This analysis is different from the Gricean one, where Mary's exact utterance, i.e. 'The dinner will get cold' is taken to be ‘what is said’, and (10a-c) - implicatures (11 is an implicature for Griceans too, of course).

Like Relevance theoreticians, Recanati too ascribes greater importance to the context, arguing that "Semantically underdetermined expressions are such that the content they contextually express depends upon the speaker's meaning, thus blurring the semantics/pragmatics distinction." (2004: 159). Hence, Recanati (1989, 2001, 2004) too, broadens the level of the original ‘what is said’, arguing that this level includes inferences which, he adds, are intuitively inseparable from the linguistic meaning, according to his Availability Principle:

In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter. (1989: 310)

20 But see Fretheim (2009) for a different view.
These pre-theoretical intuitions should determine which of the many pragmatic inferences are inseparable from the linguistic meaning. Let’s consider, for example, the proposition in (12) (and cf. with Bach’s (1994) process of expansion):

(12) I’ve had breakfast [this morning] (2004: 124)

Recanati claims that the enrichment of the given sentence in (12) by adding ‘this morning’, for example, must be intuitively accessible to interlocutors since this additional component must be retrieved for the addressee to understand the sentence within discourse. He argues that the non-enriched version of (12), ‘I’ve eaten breakfast at some point in my life’ is not even consciously available to speakers.

Recanati (2004) further claims that every asserted proposition is affected by pragmatic processes, and thus ‘what is said’ can never be a purely semantic notion. This view follows Wittgenstein (1953/2001), who argued that a word has a meaning only when it occurs within context. Recanati sketches a Situation theory in which a sentence can be semantically evaluated or the proposition can be evaluated "with respect to the situation figuring in the content" (p. 123).

Regarding the Relevance-theoretic Explicature, Recanati (2004) divides the inferences included in this category, which he calls 'primary processes' into two categories: saturation and enrichment. Saturation is a mandatory contextual process,

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21 Despite this similarity between Recanati’s explanation for (12) and the one made by Bach, Bach rejects Recanati’s contextualism. See especially Bach (2007).
22 It should be noted that the Availability Principle is sometimes adopted even by those who reject Recanati’s contextualism as a whole, e.g. Arseneault (2008).
23 This study does not address the difference between Recanati’s contextualism and Relevance theory’s pragmaticism, as presented in Carston (2009).
24 In fact Recanati includes additional primary processes such as disambiguation alongside saturation, and loosening and semantic transfer alongside free enrichments.
which is necessary in order to create a sentence conveying a truth-value bearing content, in the sense that Frege was referring to (Frege, 1956: 296).

Saturation is always based on correspondence to a constituent in the preceding context or in the sentence itself. It fills the gaps in the representation of a sentence in the process of finding a purely semantic interpretation. Examples of pragmatic additions that result from saturation are completions of fragmentary answers, or as Carston (2002) calls them 'subsentential utterances' (p. 152), and reference assignments. Enrichment, on the other hand, is a process in which an utterance is already a complete proposition, yet it seems to semantically mean something which is counterintuitive. Enrichments are optional, only pragmatically required, and not linguistically mandated. Recanati holds that "...for such processes to take place, there is no need to antecedently compute the proposition literally expressed" (Recanati, 2004: 27).

Examples of pragmatic additions that result from enrichment are pragmatic additions to the meaning of conjunctions and default enrichments. Both saturation and enrichment are what Recanati calls 'primary pragmatic processes', which precede inferring the Implicature (the secondary processes) in the process of understanding an utterance. Unlike the nature of the primary pragmatic processes, which correspond to the processes leading to inferring an explicature, here Recanati and Relevance theory tend to disagree. While Recanati opts for a process built on stages, where the output of a certain stage is the input of the next one, Relevance theoreticians do not rule out a parallel processing of information, where explicatures and implicatures can be derived at the same time.

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25 Recanati’s observations and definitions of saturation and enrichment will guide us in interpreting some of our findings pertaining to the materials constituting the explicatures. See Chapter 3, section 3.4 below.
Carston (2002) agrees that Relevance theory and Recanati have much in common with regard to the propositions explicated or implicated by an utterance, and that they only use different terminology. However, she doubts that the Availability Principle is the right way to explain the understanding process, as it relies too much on intuitions.

To clarify the hybrid nature of explicatures, which consist of linguistically specified as well as inferred materials, Ariel (2008 and onwards) differentiates between explicated inferences, which are the inferred part of the explicature, and the explicature itself, which refers to the entire content of an utterance (semantic and explicated inferences alike). We can then compare between the competing implicatures and explicated inferences, and between implicatures, explicatures and bare linguistic meanings.26

As mentioned above, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), as well as Carston (2002), have also argued that different explicatures are explicit to different degrees. Those explicatures that require more pragmatic work are less explicit than those that require only minimal inferencing. For example:

(13) a. Mary Jones put the book by Chomsky on the table in the down stairs sitting-room.
   b. Mary put the book on the table.
   c. She put it there.
   d. On the table. (Carston, 2002: 117)

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26 The gap between the linguistic meaning and the explicature was later widened by Relevance Theoreticians. For example, according to Carston (2002), pragmatics has the power to obliterate semantic specificity ('broadening' or 'loosening') or add to it, thus rendering the meaning more specific ('narrowing'). Carston argues that both broadening (or loosening) and narrowing are possible outcomes of the same process responsible for deriving the explicature. It should also be noted that what is considered as implicature has changed under Relevance theory. For example, metaphoric interpretations are now taken to be part of the explicature.
Any utterance of the above may explicitly convey the same content in context, but while 13(a) will need very little inferential work to achieve a close-to-full explicitness, (13b-d) will need quite a bit more. So, while the explicature derived from (13a-d) may be the same, when derived from (13a) it is much more explicit than when derived from (13d). Since they (also) consist of inferred materials, explicatures may be considered to be cancelable (Ariel, 2008; Carston, 1988, 2002), but since they consist of grammatical constituents as well, and very crucial to determining the truth conditions of the proposition expressed, they have been taken by some as uncancellable (Burton-Roberts, 2006, 2010; Capone, 2009). 27

It should be noted, however, that the disagreement between (neo-) Griceans and Relevance theoreticians does not revolve around terminology or the categorization of some pragmatic enrichments alone. This only attests to the deeper debate, which addresses the semantic-pragmatic division of labor. Levinson, (1983 and mainly 2000) attempts to bridge over the Gricean gap between the encoded linguistic meanings and the truth-conditional content of utterances, by introducing his 'presumptive meanings'. These inferences are considered implicatures, as they are the result of various pragmatic processes: disambiguation, indexical and reference resolution, enrichment and completion of fragmentary (subsentential) utterances. However, like the "said", they also affect the truth-conditional content of an utterance. Hence, claims Carston (2002), these inferences "…contribute to the recovery of the proposition expressed by the utterance." (p. 98), just like Relevance Theory maintains. Relevance Theory therefore advocates a division between linguistic semantics, and truth-conditional semantics. Linguistic semantics provides the encoded input, which is

27 This study will attempt to show that pragmatic ‘Cancelability’ differs from semantic Cancelability, and is more complex.
changed by pragmatic processes. The outcome is the propositions that truth-conditional semantics deals with. Truth-conditional semantics, unlike linguistic semantics, is not context-invariant, and hence, it refers to the communicated meaning of a sentence, including all inferences (Carston 2002, 2008).\footnote{See Austin (1962) for a similar (philosophical) view.}

The two models also differ on the variety of pragmatic enrichments which are included in neo-Griceans' GCIs and in Relevance Theory's Explicatures. The latter may include additional types of pragmatic contributions, such as enrichments of conjunction indirect speech (higher level explicatures).

1.2.2.2 Post-Griceans' Implicature

Unlike explicated inferences, which have an impact on truth-conditional content, implicatures only contribute to the overall conveyed meaning of the utterance. That much is universally accepted. Relevance theoreticians, however, treat implicatures differently from Neo-Griceans. First, they do not find the PCI versus GCI distinction useful. For them, GCIs are either explicated inferences (as in the case of scalar implicatures) or else, they are PCIs, which happen to be generated rather often. Second, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) draw a distinction not drawn by Griceans, between two types of conversational implicatures: implicated assumptions and implicated conclusions. Since both are pragmatically-derived, they are equally treated as implicatures by Griceans. But they play quite different roles in discourse. Implicated assumptions are pragmatically-derived assumptions needed for deriving implicated conclusions, which is the only reason for their derivation. They do not carry a take-home message in themselves. The implicated conclusion, on the other
hand, carries contextual implications of the utterance. These are taken to be a part and parcel of the speaker’s intended message.

This study follows Ariel (2008) in assuming that what Sperber and Wilson call ‘implicated assumption’ is often closer to Searle’s (1979, 1983) concept of Background. Searle (1983) has argued that a definite set of truth-conditions for a sentence can be determined only against a set of “preintentional assumptions that are not part of the literal meaning of the sentence.” (p. 145). That is, these assumptions are not intended by the speaker. He calls this set of assumptions “Background”. Since the interpretation of sentences is context-dependent, it relies on the Background, such that, if we change the Background, the truth conditions of the same sentence will be altered as well. For example, the verb “open” has different meanings in “opened the door” and in “opened the wound”. This difference, argues Searle (1983), is the outcome of different Backgrounds of capacities and social norms, which are preintentionally assumed when understanding these two phrases. The similarity between Searle's Background, and Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) 'implicated assumptions' lies in the fact that these assumptions are absolutely necessary for a successful act of communication on the one hand, but on the other hand, the assumptions are not part of the informative intention of the speaker. However, whereas Searle maintains that it is possible to encode a proposition which remains constant across all contexts, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) and especially Carston (2002), claim that as any verbal context is always interpreted against a set of Background assumptions, it is not likely that linguistic stimuli are enough to encode a full proposition.

This claim is supported by two features of this type of inference: it cannot be easily denied, and it is not a part of the speaker’s intended message. This type of
inference cannot be considered a linguistic presupposition either, since it is not linguistically marked. When addressing implicatures, this study refers only to Sperber and Wilson’s ‘implicated conclusions’.

In addition to introducing these two new sub-types of implicatures, Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) recognize degrees of strength of implicatures: "Some implicatures are made so strongly manifest that the hearer can scarcely avoid recovering them. Others are made less strongly manifest." (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995: 197). Let’s take an example:

(14) Peter: Would you drive a Mercedes?

Mary: I wouldn’t drive ANY expensive car. (p.194)

In trying to make Mary’s utterance relevant, Peter may retrieve from his accessible world knowledge the assumption ‘Mercedes is an expensive car’, which will yield the very strong contextual Implicature: Mary wouldn’t drive a Mercedes. However, Peter may retrieve other assumptions, which will summon other implicatures. If he retrieves, for example “People who refuse to drive expensive cars disapprove of displays of wealth” (p. 197), it is reasonable that the inferred implicature will be ‘Mary disapproves of displays of wealth’ (Ibid.). This is not as strong an implicature as the one mentioned above. According to Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), the relative degree of strength of implicatures may vary according to the degree of "the mutual manifestness of the informative intention" (p.199). Thus, the implicature 'Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes', as a fully determinate conclusion, which follows the Principle of Relevance, must be supplied by the addressee. On the other hand, the addressee is only encouraged at best to supply the implicature 'Mary
disapproves of displays of wealth' which is therefore weaker than 'Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes'. In other words, the inference 'Mary disapproves of displays of wealth' is compatible with the speaker's answer, yet it is not mandatory for rendering her answer relevant to the discourse as 'Mary wouldn't drive a Mercedes' is.

Sperber and Wilson (2008) address different degrees of strength of both contextual implications and conversational implicatures. Contextual implications are the inferences which are derived from an utterance in a certain context in order to view it as relevant. Their relative degree of strength is determined by the degree of probability that these implications are true. This distinction is not relevant to our study, since we did not test such differences. Distinctions between stronger versus weaker conversational implicatures, however are relevant to our study. As Sperber and Wilson stress, the relative strength of the speaker's manifest intentions determines the relative degree of strength of the implicatures. The weak versus strong implicature was indeed tested and found to be significant.

Sperber and Wilson connect these degrees of inference strength to speakers’ intentions and to the hearers’ ability to retrieve the appropriate assumptions. These assumptions will induce inferring the intended message: "The weaker the implicatures, the less confidence the hearer can have that the particular premises or conclusions he supplies will reflect the speaker’s thoughts..." (p. 200).29

Like Griceans, Relevance theoreticians, also address the issue of usage of non-literal, or figurative, language. Unlike Griceans, they argue that metaphors are comprehended by the same inferential procedures which apply to literal uses of language, and dispute their distinctiveness. Hence they call it 'a deflationary account' (Sperber and Wilson, 2008). In other words, the search for optimal Relevance is

29 Jaszczolt (2009, 2010) has transformed these differences into gradability of strength of inferences. See f. 34.
employed in the process of understanding figurative language as much as it is employed in the process of understanding non-figurative language. Both are guided by the pragmatic mechanism resulting in the creation of an ad-hoc concept, which fits the specific circumstances. However, the encyclopedic knowledge retrieved in order to understand literal language differs from the one retrieved to understand figurative language.

It should also be noted that some Relevance theoreticians point at differences between metaphors and other loose uses of language, e.g. hyperboles, and even between types of metaphors, with regard to their processing (e.g. Carston and Wearing, 2011). Nevertheless, these studies adhere to RT's deflationary account of metaphor, as introduced by Sperber and Wilson (2008).

1.2.3 The Privileged Interactional Interpretation (PII)

So far we presented two adversarial theories concerning a theoretical division into levels of interpretation. However, there are other, more recent approaches, which, although adopting the basic Maximalists' theoretical division, focus on another level, an interactionally-defined level, the level constituting the intended interpretation. This intended interpretation is called the Privileged Interactional Interpretation, by Ariel (2002, 2008, 2010) and the Primary Meaning by Jaszczolt (1999, 2005, 2009, 2010). It can sometimes be more than its so-called upper boundary, ‘Explicated\(^{\text{max}}\)’, while on other occasions it can contain even less than ‘Explicated\(^{\text{min}}\)’.

So, discursively, what is defined as a Privileged Interactional Interpretation or a Primary Meaning is heavily context-dependent. In most cases it is equivalent to ‘Explicated\(^{\text{max}}\)’. Yet, these approaches do not rule out instances in which the Privileged Interpretation is equivalent to ‘Explicated\(^{\text{min}}\)’, or even to less than that.
(especially Ariel, 2008: 304). Similarly, there are instances in which it is the implicature that constitutes the Privileged Interpretation, or as (Jaszczolt, 2009) puts it: “it is a fact of conversation that strongly intended implicit meanings often surface as primary meanings.” (2009: 17). This is the outcome of an interactional definition of what is commonly considered the conveyed content, which, we believe, is pragmatically a truth-evaluable content. This definition is based on the way interlocutors understand the PII in discourse, and therefore relies on a discursive criterion.

Let’s consider two of Ariel’s examples. In (15), the bare linguistic meaning of ‘midnight’, rather than its explicated interpretation, is taken as the Privileged Interactional Interpretation for one of the interlocutors (the operator). In (16), it is the strong implicature which constitutes the Privileged Interactional Interpretation that determines the truth conditions of the proposition expressed:

(15) M.A. (San Francisco): I’d like to leave a message for X.
    Hotel Operator (New York): I’ll connect you to their room.
    M.A.: No, no. I don’t want to wake them up. It’s midnight in New York!
    Operator: No, it’s not.
    M.A.: What time is it there?

In (15) the Explicature, the enriched meaning relevant in the discourse, i.e. ‘around midnight’, ‘too late to call people up’, is rejected in favor of the bare, here rather implausible, linguistic meaning, of ‘exactly midnight’. ³⁰ Next:

³⁰ See Ariel (2008) for wise-guy interpretations.
(16) Boss (in a job interview): You have small children. How will you manage the long hours of the job?


H.D.’s explicature (here, close to the linguistic meaning) is true, as she indeed has a mother. However, in fact, her mother never helps her with the children. Thus, the strong implicature that H.D.’s mother will help her take care of the children if she needs to work late is false. According to Griceans and even post-Griceans (see, for example, Carston, 2004a), implicatures are not expected to influence the truth conditions of the propositions expressed, but when reporting about this conversation, H.D. herself introduced it as a case in which she lied. That is, she seems to have considered her strong implicature as the PII, and felt committed to its content. Indeed, proponents of both ‘Explicated_{min}’ and ‘Explicated_{max}’ would argue that the truth-conditional content of the utterance is: H.D. HAS A MOTHER. However, as demonstrated by H.D.’s own interpretation of what she said, i.e. that she had lied, this content does not meet the conditions needed to make this sentence true, or at least not so for the speaker herself. Rather, it is the implicature that is judged as true/false here.\(^{31}\) Being highly relevant to the discourse is what makes the implicature in (16) the Privileged Interactional Interpretation, which then determines the truth conditions of the utterance. These Privileged Interactional Interpretations depend on the speaker’s intentions and do not necessarily follow any given formula of explicated or

\(^{31}\) We believe that our interpretation is the correct one here, although we are aware of the possible difference between ‘lying’ and ‘misleading’, as well as of interlocutors’ tendency to sometimes use words loosely in ordinary speech. This reservation should be taken into account in other cases, where the implicature is not so interactionally strong. In such cases, we believe, the speaker would not use the verb ‘lie’.
implicated materials. In fact, they are orthogonal to the scale made of the different levels of interpretation.

Jaszczolt’s (2005, 2009, 2010) Default Semantics model is also a new Contextualist model. Her Privileged Interpretation is called ‘the Primary Meaning’, which is

…the main message intended by the Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee and it becomes the primary object of semantic analysis independently of its relation to the syntactic form of the uttered sentence. (2010: 197).

In other words, Jaszczolt’s (2005, 2009, 2010) Default Semantics allows for each of the levels to count as the ‘Primary Meaning’, provided it is a highly relevant interpretation in the specific discourse. That is, her ‘Primary Meaning’ is the most salient interactional interpretation of an utterance. This representation is independent of syntactic constraints and therefore does not necessarily constitute a development of the logical form of the sentence, as in the Maximalist models. Her Primary Meanings are modeled as units which yield a truth-conditional analysis. For example:

(17) Child: Can I go punting?
    Mother: You are too small.
    a. The child is too small to go punting.
    b. The child can’t go punting. (2009: 18)

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32 It should be noted that unlike Jaszczolt, Ariel does not have a ‘Model Speaker’ in mind, thus, differences between speakers are possible.
Maximalists would say that (17a) is the relevant explicature, whereas (17b) is its implicature. Unlike Maximalists, however, Jaszczolt (2009) argues that the primary meaning here is the one in (17b), because it is the one which corresponds to the strongest communicative intention. Hence, Jaszczolt, as opposed to other contextualists, rejects the necessity of ‘the logical form’ as a necessary building block of ‘Explicated_{max}’. Moreover, Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics need not adhere to the criteria differentiating the ‘explicit’ from the ‘implicit’, as her Primary Meanings, just like Ariel’s (2002 and onwards) Privileged Interactional Interpretations, are orthogonal to the explicit/implicit distinction.

To summarize, both Ariel and Jaszczolt argue that when examining discourse, Privileged Interactional Interpretations (Ariel) or Primary Meanings (Jaszczolt) are the relevant ‘Explicated_{max}’, although they do not necessarily correspond to the defined explicature. Rather, they are orthogonal to the division of levels of interpretation according to their degrees of explicitness/implicitness. Both consider speakers’ intentions crucial in understanding the discourse-relevant level of interpretation.\(^{33}\) Thus, they both assign an important role to the speaker’s intentions in determining the degree of strength of an interpretation.\(^{34}\)

On the face of it, these approaches seem to enable almost anything. There is a danger then, that any possible finding can be seen to support the theory. But this is not the case. We should bear in mind that these two approaches opt for orthogonal relations between the PII and the theoretical levels introduced by both Minimalists and Maximalists. Thus, the chances that weak implicatures serve as the Privileged Interpretation are much smaller than those of the explicatures or strong implicatures

\(^{33}\) We should emphasize that having these additional discursive representations of meaning are not at all incompatible with the Maximalist approach, and especially Relevance Theory, as will be extensively explained in Chapter 2.

\(^{34}\) Jaszczolt (2009), for example, explicitly advocates gradable intentionality, and Ariel (2008) suggests different degrees to which the speaker is committed to some interpretation.
(Ariel, 2008; Jaszczolt, 2009, 2010). Both Ariel and Jaszczolt seem to agree that the relative strength of an interpretation within the specific discourse determines the likelihood that the interpretation will be taken as the Privileged Interpretation. They add that this strength depends on relevance in the sense defined by Relevance theory (see 1.2.2 above), as well as Speaker’s commitment.

Disregarding the differences between different Maximalist views, it can be said that all those who opt for ‘Explicated_{max}’ agree on a much larger semantic-pragmatic interface than the one suggested by Minimalists. This interface is present at that level of interpretation, creating a combined meaning representation which includes more inferences than ‘Explicated_{min}’.

So, whatever their names are, five theoretical levels of utterance meaning must be considered: Bare linguistic meaning, ‘Explicated_{min}’, ‘Explicated_{max}’, strong implicatures, and weak implicatures. What is the difference between the first two? Minimalists include in their ‘Explicated_{min}’ linguistic meanings alongside a few selected truth-conditions-effecting additions. These additions are the products of reference assigning, ambiguity resolution (Grice), or special pragmatic structural restrictions (Levinson). According to Maximalists, the addressee may have to undertake major pragmatic processes in order to understand what the proposition intended by the speaker expresses. ‘Explicated_{max}’, therefore, consists of the linguistic meaning augmented by explicated inferences which are not necessarily grammatically mandated. This study attempts to examine how each of these theoretical levels intersects with an interactionally-based scale of PII, in which highly communicated content is stronger than less relevant content.

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35 Each of the three last levels, i.e. linguistic meaning, ‘Explicated_{min}’, and ‘Explicated_{max}’ can constitute the Explicature.
1.3 Different levels of interpretation – Empirical research

As noted above, this study aims to examine the psychological reality behind various meaning representations by testing their ability to constitute the PII. We should point out that the PII was not tested experimentally as such, yet experiments where the contents of ‘what is said’ was examined, may shed light on the nature of the PII as well. For that purpose we will look for both discursive and cognitive, or psycholinguistic correlates of specific levels of interpretation – linguistic meaning and two types of inferences: explicated and implicated ones. As the conclusions proposed in this study rely on empirically-tested materials, this section provides a short review of some of the most prominent experiments reported in the literature which pertain to meaning representations, and are relevant to our study. This section, just like the former, is organized around levels of interpretation. By describing these experiments, this section tries to answer two questions:

1. Which of the levels described above has received experimental support?
2. What level of interpretation do speakers consider as the PII in discourse?

As most experiments compare between two or more levels of interpretation, that is also the way they are described here. We will first present the experiments which established the basic dichotomy between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ (=implicatures), and then we will deal with each level separately. We should also emphasize that this study disputes some of the meaning categorizations made in the experiments presented here. For example, inferences defined as implicatures in the experiments described below may be considered explicated inferences by this study. These differences are described in detail at the end of this chapter.
1.3.1 ‘\text{Explicated}_{\text{min-max}}’ vs. implicatures

A set of experiments which demonstrated participants’ ability to differentiate between ‘\text{Explicated}_{\text{min-max}}’ and implicatures is presented in Hamblin and Gibbs (2003). Hamblin and Gibbs compared ‘\text{Explicated}_{\text{max}}’, which they refer to as ‘what is pragmatically said’ and implicatures in order to find which is considered the pragmatic ‘what is said’, or using our terminology, the PII. Reading times served as a measure of understanding of indicative sentences in context. Pairs of stories ended with the same sentence, which, in one context, served as an enriched pragmatic meaning and, in the other, as an implicature:

(18) \textbf{Target = enriched pragmatic meaning}

Ted and Michele ran into each other at the mall.

Ted asked Michele what she had been doing lately.

Michele said that she had been busy car shopping.

Looking for ideas, Michele decided to consult Ted.

Michele asked Ted about his own car.

Ted mentioned,

“I drive a sports utility vehicle.” (enriched pragmatic meaning)\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{Target = implicature}

Ted and Michele are planning a trip to Lake Tahoe.

Michele had heard that there was a terrible storm there.

She wondered if it was going to be safe for them to go.

Michele was concerned about the vehicle they would drive.

\textsuperscript{33} We take their experiments as support for a more general distinction between 'Explicated' materials as a whole, and implicatures, rather than a distinction between ‘\text{Explicated}_{\text{max}}’ and implicatures. See explanation on page 23.
She asked Ted if he thought they would be okay.

Ted replied,

“I drive a sports utility vehicle.” (implicature) (p. 64)

In the first context, what the speaker pragmatically says by *I drive a sports utility vehicle* is similar to what he implies. That is because the listeners do not have to infer any significant pragmatic meaning beyond the fact that he drives a particular kind of car. However, in the second context, in addition to what the speaker says, he also implies something significant beyond that meaning, i.e. that his car is safe to drive in a storm. Therefore, what the speaker pragmatically says is different from what he conversationally implicates.

Hamblin and Gibbs assumed that if it takes people longer to process a conversational implicature (the second case) than it takes them to process ‘the enriched pragmatic meaning (the first case), it suggests that processing the enriched pragmatic meaning precedes processing the implicature, or at least, that it is a shorter process. Indeed, their results revealed that people took less time to read the enriched pragmatic meaning target sentences than to process the same sentences when they also conveyed an implicated addition. They concluded that people take significantly longer to derive a conversational implicature than to understand ‘Explicated_{min-max}’, although the same target sentence is involved. What is relevant to our study is the possible conclusion that addressees seem to process ‘Explicated_{min-max}’ and implicatures differently. This supports the basic Gricean dichotomy, which is

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37 And see Recanati’s (2004) division to primary pragmatic information and secondary pragmatic information. Recanati argues that primary processes are activated prior to secondary ones.
universally accepted, in fact.\footnote{Note that this does not mean, however, that Grice was talking about sequential processing. Here we accept Bach’s (2001a, 2004) distinction between ‘what is said’ as a semantic notion, and ‘what is said’ as a distinct cognitive entity. According to Bach, the strictly semantic notion of ‘what is said’, as presented by Grice, should not be influenced by the processing stage of its content.}

From our point of view, in each of the contexts in (18) Ted's answer constitutes the PII, so Hamblin and Gibbs's experiment also shows that enriched pragmatic levels, as well as implicatures, may serve as the PII. That is, Hamblin and Gibbs's experiment reinforces our assumption that it is the context which determines the level which is ultimately taken as the PII.

1.3.2 PII = ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’.

As will be discussed later (see section 1.3.3 below), Gibbs and Moise (1997) focused mainly on showing that addressees preferred to interpret the the PII as ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’. They were, however, also interested in examining ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’. They wanted to check whether it is always the case that ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’ is chosen as the PII. More specifically, can an appropriate context make addressees identify the level of ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’ as the level which constitutes what the speaker said\textsubscript{min}, rather than ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’? And can untrained participants distinguish between different types of levels of interpretation? Consider their following context:

(19) A Boy Scout troop was doing its civic service by cleaning up the park in the middle of town. The park was a mess and the scouts needed many rakes and shovels to do the job. One scout noted that there weren’t enough rakes for everyone and said that two more were needed. The scout master told him to go to the hardware store and ask for Ralph. The master said to the scout, Ralph has two rakes. (p. 63)
Here, according to Gibbs and Moise, it seems clear that what the master meant by saying *Ralph has two rakes* is that ‘Ralph has at least two rakes and may have even more,’ while his implicated meaning is that Ralph can give the scout two rakes. Hence, what the master meant to say in this situation is the minimal interpretation of *Ralph has two rakes*, which is that Ralph has at least two rakes. Each story was followed by two possible paraphrases of the last utterance. One paraphrase reflected what is taken as the minimal interpretation (Explicated$_{\text{min}}$), e.g. ‘Ralph has at least two rakes and is likely to have more than two’, while the second paraphrase reflected what is considered the enriched interpretation (Explicated$_{\text{max}}$), e.g. ‘Ralph has two rakes but no more than two’.

The proportion of participants who chose the minimal paraphrases was significantly higher than the proportion of participants who chose the enriched paraphrases. Therefore, Gibbs and Moise concluded that in some cases people understand what speakers say as conveying minimal, and not enriched, pragmatic meanings, and understanding what speakers say depends on context. Hence, this experiment of Gibbs and Moise supports the psychological reality of ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’ as a discursive level of interpretation (the PII). Their claim is that in some, although not most cases, 39 what speakers intend to say may be equal to this level. 40

In another experiment Hamblin and Gibbs (2003) tested whether people can recognize different pragmatic meanings which concern different levels of interpretation. They used stories like the following:

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39 See ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ below.
40 It should be noted that Relevance theoreticians readily agree that their explicature could correspond with Explicature$_{\text{min}}$ rather than Explicature$_{\text{max}}$.
Bob is a new tenant in an apartment building.

His neighbor Jack lived there for four years.

Bob was concerned that the building might be too loud.

Bob decided to ask a neighbor.

Bob asked Jack, since he was the only neighbor Bob had met.

Jack replied:

“I usually sleep with earplugs.” (conversational implicature) (p. 71)

Participants were asked to grade on a seven-point scale (where 1 means strongly disagree, and 7 means strongly agree) four optional paraphrases for the last utterance:

1. Jack said that he uses earplugs when he sleeps. (Explicated\textsubscript{min/max})
2. Jack said that the building is noisy. (implicature)
3. Jack implied that he uses earplugs when he sleeps. (Explicated\textsubscript{min})
4. Jack implied that the building is noisy. (implicature) (Ibid.)

Participants gave higher ratings to options 1 and 4. The paraphrase in 1 contained the verb said and the content referred to ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’ only, and the paraphrase in 4 contained the verb implied and the content referred to what speakers pragmatically implied (=implicature). The fact that participants did not opt for option (2) and (3) demonstrates that interlocutors are aware of the difference between what speakers say, or ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’, and what they implicate. This finding supports the assumption that the notions of ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min-max}’ and implicatures, both may correspond with our PII, are psychologically real, and that they are distinct levels of
interpretation. This experiment indeed shows that interlocutors distinguish between 'said' and 'implied', however, it does not point to the level which has higher chances to be considered the PII.

1.3.3 \( \text{PII} = \text{\textquoteleft Explicated}_{\text{max}} \text{\textquoteright} \)

Gibbs and Moise (1997) also demonstrated differences between 'Explicated_{\text{max}}' and 'what is implicated', by placing their target sentences in contexts which availed the non-minimal interpretations. Despite the findings reported in 1.3.2, which supported 'Explicated_{\text{min}}' as the level which equals the PII, they now show that in fact, the PII is for the most part equivalent to 'Explicated_{\text{max}}', i.e. the explicature. In the first experiment, similar to the one reported above, the participants were given sentences, and were asked to determine what speakers might have said when uttering these sentences. Each sentence was followed by two paraphrases: one reflected the minimal meaning, i.e. 'Explicated_{\text{min}}', and the other – the enriched meaning, i.e. 'Explicated_{\text{max}}'. For example:

(22) The old king died of a heart attack and a republic was declared.

(a) The old king died of a heart attack, either before or after a republic was declared. (minimal)

(b) The old king died of a heart attack before a republic was declared. (enriched)

(p. 70)

Using and in such utterances is traditionally assumed to convey a temporal or causative relation between the two events mentioned. But researchers differ on what status to assign to these pragmatic inferences. Minimalists (Griceans and Neo-
Griceans) assume they are implicatures, while Maximalists take them to be explicated inferences (Ariel, 2008; Carston, 2002, inter alia). Gibbs and Moise’s participants overwhelmingly selected the enriched interpretation rather than the minimal one here as the one that best reflected what was said.\(^{41}\) The results of this experiment suggest that there is a level which most people can refer to as a distinct level meaning, thus, supporting the psychological status of the Explicature. This meaning, as shown here, is ‘Explicated\(_{\text{max}}\)’, i.e. our PII.

Since this result may testify to the way people understand the word *say*, Gibbs and Moise (1997) conducted another experiment, in which the materials were identical to those used in the previous one, but this time the participants were first told about the difference between what speakers ‘say’ and what they ‘implicate’. The explanation was accompanied by several examples, and participants’ understanding was verified. Nonetheless, the results of this additional experiment were very similar to those of the previous experiment. Gibbs and Moise’s findings indicated that when asked to choose a paraphrase, people tended to choose the enriched explicated meaning, rather than the bare linguistic meaning even when they had been given an explanation beforehand about the difference between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’.

But it could be the case that participants chose the enriched interpretation, simply because they were opting for the most enriched interpretation. If so, when asked to choose between the enriched interpretation (= ‘Explicated\(_{\text{max}}\)’) and the implicature, they will again, choose the most enriched interpretation, i.e. the implicature. In order to differentiate the enriched ‘what is said’ (= ‘Explicated\(_{\text{max}}\)’)

\(^{41}\) Though enrichments of the Possessive type did not show such a clear tendency.
from implicatures, Gibbs and Moise put the indicative sentences at the end of short stories, such as the following (taken from their third experiment):

(23) The professor was lecturing on the life of Jose Sebastian.

He was a famous rebel in Spain who fought to overthrow the King.

Many citizens wanted Sebastian to serve as their President.

“Did Jose Sebastian ever become President?” one student asked.

The professor replied,

The old king died of a heart attack and a republic was declared.

(a) Jose Sebastian became President of the republic. (implicature interpretation)

(b) The old king died of a heart attack before a republic was declared.

(‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’) (p. 61)

Here the participants were asked to choose one of two paraphrases which best captured what the speaker said in his final utterance: the enriched explicated interpretation\footnote{Again, the word 'explicated' used here is our terminology.}, i.e. that ‘The old king died of a heart attack before a republic was declared’ or the conversational implicature, i.e. that ‘Jose Sebastian became President of the republic’. The participants overwhelmingly preferred the enriched explicated interpretations over the implicatures here. This suggests that (a) speakers intuitively differentiate the ‘explicated’ from the ‘implicated’; and (b) that for most speakers, again, ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’ is the level conceived as the PII rather than the implicature.

These findings support the post-Gricean approach that pragmatics strongly influences not only the understanding of ‘what is implicated’ but that of explicitly communicated ‘what is said’ as well. On the whole, the data from all the experiments
taken together showed that people tend to identify the PII neither with a minimal meaning, nor with the rich implicature. Instead, they are inclined to construe the intermediate level of ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’, as the one which best reflects what speakers say.\textsuperscript{43} Participants’ ability to distinguish between these levels suggests that both these levels have psychological reality. Taking the results of their fourth experiment into account (See details above), it is also clear that the understanding of the PII is context-dependent. More generally, as Gibbs (2002) argues, "the distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ is orthogonal to the putative distinction between semantics and pragmatics." (p. 482).

Another set of experiments regarding processing is presented in Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002). In their fourth experiment they selected two types of stories.\textsuperscript{44} Some contained a context which induced people to choose the minimal paraphrase (‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’) more often than the enriched meaning (the explicature, ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’); others contain a context which induced people to choose the ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’ paraphrase more often than ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’. For each target sentence they created two contexts, one for which the target sentence was the appropriately enriched interpretation, and another, where the same target sentence should be interpreted in a minimalist manner. For example (p. 446):

\begin{enumerate}
\item[(24)] Enriched context (= calling for ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’)

Roger was directing a musical. For one scene he needed extras to play a group of onlookers watching a street fight. But the stage would already be pretty
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{43} And See experimental support for Bach’s impliciture in Garrett and Harnish (2007).
\textsuperscript{44} Their aim was to examine the predictions of three pragmatic models, involving processing, which is not relevant to this study. We here refer only to Bezuidenhout and Cutting’s (2002) results which are relevant to the status of different levels of interpretation.
crowded with the principal actors in this scene. He figured that in order to prevent the scene from looking too chaotic, he needed six people.

**Minimal context** (= calling for ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’)

Roger was trying to arrange a rafting trip for his scout troupe during the summer. Many of his scouts were on family vacations. He asked the rafting company how many committed participants he would need to be able to secure the reservations for the trip. They told him that he needed six people.

**Target sentence for both contexts:**

HE NEEDED AT LEAST SIX PEOPLE.

At the end of the display of each story a screen of Xs was displayed followed by a sentence in capital letters which appeared on the next screen. In the case of the experimental items (but not the fillers), the sentence in capital letters following each story was what is considered to be the minimal paraphrase of the final sentence of the story. In other words, it corresponded to ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’, as defined by Griceans. For example, for the Minimal context-story above it is ‘he needed at least six people’. Participants were asked to judge whether the sentence in capitals (the target sentence) exactly matched the final sentence of the short story that they had just read. The computer measured the time taken to make the match/mismatch decision.

According to Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002) results showed that response times to target sentences in the context inducing ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’ were longer than to the same targets in the context inducing ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’. It seems that minimal and enriched interpretations are simultaneously processed, but that the enriched
interpretation, i.e. ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’ is usually more accessible, i.e., it constitutes the PII more frequently than other levels.

It should be noted, however, that despite Bezuidenhout and Cutting’s (2002) claim that they measured targets’ processing times, what they actually tested was (late) products of early processes (Gibbs, 1993 1994) - the speed at which different types of interpretation were activated following the initial processing of ‘what is meant’. And it’s not just the kind of task that required extra processing time but also the amount of time allowed (between offset of the story and the display of the target sentences) that invited late interpretation products.

Additional support for the important status of ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’ is provided by Noveck (2001) and Noveck and Chevaux (2002). They found that adult interlocutors were more sensitive to implicit meanings of scalar implicatures (Noveck, 2001) and \textit{and}-conjunction (Noveck and Chevaux, 2002) than children. As the \textit{and}-conjunction is used in our experiments as well, we will focus on Noveck and Chevaux (2002).

Noveck and Chevaux presented short texts, as in (25) below, to seven-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and eighteen-year olds, asking them to answer the questions in (26).

(25) Laurent broke his ankle while playing basketball.

His teacher took him to the school’s infirmary.

In the meantime, his friends called the paramedics.

The paramedics put him in their van.

Then, they took him to the hospital.

(26) a. Laurent broke his ankle and went to the hospital?

b. Laurent went to the hospital and broke his ankle? (p. 456)
While seven-year-olds seem not to distinguish between the semantic meaning of the *and*-conjunction and its explicated/implicated inferred interpretations, adults (eighteen-year-olds) tend to rule out the bare semantic meaning when it clashed with an inference (26b). When Noveck and Chevaux (2002) switched *and* to its temporal inferred interpretation *and then*, the seven-year-olds demonstrated the same behavior, i.e., they still didn’t reject the statement in the inverted order.\(^{45}\) Noveck and Chevaux concluded that children tend to adhere to logical interpretations before considering pragmatic interpretations, and that the ability to infer more informative readings evolves with age (see their results for ten-year-olds).

We can therefore say that the results of the experiments of both Noveck (2001) and Noveck and Chevaux (2002) attest to the explicature level in that the pragmatic inferences they tested for are considered part and parcel of the PII. This is why (adult) participants judge “backwards” conjunctions as false. These judgments show that some pragmatic inferences (those associated with *and*) have an effect on the truth conditions of the proposition expressed. Such pragmatic inferences should then be distinguished from conversational implicatures. According to these findings, children seem to be going by the linguistic meaning, as advocated by Grice, whereas the adults’ choices demonstrate that some pragmatic inferences (explicated ones) do constitute the PII.

\(^{45}\) Following Noveck and Chevaux (2002), by an ‘inverted order’ we refer to the temporally ‘backwards’ order of the conjuncts concerned.
1.3.4 PII = strong implicature

While up till now we have seen that either ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’ or ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’ could be taken as the PII, while implicatures could not, we now see that implicatures too may constitute this privileged message. In an attempt to replicate Gibbs and Moise’s (1997) results, Nicolle and Clark (1999) ended up demonstrating the possibility of implicatures to serve as the level which is often considered by addressees as the PII. Their participants too were asked to select the paraphrase that best reflected what each sentence said. However, Nicolle and Clark added two additional versions to the test: one in which the participants were asked to select the paraphrase that best reflected what the speaker’s words meant, and another in which the participants were asked to select the paraphrase that best reflected what the speaker wanted to communicate. As an example of their materials they give the following (p. 353):

(27) Bill and Jane were good friends. Every year they would each give the other a birthday present. Peter wanted to know how close Bill and Jane were, so he asked Mary what kind of presents they bought each other.

Mary answered, ‘Last year Jane turned 21 and Bill gave her a pearl necklace.’

(a) Bill gave Jane a pearl necklace after she turned 21

(b) Bill gave Jane a pearl necklace because they were very close

Nicolle and Clark (1999) figured that (27b), the strong implicature, is the interpretation that provides a straightforward answer to Peter’s question and is thus more relevant, as opposed to the explication in (27a). Indeed, Nicolle and Clark’s

\[\text{\footnotesize{\cite{46}}}\]

Although not always explicitly pointed out, the examples show that it was strong implicatures, rather than weak ones, which were used in the experiments above.
participants often preferred the relevant implicatures over the explicatures in all 3 versions of questions mentioned above, as opposed to Gibbs and Moise’s participants, who showed a preference for ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ over implicatures as the ‘said’ meaning. Could the participants forget the instructions? Or maybe they selected the sentence which resembled the original utterance the most?

To test this, Nicolle and Clark (1999) conducted another experiment. Here they incorporated Bach’s identifying criterion for ‘what is said’ (or for the 'Explicated' in our terminology) into the test materials: ‘what is said is specifiable by a that-clause embedded in a matrix clause of the form S said that...’ (Bach, 1994) (p. 278):

(28) Mary and Peter went to a party with their friends Bill and Jane. After a couple of hours Bill was nowhere to be seen. Peter asked Mary where Bill was and she replied,

‘Jane insulted Bill and he left.’

(a) Mary said that Bill left and Jane insulted him (minimal proposition, ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’)

(b) Mary said that Jane had insulted Bill before he left (enriched explicature, ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’)

(c) Mary said that Bill left because Jane had insulted him (implicature)

(d) Mary said that Bill had left because he had got bored (control) (p. 354)

Again, the results disconfirmed Gibbs and Moise’s results, as implicatures were selected over half of the time. But note that Carston (2002) and Ariel (2008) would consider the clausal relation in (28) as possibly explicated.

47 Nicolle and Clark’s (1999) results suggest that, when asked to select the paraphrase that best reflects what a speaker says, participants
try to understand the speaker’s overall intended meaning and do not refer to some pre-defined limited interpretation of the ‘Explicated’. This is so even though they perfectly understand the difference between ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ and implicature. Nicolle and Clark (1999) attribute the different results of their experiments to the degree of strength of their implicatures. The claim is that when the speaker’s intended meaning is a strong implicature, addressees may select this implicature over the explicated meaning, which becomes less relevant as ‘what is said’. These results suggest that the level which is considered by participants to be PII may be a strong Implicature.

Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002) designed similar experiments in an attempt to replicate both Gibbs and Moise’s (1997) and Nicolle and Clark’s (1999) experiments. They presented participants with five potential paraphrases of the target sentence and asked them to identify either the one that best captured what the speaker said, or the one that best captured what the speaker meant to communicate, or the one that best captured what the speaker’s words meant. For example (p. 441):

(29) Jane was planning to spend a week in Memphis. She couldn’t decide which of her friends, Brian or Paul, to stay with. Jill, who knew that Jane was allergic to animals, said, “Brian has three cats”.

1. (Minimal proposition) …Brian has at least three cats.
2. (Explicature paraphrase) … Brian has exactly three cats.
3. (Strong implicature) … Jane should stay with Paul.
4. (Weak implicature) … Brian likes cats.
5. (Implicated premise) … Brian’s cats will cause Jane to have an

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48 They first conducted a pretest, in which they gave the participants short stories, each with a target sentence uttered by one of the speakers in the story. The participants were then asked to write down what the speaker might have meant by saying the target sentence. They were asked to write all the options they could think of in about one minute. The number of times each implicature appeared in the lists determined its degree of strength.
Their results supported those of Nicolle and Clark’s. First, they found no significant differences between the answers to all three questions (the paraphrase that best reflected what each sentence said; the paraphrase that best reflected what the speaker’s words meant; and the paraphrase that best reflected what the speaker wanted to communicate), which supports Nicolle and Clark’s claim that interlocutors do not necessarily distinguish the Griceans ‘what is said’ from ‘what is meant’ when engaged in real-time interpretations. More importantly, Bezuidenhout and Cutting’s results are also compatible with Nicolle and Clark’s in showing participants’ preference for a strong and enriched notion of inference over a minimal or weak one. Again, the richer level of interpretation, i.e. strong implicatures, was established as the level which is taken to be what people conversationally say, i.e. the PII, more often than other levels (38.4%). ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ followed with 23.5%.

1.3.5 PII = explicatures/strong implicatures

To sum up, we first saw experiments whose results support the basic Gricean distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ (Hamblin and Gibbs, 2003). We then presented empirical evidence for three different representations of the PII level, as interlocutors see it: ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’ (Gibbs and Moise, 1997; Hamblin and Gibbs, 2003); ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ (Bezuidenhout and Cutting 2002, Experiments 3-4; Gibbs and Moise, 1997; Hamblin and Gibbs, 2003) and strong implicatures (Bezuidenhout and Cutting, 2002, Experiments 1-2; Nicolle and Clark, 1999). Taken together, all these potential representations support the assumption that any level of
interpretation can be taken as the PII, provided it is strongly communicated in a specific context.

In this section we suggest to interpret Larson et al.’s (2009) experimental results as another piece of evidence for this assumption. Larson et al.’s experiment concerned GCIs, and aimed to find whether GCIs are part of the ‘Explicated’, while differentiating between different types of GCIs. They presented participants with a character named ‘Literal Lucy’, who understands everything literally. The participants were asked to decide whether ‘Literal Lucy’ understands the speaker’s last sentence as True or False in view of a new fact, which disclosed potentially canceling information. For example:

(30) Irene: I heard you all went shopping. What did Harry buy?

    Sam: Harry bought four books.

    FACT: Harry bought five books.

    Given this FACT, Literal Lucy would say that the underlined sentence is:

         T or F

    Larson et al. assumed that if the participants decide that Literal Lucy approves Sam’s answer, i.e. say it is true in view of the new fact, then the tested type of inference, i.e. ‘Harry bought exactly four books’, is relatively easy to cancel. It means that the information in the new fact was irrelevant to the proposition expressed by Sam. If so, the GCI here is not part of the ‘Explicated’. On the other hand, if the participants decide that Literal Lucy finds Sam’s utterance false in view of the new fact, it means that the information in the new fact was relevant to the truth-conditions
of Sam’s utterance.\textsuperscript{49} Hence, the tested GCI is part of the ‘Explicated’. In addition to different types of GCIs (such as scalar quantifiers and argument saturations), the materials used by Larson et al. also included contradictions and entailments to establish a base-line, and NCEs (Necessary Contextual Elements: deictics, ellipses, indexicals, and pronoun resolutions) as fillers. Although treating NCEs as fillers, the results concerning this set of items are highly relevant to our study.\textsuperscript{50} Here are examples of their contradictions, entailments and two of their NCEs:

(31) \textbf{a. Contradiction}  
Irene: When did Robert’s great-uncle Jake die?  
Sam: He died in 1963.  
FACT: Robert’s great-uncle Jake died in 1957.

\textbf{b. Entailment}  
Irene: Tell me about Sophia’s car.  
Sam: She owns a gray Chevy.  
FACT: The car Sophia owns is a gray Chevy.

\textbf{c. NCE: Deictic}  
Irene: What shoes are you wearing to dinner?  
Sam: I’m going to wear these shoes.  
FACT: Sam has decided to wear the shoes in the upstairs closet, not the ones he is currently putting on.

\textsuperscript{49} We should mention that Larson et al. (2009) conducted two more tests under different conditions. Here we present only the first test and its results, which were very similar to those of the other two conditions.

\textsuperscript{50} They were tested in our Experiment 4.
d. NCE: Pronoun resolution

Irene: I haven’t seen that coat I gave you for Christmas... And what did you do with the sweater I gave you?

Sam: I hung it in the closet.

FACT: Sam hung the coat Irene gave him in the closet, and he put the sweater from Irene in his dresser drawer.

Here are some of their examples for GCIs types:

(32) a. Co-activities

Irene: Can the guys come to the reception?

Sam: No. George and Steve play squash at the gym until 6:00 everyday.

FACT: George plays squash at the YMCA until 6:00 daily, and Steve plays squash at SPAC until 6:00 everyday.

b. Argument saturation

Irene: I heard something big happened in the art studio yesterday.

Sam: Yeah! In a fit of rage, Rachel picked up a hammer and broke a statue.

FACT: After grabbing a hammer, Rachel angrily kicked a statue, causing it to fall over and break.

c. Repeated verb conjuncts

Irene: What happened at Doctor Witherspoon’s office?

Sam: Sasha waited and waited for her appointment.

FACT: Sasha waited 5 minutes for her appointment at Doctor Witherspoon’s office.

Contradictions cannot be rescued by cancellation, and entailments must be true. Indeed, results showed that entailments received 7% “false” answers;
contradiction – 99% “false” answers. These findings show that participants understood the task. Regarding NCEs, they received 86% “false” answers, which suggest that NCEs (e.g. reference resolution and indexicals) constitute an integral part of the ‘Explicated’.\(^{51}\) The different types of GCIs demonstrated a different behavior. On average they got 36% “false” answers, which was significantly different from all other types of materials. However, within this set of items, different types showed significantly different patterns of behavior. Co-activities, for example (see 32a above), had a 18% “false” answers, i.e., 82% chance of being cancelled, while Argument saturation (see 32b above) had a 37% “false” answers, i.e., 63% chance of being cancelled. These two are therefore not part of the ‘Explicated’. On the other hand, Repeated verb conjuncts (see 32c above), for example, had 82% “false” answers, i.e., only 18% chance of being cancelled, which suggested that they are a part of the ‘Explicated’. These findings portray a continuum along which different types of GCIs and NCEs are ordered. Certain types of GCIs may strongly affect truth-judgments, hence are considered part of the ‘Explicated’, while others have a smaller impact on truth-judgments, and are thus closer to implicatures. It should also be noted that Larson et al. did not find any significant differences within the different GCIs types (I-based, M-based, and Q-based) as to their ability to constitute part of the ‘Explicated’.\(^{52}\)

Larson et al.’s findings suggest a scale along which various explicated contributions to the bare linguistic meanings are ordered.

\(^{51}\) Although focusing on GCIs, Larson et al. also note that the significant difference between contradictions and NCEs suggested that "some participants…are distinguishing even those contextually-supplied elements of WHAT-IS-SAID from those that are supplied strictly semantically," (p. 91-92). This result may provide support for the Minimalist model, and see a short discussion in Terkourafi (2010).

\(^{52}\) That, as opposed to other differences between these GCIs types, which were experimentally supported by Katsos, (2003).
As we mentioned at the beginning of section 1.3 above, this study does not accept some of the assignments of interpretations above as explicated or implicated. These disagreements can be divided into three groups based on the grounds for the disagreement. First, let’s take the issue of numeral determiners. Gibbs and Moise’s (1997) example in (19), as well as Bezuidenhout and Cutting’s (2002) examples in (24) and (29), are based on the assumption, originally made by Horn (1972), that the ‘exactly’ reading of a numeral determiner is not semantic, but pragmatic. The semantic reading, according to Horn, is the ‘at least’ reading. Carston (1998) argues for a relevance-driven semantics of number terms which can straightforwardly feed into a relevance-driven pragmatics. She chooses an underspecified meaning for the numbers (e.g., ‘seven’ for seven), which is adapted in context into ‘exactly seven’, ‘at least seven’, etc. See also Carston (2002): 97-98, examples 4b and 5b. There are other opinions as well (see Kadmon 2001 and Panizza et al. 2009, for example, on setting different conditions for accessing each interpretation).

Second, the way some of the materials are phrased seems strange, and mostly remote from discourse. Nicolle and Clark’s (1999) optional answer in (28b) seems odd, as it does not straightforwardly answer Peter’s question regarding Bill’s whereabouts. That could affect the participants’ reluctance to choose this answer as the most suitable one as the PII. Gibbs and Moise’s (1997) example in (23b) is also oddly phrased in the sense that foreground and background information is switched. Third, with regard to example (18), this study disputes the difference between Ted’s answer and the linguistic meaning. In this case, the target sentence is also the linguistic representation. Hamblin and Gibbs (2003) refer to it as ‘Explicated_{\text{max}}’, for, as they explain, it may convey more than the linguistic meaning, (e.g. recommending this kind of car), but this is a rather weak implicature. Thus, we take their experiments
as support for a more general distinction between the ‘Explicated$_{\text{min/max}}$’ as a whole, and implicatures.

We opened this presentation of previous experiments with two questions (repeated here):

1. Which of the levels described above has received experimental support?
2. What level of interpretation do speakers consider as the PII in discourse?

The answers, as shown above, are as follows:

1. Taken together, the findings of the experiments described above demonstrate the psychological reality of three levels: ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’, ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ and strong implicatures. In other words, the findings as a whole support the post-Gricean trichotomy of linguistic meanings, explicatures, and implicatures.

2. Pragmatics plays a major role in what interlocutors tend to consider as the communicated message, as it is shown that any of these representations may be chosen to represent the discursive PII. In many cases it is the intermediate level of ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ which constitutes the PII, but there are numerous cases in which it is other levels of interpretation which are taken as the PII: In some cases it is the bare linguistic meaning, in others – the strong implicature.

Each of the models presented in 1.2 above (Minimalists and Maximalists) has different predictions concerning the psycholinguistic and discursive behavior of the levels of interpretation. Chapter 2 will present these predictions and elaborate on the way this study examined them.
CHAPTER 2: MOTIVATIONS AND GENERAL PREDICTIONS

Chapter 2 introduces the arguments of this study and the rationale behind them. It begins with our main claim that interactional, i.e., pragmatic, characteristics of various levels of interpretation depend on degree of strength. We then introduce our four strength criteria, and conclude by presenting the predictions of each of the models we examine here with regard to our experiments.

2.1 Strength-continuum

The purpose of the present study is to determine the psychological reality of various meaning representations that have been discussed in the literature, focusing on the propensity of these representations to serve as the Privileged Interactional Interpretation (PII) within a given discourse. As already noted in Chapter 1, the PII, "is the meaning… by which the speaker is judged as telling the truth or being sincere", as well as "the meaning which contains the message that the addressee should take to be the relevant contribution made by the speaker..." (Ariel, 2002: 1006). We aim to characterize the behavior of these levels of interpretation interactionally, namely, within discourse. Our claim is that this behavior actually depends on their degrees of strength.

Whereas Griceans did not address the issue of degrees of strength, and focused on introducing a dichotomy of meaning representations between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ (= implicature), post-Griceans did. The concept of degrees of ‘strength’ of pragmatic inferences was, as noted above, already addressed by Relevance theoreticians, (see Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), Carston’s (2002, 2005), and Wilson and Sperber (2004)), as well as by Ariel (2008, 2010) and
Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) propose a strength hierarchy for implicatures, claiming that strong implicatures are more determinate, and the addressees cannot but recover them. In other words, they must be derived in order to make the speaker's/writer's utterance relevant. At the same time, the speaker/writer must take full responsibility for these implicatures. Regarding explicatures, Sperber and Wilson say that “… an explicature is explicit to a greater or a lesser degree” (p. 182), depending on the ratio between the part contributed by inferred materials and that contributed by grammatical materials. The larger the pragmatic contribution, the less explicit the explicature is. Sperber and Wilson thus in effect distinguish between two degrees of strength within each group of inferences: strong implicatures > weak implicatures and strong (more explicit) explicatures > weak (less explicit) explicatures.

Combined into a single scale we get the following:

(33) Strong (highly explicit) Explicature > weak (more implicit) Explicature > 
    Implicatures[strong] > Implicatures[weak]

As we have suggested in Ch. 1 (section 1.3.5), partial experimental support for this hierarchy can be found in Larson et al. (2009), though they did not use this terminology to frame their findings. We will here examine both distinctions.

As already noted in Chapter 1, Ariel and Jaszczolt are in accord with Maximalists in that they too believe that the proposition actually intended by the speaker often includes substantial portions which are pragmatically derived. Furthermore, Ariel (2002 and onwards) too views ‘Explicated_{max}’ as the level taken as

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53 See Chapter 1, sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 above.
the PII in most cases.\textsuperscript{54} At the same time, Maximalists, just like Ariel and Jaszczolt, do not rule out a more flexible variety of levels of interpretation which may constitute the PII.

Following Maximalists, mainly Relevance theory, this study too opts for a basic three-level distinction: bare linguistic meanings\textsuperscript{55}, explicated inferences, and implicated inferences. Operationalizing the definition of PII (following Ariel, 2002, 2008, 2010, or the Primary Meaning, following Jaszczolt, 2005, 2009, 2010), this study aims to support the assumption that there isn’t only one level of interpretation which corresponds to PII, and which is right for all discourse purposes. Rather, each level of interpretation may be considered PII in a specific discourse. In other words, the various levels of interpretation may be ordered along a continuum, which adheres to the basic order of Relevance Theory’s trichotomy, and yet, is more fine-grained and flexible. The parameter we propose for this continuum is the interpretation strength. A strong interpretation is an essential part of the utterance, and as such we expect it to be manifest pragmatically.

We here propose four pragmatic criteria by which 'strength' can be defined. Assuming two interpretation levels (A and B) associated with some utterance, A is defined as stronger if it demonstrates the following behaviors in any of our comprehension tests:\textsuperscript{56}

\begin{enumerate}
\item (34) Pragmatic Criteria:
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{54} Although it should be noted that unlike Ariel, Jaszczolt, does not rule out relatively high proportions of strong implicatures constituting the Primary Meanings.
\textsuperscript{55} The decision to test the bare linguistic meaning as a meaning which may (rarely) serve as the PII, is explained below.
\textsuperscript{56} Note that ‘Strength’ is here defined behaviorally. In other words, we do not attempt to motivate strength differences, but rather focus on manifestations of different strengths of interpretations.
(a) The discourse inducing the understanding of A as the PII is considered more coherent than the discourse inducing the understanding of B as the PII, as a result of A or B's influence.

(b) A has a higher propensity than B to be confirmed by interlocutors as the PII.

(c) Confirming A as the PII is made with a higher degree of confidence than confirming B as the PII.

(d) A is more difficult for the speaker to deny than B.

In addition, examining (34b) and (34c) above involved measuring Response Times. Here we expected that

- Response Times to confirming A as the PII would be shorter than response times to confirming B as the PII.
- Response times to deciding how confident the addressee is in confirming A as the PII would be shorter than response times to deciding how confident the addressee is in confirming B as the PII.

We will now elaborate on (34a-d). Let's begin with the first criterion - the degree of coherence of the discourse contributed by the understanding of an unwritten proposition as various levels of interpretation (34a). It is widely accepted that for a successful reading comprehension, basic skills, i.e. decoding and syntactic analysis, must be employed alongside other skills such as reasoning and integrating world knowledge. All are components of text understanding (van den Broek and Gustafson, 1999; van den Broek, Rapp, and Kendeou, 2005; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983; Graesser and Clark, 1985; Kintsch, 1988; Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978, among others).
Van den Broek and Gustafson (1999) argue that a representation of a text produced by the reader is coherent if it includes meaningful relations among its components. During reading, readers identify these relations between various elements e.g. events or states, clauses etc., realizing that these relations are responsible for providing coherence to the mental representation created for the text (see also Graesser and Clark, 1985; Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978). van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) have laid the foundations of what was later on developed by Kintsch (1988 and onwards), as the construction-integration model. According to this model, having read a complete sentence, a primary list of propositions which can be derived from the text is transformed into a network of propositions. What determines whether all nodes of this network are successfully connected is the degree of coherence of the original text. How does this work?

As the participant is reading the text, s/he connects the list of propositions in her/his mind in a certain manner, creating a network of propositions bearing a certain degree of coherence. Thus, based on this approach to text comprehension, it can be assumed that two texts, which are identical up to the point of the final utterance, could demonstrate different degrees of coherence, as, naturally, the final utterance too should influence the newly constructed network of propositions and its coherence. Since this utterance is different for each of the two contexts, it is assumed to have a different impact on the network constructed for each text. The last utterance of text B, for instance, may reduce the degree of coherence of the entire network representing text B, while the degree of coherence of the entire network representing text A might increase as a result of the influence of the last utterance of text A.

For the texts we used in the Experiment to be coherent, a certain target representation had to be retrieved by the participant. The immediate basis for this
target representation was the final utterance of the text, the “trigger” utterance, which was different for each condition. The difference in the trigger-target pairs was due to the target constituting the linguistic meaning, the explicature, a strong implicature or a weak implicature of the trigger utterance against its preceding discourse. We reason that a piece of discourse taken as more coherent testifies to an easier and smoother association between the explicit trigger utterance and the invoked target sentence. Such facilitated paths are characteristic of stronger interpretations.

The test measuring the propensity of propositions to be confirmed as the PII (34b) also requires some elaboration. Here we test the ability to confirm propositions which stand for either the bare linguistic meaning, the explicature (=the linguistic meaning enriched by various pragmatic completions), a strong implicature, or a weak implicature as constituting a speaker’s relevant utterance. By 'relevant', we refer to the definition proposed by Relevance Theory, (see section 1.2.2 above). The actual question we use is whether the target sentence is true or false based on the text the participant has just read. This confirmation-test is accompanied by a confidence-test (34c), which measures the differences between degrees of confidence in confirming each level of interpretation as the PII. As noted above, this propensity is also measured by comparing between response times to confirmation of each level of interpretation, as well as between response times to indicating the degree of confidence in the decision.57

The rationale behind the Deniability test is similar to Grice’s Cancelability criterion, but the two are not identical. Cancelability, as mentioned in Grice (1975, 1989), is a semantic criterion, which equally applies to all types of pragmatic inferences. Cancellation can take place explicitly, by adding to an utterance ‘but not

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57 See an elaborated explanation on our confirmability test below (Chapter 3, section 3.2).
when the potential implicature is $p$, or contextually, by embedding the utterance in a discourse where the utterance would not carry the implicature. Cancellation, as defined by Grice, captures all and only non-semantic interpretations. It does not address the question of strength of the relation of the inference to the sentence on which it is based. All pragmatic inferences are equally cancelable. Thus it does not make sense to look for different degrees of Cancelability.

Neo-Griceans support this point of view. Neale (1992) for example, adds that appealing to truth-conditional content while dealing with inferences is not needed. All inferences, not contributing to proposition’s truth conditions, are equally cancelable, whereas grammatical meaning, which determines the truth-value of the proposition, is not submitted to cancellation. As noted above\(^{58}\), neo-Griceans have also claimed that even GCIs are defeasible, although, as Levinson (1995) says they “do go through by default” (p. 98). Thus, GCIs may intrude on truth conditions, despite the fact that they are cancelable, which makes them an intermediate level of interpretation. They are cancelable like implicatures, and at the same time – truth-value-influencing, like the bare linguistic meanings. Hence, GCIs are considered a distinct category of inferences which influence the truth-value of the proposition. This suggests that there is a basis, perhaps, for distinguishing between different pragmatic inferences.

Relevance Theory does refer in several places to the speaker’s degree of commitment to the conveyed content. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) mention the speaker’s responsibility for the implicatures derived from his/her utterance (p.199, for example), and what is intended by the speaker is also addressed, e.g. Carston (2002, Chapter 1). However, this concept is not highly developed under Relevance Theory, which focuses mostly on the processes undergone by the addressee, when s/he

\(^{58}\) See Chapter 1, section 1.2.1.4.
recovers the speaker’s intentions. However, since Relevance Theoreticians define the
degree of strength of an interpretation according to its relevance to discourse, it stands
to reason that weak implicatures, usually less relevant to the discourse, should be
more deniable than strong ones.

Note that Burton-Roberts (2006, and mainly 2010) also addresses the issue of
cancellation as related to the speaker’s intention. Burton-Roberts proposes a revised
cancellation criterion, which should be thought of as clarification of the speaker’s
intended meaning. He focuses on explicatures, claiming that logically they cannot be
cancelled, as opposed to Carston (2002), who does not rule out the cancellation of
potential explicated inferences. However, he broadens his claim to implicatures as
well, specifically to PCIs. These, according to Burton-Roberts, unlike GCIs, are
uncancelable, because they are intended by the speaker. According to Burton-Roberts
(2010), if by his/her utterance the speaker intended the addressee to derive an
inference that p (either an explicated inference or an implicature) then the speaker
cannot cancel p. His solution is that we should treat cancellation as an operation that
cannot contradict \textit{what was intended}, rather than \textit{what is independent of context}. As
GCIs are independent of context, they are not bound by speaker’s intentions, and
hence, are cancellable.

We do not find that we need to modify or reinterpret Grice’s semantic
criterion, so that it can be used for pragmatic distinctions as well. Rather, two
separated criteria are needed for the two different distinctions. We therefore propose a
similar, yet pragmatic-based test, which will enable us do exactly that – the
Deniability test. We propose that Cancelability and Deniability have different aims.
While the semantic Cancelability criterion aims to distinguish between semantic
meanings and pragmatic inferences, the Deniability criterion aims to distinguish between stronger and weaker interpretations within discourse.

Deniability, as perceived in this study, is close to being the pragmatic counterpart of Grice’s semantic Cancelability criterion. It is a discursive pragmatic correlate which pertains to the speaker’s perceived ability to actually deny a potential message or inference somehow associated with his/her utterance in interaction. There is some dependence between Cancelability and Deniability: it is impossible to deny the bare linguistic meaning, which is not cancelable. More interestingly, however, we suspect that not all that is cancelable is deniable to the same degree. Unlike Cancelability, Deniability, we predict, will reflect the strength of the potential inference, and that strength depends on pragmatic factors only. Hence, Cancelability may bear one of two values – cancelable or not cancelable, and reflects a semantic relation, whereas Deniability is gradable, and pragmatic. Due to the gradability of the Deniability test, it shows cancelable material to be denied to different degrees. Thus, it serves as a tool to differentiate between different types of pragmatic inferences to a finer degree, possibly between ‘what is said$_{\text{min}}$’ and ‘what is said$_{\text{max}}$’ (= explicature), for example. When an interpretation is easy to deny, we take it to be a weaker interpretation. When deniability is hard, a stronger interpretation is involved.59

This gradability has been independently proposed by Jaszczolt (2005, 2009). She argues that

Cancellation is difficult when the pragmatic enrichment is well entrenched and expected across contexts. In other words, when such enrichments are of the form of salient presumptive meanings…or

59 And see Camp’s (2013) interesting distinction between the speaker’s deniability and the hearer’s pedantry.
strong social, cultural, or cognitive defaults..., they are harder to cancel explicitly in that they require a rather non-standard scenario."

(2009: 12)

Hence, she expects these strongly entrenched pragmatic meanings, which are implicit, and yet, constitute the intended meaning, to be hard to deny.

Our study put this criterion to the test. To see that Cancelability and Deniability do not invariably yield the same results, let’s consider a few examples. Let’s start with Grice’s (1975, 1989) famous example, which served as an example of flouting the maxim of quantity:

(35) A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: "Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular" (1989: 33).

It may be inferred that Mr. X is not much of a scholar, but, as Grice claimed, this inference is cancelable. A’s commitment to his/her uttered proposition does not oblige him/her to have also committed to Mr. X not being good at philosophy. Looking at this example, it seems that A can deny saying that X is not much of a scholar. Indeed, it may very well be that A will be able to deny ever saying (or even intending) the plausible inference about X’s poor scholastic abilities at philosophy.

However, in other cases, the Deniability test and the Cancelability criterion may yield different results. Being gradable, Deniability allows us to ask: to what extent could any speaker deny having committed to the inference? Such a question only makes sense when the utterance is examined in discourse, where it carries a
specific discourse role. Here’s an example where Cancelability and Deniability, we surmise, might give different results (the inference is cancelable, yet hardly deniable):

(36) A: Can you introduce me to Shirley? I find her quite attractive.
   B: I saw her with a new guy last week (Originally Hebrew, 12.3.2009).

A few implicatures may arise from B’s reply. One of them will be ‘Shirley has a boyfriend’. Indeed, this implicature is cancelable, in that the proposition will be seen as true even if Shirley doesn’t have a boyfriend, provided she did go out with a guy last week. But discourse-wise, it will be very difficult for B to deny having said that ‘Shirley has a boyfriend’. Note that in this dialogue B’s utterance pragmatically functions as an answer to A’s request, which implicates that A is romantically interested in Shirley. Interactionally, therefore, it will be highly unlikely for B to try and deny it, though to some extent it is deniable. Let’s see another example:

(37) Mother: Itai has such a good memory. He already remembers a great deal of the song by heart.
   Noa (angrily): Come on, he remembers only the first two verses.
   Mother: That’s not nice. You both have a good memory. (Originally Hebrew, October, 12, 2010).

Noa is obviously jealous of Itai, due to the great impression he made on their mother, and therefore belittles his accomplishment. Note that nowhere does Noa say that ‘Itai does not have such a good memory as you (=his mother) believe’. Hence, this implicature is cancelable. However, the mother understands Noa to convey this
message, and refers to it (by using 'that'), as if it were said. Thus, according to the mother’s understanding of the situation, Noa will most likely not be able to deny belittling Itai’s ability to memorize songs. Here we see a clear difference between the truth conditions of the Minimalist ‘what is said’, to which the Cancelability criterion refers, and the truth conditions which are discourse-dependent, and addressed by the Deniability test.

A similar example is presented in Ariel (2002: 300):

(38) \[ R_1: \text{And Haim Getzl (=} \text{John Doe}) \text{ who is a company director pretends to know that the balance sheet is going to be good so he starts buying} \]

\[ S_1: \text{OK that’s a criminal offence} \]

\[ R_2: \text{Eh...} \]

\[ S_2: \text{It's a bit of a criminal offence} \]

\[ R_3: \text{So he has a mother-in-law} \]

\[ S_3: \text{For this you go to jail} \text{ (taken from Lotan, 1990: 16).} \]

In (38) the final utterance of R (R₃) seems quite irrelevant, as the relation between having a mother-in-law and committing a criminal offence is not clear. However, assuming that R₃ is obeying the CP and the maxims in general, or Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance principle, S must assume that by saying R₃, R has intended to generate an implicature (= 'the company director will buy shares, but use his mother-in-law's name in the purchase to conceal his act'). S₃ does not refer to what was said by R₃, since having a mother-in-law will not send one to jail, but rather, to the inferred implicature. Naturally, R relies on S to interpret R₃ the way S did. Thus, here
we have an additional example for interlocutors treating the generated implicature as if it were explicitly uttered, and hence, it seems that S would hold R responsible for practically 'saying' the cancelable (but not deniable) content of the implicature.

In the last three examples the Deniability test seems stricter than the Cancelability criterion, as far as an appropriate interaction might proceed. Namely, some of the speaker's utterance interpretations are cancelable, yet hardly deniable (36), or practically non-deniable (37) and (38). Obviously, semantics alone cannot provide all the actual truth conditions for each utterance on any occasion. There is a clear role for pragmatics, and the Deniability test proposed here addresses exactly that. At the same time, it also provides an appropriate pragmatic tool for differentiating interpretation strengths, since deniability comes in degrees, which we can test for by comparing various levels of interpretation. In natural discourse, speakers are often committed to much more than that which semantics dictates: what is defined as cancelable, i.e. all pragmatic inferences, is not always easily deniable. While what is deniable is by definition also cancelable, what is cancelable is not necessarily deniable, or not easily so, at least.60

A strong basis for the pragmatic criteria can be found in Ariel (2008). Ariel proposes several parameters to distinguish between explicated inferences (= the inferred part of explicatures), strong implicatures, and weak implicatures (p. 292):

Table (1): Ariel's (2008) Parameters for Distinguishing between Explicated and Implicated Inferences

60 It should be noted that some researchers have argued against taking into consideration what is understood by the addressee as a criterion to grade the speaker’s commitment to what was said. For example, Bach (2001b) claims that “it is a mystery to me why facts about what the hearer does in order to understand what the speaker says should be relevant to what the speaker says in the first place” (p. 156). However, this study assumes that the speaker’s commitment to the conveyed content, as understood by the addressee, is what both parties of the discourse consider as a pragmatic PII, especially when the conversation proceeds smoothly.
All inferences, according to Ariel (2008), are inexplicit, cancelable, and not fully determinate. However, they can be distinguished by the following features: directness, interactional necessity, and truth-conditionality. These last three features are strongly related to the pragmatic criteria of strength presented in this study. By ‘directness’, Ariel (2008) refers to “the inseparability of explicated inferences from the directly communicated linguistic meaning” (Ibid). That is, as predicted by Recanati’s (2004) Availability Principle, explicated inferences are functionally non-separate from linguistic meanings, while strong or weak implicated inferences are. This distinction was the basis for our Confirmability and Confidence tests. Thus, it would stand to reason that linguistic meanings and explicatures would demonstrate similar behavior, which should be different from that of implicatures.

Ariel’s last two features could also serve as a basis for this study’s predictions. Being interactionally necessary and truth-conditional, Ariel’s observations (Table 1) give priority to explicated inferences and some strong implicatures over weak implicatures. These features seem strongly connected to our
Deniability test. The predicted results of the Deniability test depend on the ability of the inference to affect truth conditions and be taken by interlocutors as interactionally necessary. If an utterance is considered as affecting truth-conditions and discursively indispensable, it stands to reason that it would be undeniable.

In sum, Ariel’s characterization predicts differences of deniability, in that it suggests that the closer the level of interpretation is to the bare linguistic meaning, the harder it is to deny. However, Ariel does not mention degrees of strength for each feature. As illustrated by Table (1), she presents all features of inferences as dichotomous: (-) or (+).

We extract different predictions with regard to our tests from each of the two rivalry models. Minimalists would predict that the bare linguistic meaning or ‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’ would constitute the PII, whereas for Maximalists it is ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’.

Next, Minimalists (and Maximalists) do not necessarily commit themselves to ease/difficulty of confirmation (e.g., Grice 1975, 1989 does not refer to processing, and see also Bach, 2001a; Hawley, 2002), and some Maximalists do not rule out a parallel or an incremental processing of a whole proposition, (see for instance, Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004). But, it would be reasonable to assume that if ‘Explicated$_{\text{max}}$’ is the basic unit of understanding of an utterance for Maximalists, (i) it is this level that should be most frequently confirmed as the PII; (ii) it should be the fastest to be confirmed as the PII; (iii) it should be the level which interlocutors are most confident about in confirming as the PII; and (iv) the confidence decision about it should be the fastest.\footnote{‘Explicated$_{\text{min}}$’ was not directly included in the speed and confirmability tests. It was addressed later on (Experiment 4).} As the basic unit of interpretation, this level should also turn out to be most coherent with the preceding discourse, and the least deniable. Note that Recanati (2004) claims that the level of linguistic meaning is in fact inaccessible to
interlocutors. Hence, according to Recanati, the bare linguistic meaning should not
demonstrate any distinct behavior, i.e., will not be confirmed by itself.

Maximalists then predict the following strength hierarchy with regard to our
criteria:

\[(39) \text{Explicature (+ linguistic meaning)} > \text{Implicature}_{\text{strong}} > \text{Implicature}_{\text{weak}}\]

Grice would argue that as it is the level of bare linguistic meaning which
constitutes the basic unit of understanding, confirming this level as the PII should be
faster. In addition, he does not acknowledge the Maximalist 'Explicated' level. The
following strength hierarchy is then predicted:

\[(40) \text{Bare linguistic meaning} > \text{Implicature}_{\text{strong/weak}}\]

It should be noted, however, that some neo-Griceans such as Bach and
Levinson (see section 1.2.1 above), may predict some default meanings to be
considered the PII more frequently than other inferred meanings. Hence, they may
expect the following scale:

\[(41) \text{Bare linguistic meaning} > \text{Explicated}_{\text{min}} > \text{strong/weak Implicature}\]

In order to address this hypothesis, our materials in the 'explicature' group included
both Explicated_{\text{min}} and Explicated_{\text{max}} inferences.

At this point, we believe we should explain the inclusion of the level of
linguistic meaning in the scale in A as a level which can be independent and equal the
PII. After showing the hierarchy of strength with respect to relevant interpretations, we were interested in distinguishing between degrees of strength within relevant interpretations, especially within the category of explicature: between the linguistic basis and the inferences, and even between different explicated inferences, namely, between explicatures resulting from different pragmatic processes, which can further distinguish between various interpretations. We are well aware that the linguistic meaning level is almost never interactionally functional on its own. We are also aware that some, e.g. Carston (2002, chapter 1; 2012, p.c), believes that people’s intuitions about it cannot be tested in any rigorous way. Yet, we decided to test it anyway, since it is a well-established theoretical construct, which is sometimes used in natural discourse. See, for example, (42), taken from Ariel (2008: 304):

(42) Ben: What are you doing, criticizing me?

    Gus: No, I was just…

    Ben: You’ll get a swipe round your ear hole if you don’t watch your step.

    Gus: Now look here, Ben…

    Ben: I’m not looking anywhere!

    (The dumb waiter, pp. 15/16, quoted from Yus Ramos, 1998: 87).

In his answer, Ben chooses to refer to the unintended meaning of 'here', and ignore the intended function of the phrase 'look here', used here by Gus as a discourse marker. Note that, in fact, Ben adheres to the underdetermined meaning of 'here'. He doesn't say 'I'm not looking at you', which could have been considered as Explicated_min, but rather refers to the basic semantic meaning of 'here' as pointing out some place. Ariel argues that in order to create wise-guy interpretations, interlocutors must be conscious
to the linguistic meaning. Hence, wise-guy interpretations demonstrate the psychological reality of the bare linguistic meaning, by its use within discourse. We expected the bare linguistic meaning to be harder to deny than other interpretation levels.

Thus, we are aware that the explicature, as defined by Relevance theoreticians, includes the bare linguistic meaning, and at least theoretically, may be equal to it, yet here, since we wanted to test this very possibility, we chose cases where the two are necessarily distinct, that is, where the explicature must incorporate some pragmatic inferences over and above the bare linguistic meaning.

But, as noted above, supporting the psychological reality of the explicature, as defined by Relevance Theory, is not our only aim here. We would also like to show that each level of interpretation can indeed be considered the PII, yet it has a certain propensity to be considered the PII, a propensity which is higher or lower than the propensity of other levels of interpretation. Thus, the scale in (43) below, which, again, depicts Maximalists' prediction, and is partially inspired by Ariel’s table, should be orthogonal to the one in (44). In fact, we see (43) as potential specification of (44):

(43) Bare linguistic meaning > ‘Explicated\textsubscript{max}’ > Implicature\textsubscript{[strong]} > Implicature\textsubscript{[weak]}.

(44) Strongly communicated message > Weakly communicated message

We would like to emphasize that the models compared here were not originally introduced as models reflecting pragmatic discursive representations within
discourse. But, since we’re interested in grading these representations according to the various models, we here derive potential relevant predictions from them.

We should add that both scales in (43) and (44) above are already presented in the literature, as well as the orthogonal relations between them (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.3). We only advocate the feature of strength, which can be measured by various tests introduced here.

It should also be noted that by no means are we suggesting that the different degrees of strength of these various pragmatic contributions attest to the order in which they are inferred. The issue of processing was not addressed here. We, like Relevance theoreticians, e.g. Carston (2002), believe that interpretive assumptions are retrieved in parallel rather than sequentially. In any case, the results of our experiments cannot be used to support sequential processing. On the other hand, it might be the case that the order of accessibility of hypotheses is indeed determined by degrees of strength. This, however, was not tested here.

In sum, from our point of view, Relevance Theory is a theoretical attempt to offer distinct representational levels, which, when pragmatically-manifested, can be positioned on a graded continuum of communication-strength. This is the Interpretation Strength Scale we intend to support in this study.

Our newly proposed discourse oriented gradation of strength is therefore consistent with the theoretical hierarchy proposed by Maximalists. This gradation should be manifest in different degrees of likelihood of each level of interpretation to be taken as the PII, as well as its likelihood to be denied. Likewise, the discourse which induces the understanding of each level of interpretation are also predicted to
show this gradation. In other words, the Interpretation Strength Scale recognizes not only a fixed strength gradation, according to which explicatures (and within those - bare linguistic meanings) are the strongest, weak implicatures are the weakest, and strong implicatures constitute an intermediate level.

2.2 The rationale for the tests

Four types of tests are used in the present study to examine the different degrees of strength of each level of interpretation:\(^{62}\) (1) a Discourse Coherence test, where we examine different degrees of coherence of discourses which induce the understanding of a certain message as a specific level of interpretation; (2) a Confirmability-as-PII test, where the likelihood of each level to be taken as the PII is examined; (3) a Confirmation of Confidence test which examines the degree of confidence in the confirmation of a certain level of interpretation as the PII; and (4) a Deniability test, where the perceived ability of the speaker to deny an interpretation s/he reasonably communicated is measured. In all the tests, the various levels of interpretation of an utterance are tested, given a context which is based on natural discourse.

The line of the argument is as follows: Using an off-line Coherence test we first measure degree of Discourse Coherence of the texts yielding the understanding of the relevant target representation as a linguistic meaning, explicature, strong implicature, or weak implicature (Chapter 3, Experiment 1). Then, we turn to examining the different degrees of strength that the different levels of interpretation have, using an on-line experiment, examining both Confirmability as PII Decision and Confidence Decision, alongside the response times associated with these decisions (Chapter 3, Experiment 2). To further look into the differences in strength, our next

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\(^{62}\) The tests will be more properly introduced in Chapter 3 below.
step includes two off-line tests (Chapter 3, Experiments 3 and 4), using hard-copy questionnaires. Here we first check speakers’ perceived commitment to various meaning representations by applying the Deniability test, where participants are asked to grade the speakers’ ability to deny having said parts of the intended meaning within a specific discourse. Finally, in order to re-examine the justification for a distinct status of ‘Explicated_{min}’, we further tease apart the different levels of interpretation. In order to see if we can establish a finer strength continuum, various kinds of pragmatic contributions to the explicature level are compared (Experiment 4). This division should enable us to offer a set of fine-tuned distinctions between the statuses of various inferred interpretations. In other words, our strength criteria, we argue, can not only serve to distinguish between linguistic meaning, explicature, strong implicature, and weak implicature; rather, different explicated inferences too can be classified as stronger vs. weaker interpretations.
CHAPTER 3: TESTING THE CRITERIA

3.1 Experiment 1: The Discourse Coherence test

Following van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) and Kintsch (1988), we assume that different levels of interpretation would be reflected by different degrees of discourse coherence. As already noted (Chapter 2), van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) and Kintsch (1988) argue that the network of propositions gradually built by the reader bears a certain degree of coherence, which is influenced by each new piece of information as the text unfolds. Since our trigger utterance, the utterance triggering the interpretation at the end of each text, is different for each level of interpretation, we expect the texts inducing the various levels of interpretation to demonstrate different degrees of coherence. Item (45) is an example (for the full description of the materials see section 3.1.4 below):

(45) **Strong Implicature condition** (Appendices I, II, section 1, item 24)

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence) Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.

3.1.1 Aim.

The aim of this experiment is twofold. First, we aim to make sure that the short texts inducing the interpretation of the target sentence, whether as a linguistic meaning, an explicature, a strong implicature, or a weak implicature, are coherent. By 'coherent'
we mean that the average grade given to the short texts which are designated to give rise to each level of interpretation, does not fall short of 4 on a 7-point scale. Second, we aim to measure degree of coherence of a short text ending in a sentence triggering the interpretation of our target utterances as an indication for the strength of the interpretation. We assume that the process by which one arrives at relevant interpretations is different for each case. Here we examine the texts which, in Experiments 2-4 precede the target utterances inducing the linguistic meaning, the explicature, the strong implicature, or the weak implicature. Coherence rating is the measure: The more coherent the preceding text, the stronger the interpretation.63

Recall that, in all the texts, interpreting the target utterance requires that the text be coherent. Hence, we expect the interpretation generated from the texts, when rated as most coherent, to be either the linguistic meaning or the explicature of the triggers, and the texts rated as least coherent, to hinge on a weak implicature. Strong implicatures should come out as intermediate cases. We thus aim to support our Interpretation Strength hypothesis, whereby linguistic meanings and explicatures are relatively stronger than strong implicatures, which are relatively stronger than weak implicatures.64

3.1.2 Predictions.

Note that, as opposed to the materials to be used in Experiments 2-4, in which the designated inference is made explicit, here we deal with 'conditions' which prompt a certain level of interpretation without making explicit that anticipated inference. On

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63 It should be noted that the experimental materials were pretested. First, the materials were given to three judges, who rated the inferability of the specific interpretations. After running an inter-rater analysis, three more pretests were run (with 11, 14, and 12 participants), where the likelihood of these interpretations to be taken as intended by the speaker was measured. Their results triggered the modifications made to these materials in subsequent experiments.

64 While we cannot prove that subjects actually derive the meaning representations we’re interested in, it stands to reason they do, because it is this representation that renders the short text relevant (see (48) below).
the assumption that testing these short texts for their degree of coherence will prove they are all coherent to a satisfying level (scoring 4 and above on a 7 point coherence scale), we predict a hierarchy of coherence which is compatible with the scale proposed above (repeated here for convenience, see 46). This scale is similar to that promoted by Maximalists, with one exception – we expect the texts calling for the bare linguistic meaning to display a coherence-level which is distinct from that calling for explicatures:

(46) Bare linguistic meaning condition > Explicature condition > Implicature_{[strong]} condition > Implicature_{[weak]} condition

And why is that? Whereas the trigger utterance inducing a bare linguistic interpretation is in fact identical to what is meant by that utterance, the trigger utterance inducing an explicature-interpretation is not, instead it needs to be enriched by some explicated inferences (see examples 47a-d below). It therefore forces the addressee to undergo some cognitive processes (e.g., reference assignment) in his/her search for relevance. Hence, we expect these two conditions to give rise to different degrees of coherence.

Regarding the predicted difference between the Explicature condition and the Strong Implicature condition, we should bear in mind that the derived content is conveyed more directly in the explicature condition than in the strong implicature condition. In other words, the response to the trigger utterance in the strong implicature condition does not prompt the latter as directly as it does in the explicature condition. Rather, the reader presented with the short text, just like the addressee in the short texts, must walk the extra mile to infer the intended answer by a
process which requires more effort, when the strong implicature condition is presented to him/her (again, see examples (47a-d) below).

As for the Weak Implicature condition, we assume that the trigger sentence leading to the derivation of weak implicatures would affect lower coherence rating because it requires more inferential work. In other words, in order to give rise to weak implicatures, the last utterance of the short text has to suggest more possible inferences than the last utterance used in the strong implicature condition (see 1.2.2 above and examples (47a-d) below). When several alternative inferences compete on the prominence and relevance to the same context, it naturally reduces the likelihood of each of them being the most relevant one.

3.1.3 Participants
Sixty native speakers of Hebrew, aged 20-62, 38 men, and 22 women served as participants. All were students of Tel-Aviv University, both undergraduates and graduates. They were paid 20 NIS for their participation.

3.1.4 Materials
First, as mentioned earlier, here we distinguish between the contents of the products and the short texts which induce these inferential products. The products themselves will be tested in Experiments 2-4, where they will serve as the target sentences, which are always the same across levels of interpretation. These target sentences, though not included in the materials used in Experiment 1, must be inferred in order to make the texts preceding them coherent and meaningful, as we explain below (48). Thus, we may say that the unwritten target sentences also contribute to the coherence of the short texts inducing them. As these short texts are supposed to induce the same target
sentences which constitute different levels of interpretation (linguistic meaning/explicature/strong implicature/weak implicature), these short texts differ from each other in their final utterance. Therefore, these short texts are always **different**.

Example of materials (Appendices I, II, section 1, item 24):

(47a) **Linguistic meaning condition**

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence) Michal: Yes, Gadi has been married for two years now.

(47b) **Explicature condition**

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence) Michal: Yes, he has been married for two years now.

(47c) **Strong Implicature condition**

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
(Trigger sentence) Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.

(47d) **Weak Implicature condition**

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.
Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence:) Michal: I called him, but he wasn't home; some kid answered me.

One may ask: why is the level inferred actually the PII? Isn’t it, in fact, the level most reminiscent of the last utterance in the discourse? As noted above, participants are presented with the text short of the target sentence. However, in order to construct a coherent representation of the text, participants should infer this target sentence. Namely, the text would be perceived as coherent only after the unmentioned target sentence is inferred. To illustrate, consider example (47c) repeated here in (48):

(48) **Strong Implicature condition**

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.
Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence) Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.
In this case, the information given by Michal in the trigger sentence would not seem relevant to the specific discourse unless the reference to the ring means that Gadi is married (=the unmentioned target sentence), and is, therefore, not a potential partner.

The four versions of each short text are divided across four hardcopy questionnaires, each containing one version of each short text (a context giving rise to the linguistic meaning or explicature or strong implicature or weak implicature). Each questionnaire includes 24 experimental items and 31 filler items, which were previously assessed as coherent to a low-to-medium degree. Each version of the questionnaire is given to 15 participants.

3.1.5 Procedure.

Participants were presented a booklet which contained 24 experimental items and 31 filler items. They were asked to rate the degree of coherence of each item on a 7 point coherence scale. The instructions were as follows:

You are presented with a few texts. We are interested in their degree of appropriateness. Following each text there is a 7 point-scale of well-formedness/coherence. 1 means incoherent and 7 means highly coherent. You are asked to read each text very carefully, and rate its degree of well-formedness/coherence.

Important: you should indicate only one figure for each item.

For example:

1. Raya and Tali entered the new fancy caffé.

   Raya called the waiter.

   Raya: Excuse me, we are thirsty after the hard work-out we've been doing.

   Waiter: Would you (in Hebrew refers only to Raya) like a glass of water?
Explanation: "It seems to me that the text is not highly coherent. One could have given more information on Raya and Tali's work-out, or the waiter should have offered them both some water. Therefore I rated it as 4."

2. Galia is visiting Yafit. Yafit is offering her a cake.

   Yafit: How is cake?

   Galia: Excellent. I had no idea you could bake.

   Yafit: A little, but I am not really an expert like my mother.

   Explanation: "It seems to me that the things said here are strongly related, and I feel there is no need for any correction. Therefore I rated it as 7."

3. Shachar is asking his friend Tal to introduce him to his friend Ayelet.

   Shachar: Do you know if she likes cheese?

   Tal: I played poker with her two weeks ago.

   Shachar: What does Dani have that I don't?
3.1.6 Results.

Results of degree of coherence show that all the items scored significantly higher than 4, including the weak-implicature-condition: t(23)=3.19, p<0.05. The mean score of each level is presented in Table (2) and illustrated by Figure (1):

Table (2): Rating Mean and SD for Each Level of Interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of interpretation</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic meaning</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicature</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Implicature</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Implicature</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results further established most of the predicted hierarchy with the exception of distinguishing between Bare linguistic meaning condition and Explicature condition.

Both subject ($F_1$) and item ($F_2$) one-way ANOVAs were performed and turned out to be significant, $F_1(3,177)=41.58$, $p<.001$, $F_2(3,69)=11.34$, $p<.001$. When comparisons between conditions were done (using 3 orthogonal contrasts) in order to find which difference is responsible for the significance above and whether the expected hierarchy is supported, the predicted hierarchy was almost fully received: with regard to the difference between the degree of coherence of the linguistic meaning condition and that of the explicature condition, the difference came out non-significant, $F_1(1,59)<1$, n.s.; $F_2(1,23)=1.23$, n.s. However, the contrast between the degree of coherence of the explicature condition and that of the strong implicature condition was significant, $F_1(1,59)=13.87$, $p<.001$; $F_2(1,23)=6.80$, $p<.05$. So was the contrast between the degree of coherence of the strong implicature condition and that of the weak implicature condition: $F_1(1,59)=57.37$, $p<.001$; $F_2(1,23)=12.02$, $p<.005$. 

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Figure (1): **Rating Mean for Each Level of Interpretation**

![Diagram showing rating means for each level of interpretation: Linguistic meaning, Explicature, Strong Implicature, Weak Implicature]
Thus, the degree of coherence of a context inducing the linguistic meaning or the explicature interpretation is higher than the one of a context inducing the strong implicature interpretation, which, in turn, is higher than the one of a context inducing the weak implicature interpretation. The gradation we got was therefore:

(49) Bare linguistic meaning = explicature > Implicature\text{[strong]} > Implicature\text{[weak]}.

3.1.7 Discussion.
Overall, most of the results of Experiment 1 support our predictions regarding the Interpretation Strength Scale. Put differently, there seems to be a scale of coherence which corresponds to the scale of strength supported by Relevance Theory.

These results corroborate both Relevance theory and our own predictions in that they show that the explicature condition is stronger than the strong implicatures condition, which is stronger than the weak implicatures condition. However, the lack of difference between the bare linguistic meaning condition and the explicature condition is unexpected on our account. On the view of PII, the bare linguistic meaning condition should be rated as more coherent than the explicature condition, since we consider it as an independently-manifested level, in some cases at least.

Maximalists such as Recanati would maintain that the results of Experiment 1 could attest to the inability of bare linguistic meanings to function as a pragmatically independent level. In other words, receiving the same coherence score as the explicature condition, the bare linguistic meaning condition demonstrates no independent status, and thus, reinforces the interlocutors' inability to consciously recover the linguistic meaning itself (see, however, Experiment 3 whose results somewhat challenge this possible explanation).
Having established a discourse coherence scale of the texts inducing the understanding of different levels of interpretation, we now turn to examine the relative strength of the products, i.e., the levels of interpretation themselves.

### 3.2 Experiment 2: The Confirmability and Confidence test

In Experiment 2 we are looking at various levels of interpretation of target utterances which, here, follow both the trigger utterance and an unbiassing sentence-context. Consider, for instance, the item in (50) where the target sentence constitutes a strong implicature (see full description of the materials in section 3.2.4 below):

(50) **Strong Implicature** (Appendices I, II, section 2, item 3)

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.

Professor: Yes?

Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?

(Trigger sentence:) Professor: Yes, but I don't have much time now.

(An unbiassing sentence-context:) Please, have a seat.

(Target sentence:) **According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.**

To test our predictions here, we use the Confirmability test and Confidence test. The Confirmability test measures the degree to which participants can confirm that a certain utterance is the PII, and the Confidence test measures their level of confidence in their confirmability decision.
3.2.1 Aim.

The aim of Experiment 2 is to test our predictions regarding the hierarchy of the various levels of interpretation (linguistic meaning, explicature, strong implicature, and weak implicature) taken as the PII (Privileged Interactional Interpretation), by using a Confirmability test, followed by the Confidence test.

3.2.2 Predictions.

Recall that the expected hierarchy is as follows:

(51) Bare linguistic meaning > Explicatures > Implicature_{strong} > Implicature_{weak}

Given the scale in (51), we expect to find here a significant difference between the confirmability of the bare linguistic meanings (as the PII) and that of explicatures. We assumed that testing the confirmability of an interpretation as a PII would be more sensitive to interpretation strength than the coherence-test, as focusing on one sentence should be easier than rating coherence of a whole discourse. To test the different predictions we used a number of measures (Yes/No questions; Response Times to “yes” answers; each involving a specific prediction; Degree of answer confidence; and Response Times to confidence answers).

3.2.2.1 Specific predictions:

1. Yes/No questions. Using a True/False question regarding the target sentence in context, we expect to find significant differences between four levels of interpretation. We predict that bare linguistic meanings would be stronger than explicatures, and explicatures would come out stronger than implicatures with
regard to their likelihood to be taken as intended by the speaker. We also predict a significant difference between strong implicatures and weak implicatures, the former assumed stronger.

2. Response Times to “yes” answers. The predicted RTs to “yes” decisions should also be graded under the assumption that the stronger the interpretation of the target with respect to the trigger, the faster it would take to be confirmed as the PII.

3. Degree of answer confidence. Here too we assume that the stronger the interpretation of the target sentence vis a vis the trigger the greater the confidence of the appropriateness of the answer. Hence, we expect the same gradation to emerge.

4. Response Times to confidence answers. Along the same lines, the greater the confidence the faster the confirmation s/he should be able to determine this confidence degree. Hence, stronger interpretations should be responded to faster.

3.2.3 Participants.
Participants were 72 native Hebrew speakers aged 18-37 (45 female, 27 male). All were students of Tel-Aviv University, both undergraduates and graduates. They were paid 30 NIS for their participation.

3.2.4 Materials.
Thirty-eight short texts are used here, 12 of which are fillers, and two serve as training items. In all, there were 24 experimental items, six items for each level of interpretation in each version. As can be seen in the examples below (52a-d), each
short text has four versions (usually dialogs). The same target sentence is used for each four short texts, but as it is inferred from the text, it constitutes a different level of interpretation in each different version of the same short text. In addition, a short utterance is inserted between the trigger sentence and the target sentence, serving as an unbiasing sentence-context. Its role is to eliminate the possibility of a priming effect, especially in the linguistic meaning and the explicature conditions, which could give them an advantage. Four stimulus presentation files are prepared so that each participant sees only 1 of the 4 versions of the target (Appendices I, II, section 2, item 3):

(52a) **Linguistic meaning**

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.

Professor: Yes?

Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?

(Trigger sentence:) Professor: Yes, but the meeting will be short.

(An unbiasing sentence-context:) Please, have a seat.

(Target sentence:) **According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.**

(52b) **Explicature**

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.

Professor: Yes?

Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?

(Trigger sentence:) Professor: Yes, but it's going to be short.

(An unbiasing sentence-context:) Please, have a seat.

(Target sentence:) **According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.**
(52c) **Strong Implicature**

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.

Professor: Yes?

Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?

*(Trigger sentence:)* Professor: Yes, but I don't have much time now.

*(An unbiasing sentence-context:)* Please, have a seat.

*(Target sentence:)* According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.

(52d) **Weak Implicature**

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.

Professor: Yes?

Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?

*(Trigger sentence:)* Professor: Yes, I wish we could have sat down you for a long meeting.

*(An unbiasing sentence-context:)* Please, have a seat.

*(Target sentence:)* According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.

3.2.5 **Procedure.**

Participants were tested individually. They sat in front of a computer screen and were asked to read the following instructions:

Thank you for participating in this experiment. You are about to read a few very short texts. The texts will unfold one sentence at a time. When you finish reading a sentence, please, press the spacebar to continue.

At the end of each short text, you will be asked to decide whether the last sentence (appearing in capital letters/larger font size) is true or false, based on the text you have just read. The possible answers are YES (for 'true', on your right) and NO (for
'false', on your left). (The appropriate keys (L and S keys on the keyboard, respectively) are marked ‘yes’ and ‘no’).

Please try to answer as quickly and yet as correctly as possible.

After pressing the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ key you will be presented with a scale from 1 to 7 to indicate how confident you are about your ‘yes’/‘no’ answer. You will be asked to press a number from 1 (not confident at all) to 7 (totally confident).

If you have any questions, please ask now.

We will begin with an example.

At this point, after pressing the space bar, the participant was given a sample short text followed by a ‘yes’/‘no’ question, which in turn, was followed by the confidence scale rating. It should be noted that all the sentences of the texts were displayed centrally. The sentences of the text itself appeared on the upper half of the screen, while the target sentence appeared in the middle of the screen. Then the participant was asked if the instructions for the experiment were clear. Once the participant confirmed that s/he understood the instructions, the experiment began. The first two texts served as training items, and the third was always a filler item. Participants advanced the text sentence by sentence by pressing a key. Response times were measured from the onset of the target sentence until the press of the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ key. After pressing the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ key, the following scale was displayed on the screen:
Response times were measured from the onset of the scale until the press of a number (between 1 and 7). The order of the experimental items was random for each participant in every set of tasks, whereas the order of the fillers was fixed across items.

3.2.6 Results.

1. Results of Yes answers are presented in Table (3) and illustrated in Figure (2).

Table (3): Rating Mean and SD ('Yes' Responses) for Each Level of Interpretation (percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Interpretation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic meaning</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicature</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Implicatures</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Implicatures</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.22</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Both subject ($F_1$) and item ($F_2$) one-way ANOVAs were performed and turned out to be significant, $F_1((3,213)=72.78, \ p<.001$, $F_2(3,69)=16.17, \ p<.001$. When comparisons between conditions were done (using 3 orthogonal contrasts), results replicated those of Experiment 1. Again, they were not fully compatible with the predictions, since no significant difference was found between Linguistic meaning and Explicature: $F_1(1,71)<1, \ n.s.; \ F_2(1,23)=1.23, \ n.s. \ However, \ the \ difference \ between \ Explicature \ and \ strong \ Implicature \ was \ significant, \ F_1(1,71)=37.39, \ p<.001; \ F_2(1,23)=11.97, \ p<.005. \ The \ same \ is \ true \ for \ the \ difference \ between \ strong \ implicature \ and \ weak \ implicature: \ F_1(1,71)=30.70, \ p<.001; \ F_2(1,23)=5.07, \ p<.05.
Hence, the scale we received was:

(53) Bare linguistic meanings = Explicatures > Implicature_{strong} > Implicature_{weak}

Note, however, that even the percentage of 'yes' answers given to weak implicature (60%) is significantly higher than chance (50%), as confirmed by a one-sample-t-test, t₁(71)=3.91, p<.0005; t₂(23)=1.91, p<.05.

2. Results of Response Times to Confirmability 'yes' responses are presented in Table (4).

Table (4): Response Times ('Yes' Responses) for Each level of Interpretation (milliseconds)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Interpretation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic meaning</td>
<td>3588</td>
<td>1322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicature</td>
<td>3687</td>
<td>1346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Implicatures</td>
<td>3574</td>
<td>1221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Implicatures</td>
<td>3856</td>
<td>1402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fourteen outliers greater than 3 SD above the mean were discarded from the response time analysis (0.8%). Still, no significant results were received:  F₁(3,213)=1.55, n.s.; F₂(3,69)=1.02, n.s. Our strength scale was therefore not supported by this measure.65

65 This result is inconsistent with some previous studies e.g. Bezuidenhout and Cutting (2002), and Jang et al. (2013).
3. Degree of confidence answer

Table (5) shows the mean rates (between 1 and 7) subjects assigned to how confident they were about their 'yes' responses:

Table (5): Rating Mean and SD ('Yes' Responses) for Each level of interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Interpretation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic meaning</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicature</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Implicatures</td>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Implicatures</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results are illustrated in Figure (3):

Figure (3): Rating Mean ('Yes' Responses) for Each level of interpretation

The resulting hierarchy replicated the results of the likelihood of being confirmed as the PII (the Confirmability test), $F_1(3,213)=23.15$, $p<.001$;
F_2(3,69)=10.61, p<.001. No significant differences were found between linguistic meanings and explicatures: F_1(1,71)=2.00, p=.16; F_2(1,23)<1, n.s. However, the difference between explicatures and strong implicatures was significant: F_1(1,71)=8.48, p<.001; F_2(1,23)=11.62, p<.005, and so was the difference between strong implicatures and weak implicatures: F_1(1,71)=7.31, p<.005, although it only approached significant in the item analysis, F_2(1,23)=3.33, p=.081.

Thus, the scale portrayed by the Confidence test was

\[(54) \text{ Bare linguistic meanings } = \text{ Explicatures } > \text{ Implicature}_{\text{strong}} > \text{ Implicature}_{\text{weak}}\]

4. Response Times to confidence responses

These are presented in Table (6).

Table (6): **Response Times for Each Level of Interpretation (milliseconds)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Interpretation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic meaning</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicature</td>
<td>1341</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Implicatures</td>
<td>1509</td>
<td>740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Implicatures</td>
<td>1570</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results are illustrated in Figure (4).
Again, as in 2 above, 25 outliers greater than 3 SD above the mean were discarded from the response time analysis (1.4%). But unlike the results in 2 above, here, overall, a significant difference was found: F$_1$(3,213)=5.83, $p<.005$; F$_2$(3,69)=4.16, $p<.01$.

Examining the comparisons between conditions revealed an interesting finding. Two differences came out non-significant: a. just like before, the difference between RTs concerning confidence in considering linguistic meanings as the intended meanings and those concerning confidence in considering explicatures as intended meanings was not significant: F$_1$(1,71)<1, n.s.; F$_2$(1,23)<1, n.s., and b. unlike the previous results, the difference between RTs concerning confidence in considering strong implicatures as intended meanings and those concerning confidence in considering weak implicatures as intended meanings was not significant: F$_1$(1,71)<1, n.s.; F$_2$(1,23)<1, n.s.
However, the difference between RTs concerning confidence judgments in considering explicatures and strong implicatures as the intended meanings turned out significant: $F_1(1,71) = 5.11, p < .05; F_2(1,23) = 5.84, p < .05$.

Thus, examining the parameter of Response Times to determining the degree of confidence in the response given in the confirmability task yielded the following scale:

(55) Linguistic meaning = explicature < Implicature_{[strong]} = Implicature_{[weak]}.

3.2.7 Discussion.

The results of Experiment 2 indicate a partial hierarchy in both confirmability and degree of confidence as to the likelihood of each level of interpretation to be considered PII. In this hierarchy, the explicature (bare linguistic meaning included) is the strongest level, weak implicature is the weakest level, and strong implicature is the intermediate level. The results of the online Confidence test also demonstrate a dichotomy, grouping linguistic meaning and 'explicated_{max}' on the one hand, as the levels whose degree of confidence is determined faster, and the 'implicated' on the other.

A number of conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the results of Experiment 2:

1. First, the lack of differences between linguistic meanings and explicatures does not support the psychological reality of linguistic meanings, which, when in discourse, are shown here to be subjected to enrichment to the level of explicatures, as argued by Relevance theoreticians. Moreover, this lack of differences suggests that in discourse, the routine enrichment of the bare linguistic meaning renders it possible only on a theoretical level of interpretation.
In fact, the relatively rare cases where it has been shown to be taken as PII might be misunderstandings and wise-guy interpretations (see Ariel, 2008: 304).

2. Explicatures and (strong and weak) implicatures are ordered on a scale, which reflects their likelihood to be taken as the PII. The strongest level, the one with the highest likelihood to be considered the PII, is the explicature, as proposed by Ariel (2008, 2010), Carston (2012 p.c.), and Recanati (2004), among others.

3. An especially interesting result is the finding that the likelihood of weak implicatures to be taken as PII is above chance (60%). Hence, these results suggest that when the context is rich and supportive, weak implicatures can also be identified as the PII. This underscores the highly influential role context plays in understanding discourse.

4. The hierarchy revealed when measuring participants' degree of confidence in their 'yes' responses also supports Ariel (2008, 2010) and Maximalist approaches (see Chapter 1 above), in that it attests to the relatively high strength of explicatures as the level that is most likely to be considered the PII. Participants found it easier to confirm explicatures as the PII than to confirm both strong and weak implicatures.

5. The null results, showing no differences in response times to the decision as to whether to accept the target sentences as PIIs, argue against our hypothesis.

6. However, differences in response times to determining the degree of confidence of participants in their 'yes' answer were partially supportive of the predicted gradation, showing, however, that it comprises of 2 (rather than 4) types of interpretations that differ in strength:
Bare linguistic meanings = Explicatures > Implicature[strong] = Implicature[weak]

This dichotomy thus differentiates between the explicated and the implicated. It attests to the psychological reality of each of these categories. It thus supports the Relevance theoretic account, which draws the line between explicated and implicated inferences.

### 3.3 Experiment 3: The Deniability test

Deniability, as introduced in Chapter 2, is the interactional parallel of Grice's (1989) Cancelability. Deniability tests the extent to which a speaker is licensed to say that s/he has never said a specific content in a certain situation. Deniability may be applied in cases Cancelability cannot. Here is an example of an item (given again in 3.3.4 below):

(57) **Strong Implicature** (Appendices I, II, section 3, item 24)

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

*(Trigger sentence:)* Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.

*(Target sentence:)* **Conclusion:** According to Michal, Gadi is married.

**Question:** Can Michal deny the conclusion (=to what extent will Michal be licensed to say in the future: "In that situation, I didn't say that Gadi was married.")
3.3.1 **Aim.**

Our aim is to use the Deniability test as a tool to differentiate between all levels of interpretation on the strength hierarchy: Linguistic meanings should be the hardest to deny, followed by explicatures and then by strong implicatures. Weak implicatures should prove the easiest to deny. Although it is possible that the inferred representations already confirmed as potential PIIs might be considered deniable, some should be denied less easily than other inferred representations, which were found to be weaker (Experiments 1-2). If so, Deniability might prove to be a more sensitive tool to identify interpretation strength.

3.3.2 **Predictions.**

By now, one possible interactional gradation has been established: linguistic meaning = explicature > implicature\textsubscript{[strong]} > implicature\textsubscript{[weak]}.\(^{66}\) In Experiments 1 and 2, the level of explicatures manifested a unique behavior, and proved itself stronger than both strong and weak implicatures. However, as the difference between the bare linguistic meaning and the explicature does exist theoretically, we assume the Deniability test would be a more sensitive test that would bring out the difference between linguistic meanings and explicatures. This can be justified by the following reasoning:

\(^{66}\)This gradation has been established in both Experiments 1 and 2. However, we should mention that the differences in the response times to confidence answers in Experiment 2, yielded a different gradation: linguistic meaning = explicature > implicature\textsubscript{[strong]} = implicature\textsubscript{[weak]}.
1. The Deniability test forces the participant to go back to the short text to see whether the proposition of the given target sentence can be denied as having been said by the speaker, and if so, to what extent it can be denied.

2. Returning to the short text forces the participant to consider every little deviation from the phrasing of the target sentence.

3. We believe that these deviations will make the participants more attentive to the possibility of denying the content of the target sentence. For example, these deviations include uses of pronouns in the trigger sentences instead of lexical nouns in the target sentences (reference assignment). Here the participants could perhaps reason that other referents could be intended by the pronouns in the trigger sentences.

We therefore aim to show that the Deniability test would attest to a distinct status of the level of bare linguistic meanings as well.

   In view of this line of reasoning, we expect the results to correspond to those of either the Discourse Coherence test (Experiment 1) or the PII Confirmability test (Experiment 2) with one exception – the Deniability of the bare linguistic meanings will turn out different from that of explicatures:

   (58) Bare Linguistic Meanings > Explicatures > Implicatures[strong] > Implicatures[weak]
3.3.3 Participants.

The participants were 48 students of Tel-Aviv University both undergraduates and graduates (22 women, 26 men), aged 20-44. All were native speakers of Hebrew. They were paid 30 NIS for their participation.

3.3.4 Materials.

Unlike Experiment 2, Experiment 3 is an off-line test, which enabled the participants to read the texts over and over again, making redundant the need for the unbiasing sentences (used in the texts of Experiment 2). This time participants were presented with target sentences they had to rate in terms of perceived deniability. All versions of all short texts were arranged in four different questionnaires, each consisting of 39 items: 2 sample items, 1 buffer (presented as question 1), 12 fillers and 24 experimental items. Each questionnaire comprised 6 short texts whose target sentence was the linguistic meaning, 6 – whose target sentence was the explicature, 6 – whose target sentence was the strong implicature, and 6 – whose trigger sentence induced understanding the target sentence as the weak implicature.

We should bear in mind that participants are comparing the same target sentence, which either constitutes the linguistic meaning in one context, or the explicature, or the strong implicature, or the weak implicature in other contexts (differing basically in terms of the trigger sentences within otherwise a rather identical context). For example (Appendices I, II, section 3, item 24)):

(59a) **Linguistic meaning**

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

67 These four versions of the same short text appeared in four different questionnaires.
Michal met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence:) Michal: Yes, Gadi has been married for two years now.

(Target sentence:) Conclusion: According to Michal, Gadi is married.

(59b) Explicature

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence:) Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.

(Target sentence:) Conclusion: According to Michal, Gadi is married.

(59c) Strong Implicature

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence:) Michal: I called him, but he wasn't home; some kid answered me.

(Target sentence:) Conclusion: According to Michal, Gadi is married.

(59d) Weak Implicature

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

(Trigger sentence:) Michal: I called him, but he wasn't home; some kid answered me.

(Target sentence:) Conclusion: According to Michal, Gadi is married.
3.3.5 Procedure.

Participants were instructed to rate the degree of deniability of each target sentence taken into consideration the circumstances under which it was uttered (the phrase 'under these circumstances' was underlined in each question, see section 3.3.4; above emphasis was added also by the experimenter). Given these specific instructions, we argue that what was rated was in fact perceived as the PII. The instructions were as follows:

*Thank you for participating in this experiment.*

*You are about to read a few short texts. At the end of each short text there is a conclusion derived on the basis of what a speaker in that text has just said. You are asked to rate, on a 7 point scale, the extent to which it is possible for that same speaker to deny having said (what is mentioned in) the conclusion, which could be implied from what s/he had said. You may change your mind and change your rating before submitting the questionnaire.*

Following the instructions, two practice examples were presented followed by a comprehension. Once the participant’s understanding of the task was confirmed, s/he was left alone to finish rating the deniability of all the items.

3.3.6 Results.

Results of the rating means and SDs are presented in Table (7) and in Figure (5).
Table (7): Rating Mean and SD for Each Level of Interpretation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Interpretation</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic meanings</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicatures</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Implicatures</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Implicatures</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two one-way ANOVAs (one for subjects and one for items) revealed that there was a significant difference between the grades given to each level of interpretation, $F_1(3,141)=101.19, p<.001; F_2(3,69)=37.69, p<.001$. Comparisons between conditions showed a significant difference between each pair of conditions, thus, yielding a clear hierarchy: linguistic meaning – explicature: $F_1(1,47)=2.07, p=.08$ (marginally significant); $F_2(1,23)=2.50, p<.05$ ; explicature – strong implicature: $F_1(1,47)=51.37, p<.001$; $F_2(1,23)=27.63, p<.001$ ;strong implicature – weak implicature: $F_1(1,47)=51.47, p<.001; F_2(1,23)=32.28, p<.005$.

Hence, the scale we received for Deniability was:

(60) Bare Linguistic meanings < Explicatures < Implicature[strong] < Implicature[weak]

The less deniable the level, the stronger it is, which means that the strength scale was:

(61) Bare Linguistic meanings > Explicatures > Implicature[strong] > Implicature[weak]
This hierarchy is illustrated in Figure (5):

Figure (5): **Rating Mean for Each Level of Interpretation**

As can be seen, the gap between the deniability of linguistic meanings and explicatures is notably smaller than both the one between explicatures and strong implicatures and the one between strong implicatures and weak implicatures. That is, with regard to Deniability, explicatures are much closer to linguistic meanings than to strong implicatures. But we should also note that while linguistic meanings, as well as explicatures, are perceived as very hard to deny, the rating assigned by participants to strong implicatures was 3.2, showing that they too were not so easy to deny. Weak implicatures were the only ones to get a rating higher than 4. Another interesting finding is that, in some contexts, even linguistic meanings are deniable. Indeed, they are deniable to a very low degree, yet the speaker is still seen as licensed to deny saying them.

In sum, linguistic meanings are the most difficult to deny (their deniability rating was the lowest - below 2), and thus the strongest, weak implicatures are the easiest to deny (their deniability rating was the highest - above 4), i.e. the weakest.
Strong implicatures and Explicatures are of an intermediate level. But in fact, while the deniability of explicatures is significantly different from that of the linguistic meanings, it is closer to it than to that of strong implicatures.

3.3.7 Discussion.

The findings of Experiment 3 provide support for the predicted scale (X > Y = X is stronger, i.e. less deniable than Y):

(62) Bare Linguistic Meanings > Explicatures > Implicature_{strong} > Implicature_{weak}

Interactionally speaking, unlike the results of Experiments 1 and 2, here, bare linguistic meanings have proven to constitute a distinct level of interpretation. Only one explanation seems possible: the Deniability test is unique in that it involves negation which, in the task under discussion, is demanding, requiring thinking and rethinking. The result is the most fine-tuned perception of the differences between these various levels of interpretations, whose gradation, as in a fuzzy set, may often escape clear cut distinctions, especially when not sufficient processing time is allowed (as is the case in Experiment 2). Compared to the less demanding tests used earlier, this task yielded a significant difference between all the levels of interpretation anticipated.

The results of Experiment 3 also support Relevance theory. They attest to the psychological reality of each of the 3 types of interpretation tested, including the explicature, which here emerges as a distinct level of interpretation distinguishable not only from both types of implicatures, but also from the bare linguistic meaning, thus manifesting its own discursive pattern. On the one hand, explicature is not as
easily deniable as strong (and weak) implicatures, but on the other hand, it is not as difficult to deny as bare linguistic meanings. As such, the results of Experiment 3 also support the trichotomy of levels of interpretation as presented by Relevance Theory. Moreover, the proximity detected between the low deniability of linguistic meanings and explicatures supports a Maximalists’ ‘Explicated’ level, which consists of the linguistic meaning enriched by various explicated inferences.

Of course, the very low degree of deniability of linguistic meanings, as opposed to the relatively high degree of deniability of implicatures is also compatible with Grice’s a-contextual Cancelability criterion. Based on Grice’s inclusion of ambiguity resolution and reference assignment under ‘Explicated_{\text{min}}’, Griceans may find partial support in the higher proximity of explicatures to linguistic meanings than to implicatures, promoting ‘Explicated_{\text{min}}’. However, the explicated inferences used in Experiment 3 are not restricted to ambiguity resolution and reference assignments. Rather, they involved various ways of enriching an utterance, including enrichments of and conjunctions.\textsuperscript{68} Hence, unless the group of explicatures is divided into its sub-categories and examined separately, the Minimalist model cannot be said to be supported.\textsuperscript{69}

An additional important finding is the confirmation of the newly introduced Deniability test. As this test is used only after having established the strength hierarchy (Experiments 1 and 2), the (almost-fully) replicated results we get here reinforce the ability of this test to measure degrees of strength of levels of interpretation.

Taken together, the results of Experiments 1-3 provide support for our Interpretation Strength Scale, which orders the levels of interpretation on a scale

\textsuperscript{68} See Chapter 2 for details.

\textsuperscript{69} This will be taken up in experiment 4.
based on their degree of strength. As the Interpretation Strength Scale opts for scalar rather than clear-cut boundaries between the various levels, we also predicted differences of degrees of strength within the level of implicatures (strong vs. weak).

Having established the psychological reality of explicatures, we now shift our focus to the level of explicatures and its unique behavior. We considered the possibility that what seems to be a trichotomy is actually a within-levels-continuum. Thus, Experiment 4 will test the assumption that we have a continuum of levels of interpretation, and not just three distinct levels. We will divide up the group of explicatures into sub-groups based on various kinds of pragmatic contributions, looking for significant differences between them.

3.4 Experiment 4: The Deniability test (only Explicatures)

Having established the explicate as a valid and distinct level of interpretation, we now zero in on the various pragmatic contributions included within explicatures - the explicated inferences. An explicated inference can be the outcome of any one of a number of processes, such as disambiguation, reference assignment, and enrichment, etc. Are there any differences between these various explicated inferences, in terms of their degree of strength? Will these differences reflect a possibly different status for an Explicated\textsubscript{min} versus an Explicated\textsubscript{max}?

3.4.1 Aim

The aim of this experiment was twofold:

1. Replicating the results of previous experiments, which supported the relatively high degree of strength of explicatures, as far as deniability is concerned.
2. Testing the continuum hypothesis by examining the behavior of five categories of explicatory inferences (see explanation in 3.4.4 below): lexical disambiguation, reference assignment, default (or salient in terms of being prototypical members of a category or a scenario) enrichments, e.g., *eating breakfast today*, completion of fragmentary answers and various *and* enrichments.\(^\text{70}\)

### 3.4.2 Predictions

The strength continuum suggests the following prediction: although there is a significant difference between all explicatures taken together as a single category and all other meaning levels, some explicatory inferences might be easier to deny than others, and thus might be ranked closer to strong implicatures. Other explicatory inferences may be harder to deny, which would allow them to be ranked as closer to linguistic meanings. If so, we may offer a continuum of levels of interpretation organized according to their ease of deniability within the explicature category. In other words, the proposal is that we may find a far richer scale than first envisioned. Instead of the simple scale in (43), repeated here in (63):

\[(63) \text{ Bare linguistic meaning} > \text{ Explicated}_{\text{max}} > \text{Implicature}_{\text{[strong]}} > \text{Implicature}_{\text{[weak]}} \]

we may have more members on the scale, breaking down the conventional Explicature category, we operated with so far, into sub-categories.\(^\text{71}\)

---

\(^{70}\) Regarding the *and*-conjunction, Levinson (1995, 1998, 2000) also includes them in his distinct category of GCIs, yet, his enriched meaning of *and* does not account for a wide range of relations, as were examined here.

\(^{71}\) It should be noted that Relevance-theoreticians too suggested gradability of strength, but their gradability depending on the relative contribution of the explicatory inferences versus that of linguistic meaning, rather than on the nature of different pragmatic contributions.
Minimalists’ ideas, one might predict that the explicatures which result from the processes involved in Grice’s (1975, 1989) ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’, i.e., lexical ambiguity resolution and reference assignment (core inferences), will be relatively harder to deny (See Chapter 1, section 1.2.1.1). Such a result will lend support to the psychological reality of the Gricean ‘Explicated\textsubscript{min}’, since it will place these two inference types closer to the linguistic meaning than other explicated inferences on the continuum (Berg, 2002; Borg, 2005; Grice, 1989; Horn, 1984, 2006; Levinson, 1983, 2000). In an intermediate position we may find Levinson’s additional ‘presumptive meanings’. These ‘periphery’ inferences are predicted to be easier to deny.\textsuperscript{72}

Following is the Minimalists’ predicted scale:

(64) Reference resolution/Disambiguation $>$ Default enrichments/Fragments completion/Conjunction enrichments

However, since Levinson did not include all possible enrichments of and-conjunction (see f. 70 above), Minimalists’ should in fact predict that Conjunction enrichments are the easiest to deny, as most materials here are not confined to the temporal-relation-enrichment. Hence,

(65) Reference resolution/Disambiguation $>$ Default enrichments/Fragments completion $>$ Conjunction enrichments

\textsuperscript{72} Note that a hierarchy of Levinson’s (2000) GCIs was tested by Larson et al. (2009). However, their results were not compatible with Levinson’s classification system.
Maximalists, on the other hand, have not offered a strength-based distinction between different types of explicated pragmatic enrichments. Thus, they seem to have no predictions as to the hierarchy of these pragmatic enrichments.

3.4.3 Participants
Participants were 32 students from Tel-Aviv University (19 women, 13 men), aged 20-29, both undergraduates and graduates. All were native speakers of Hebrew. They were paid 30 NIS for their participation.

3.4.4 Materials
In addition to the materials used in Experiment 3, we added new short texts allowing the testing of the various kinds of pragmatic contributions to explicature found in the literature. We intended to test the deniability of explicatures which are the result of five pragmatic processes: reference assignment, lexical ambiguity resolution, default enrichments, fragment completion, and and Enrichments.

As the materials used in our previous experiments did not include items which summoned lexical ambiguity resolutions, we had to construct such cases, while checking the degree of salience of various meanings of ambiguous words. In order to be 'salient', information must be consolidated, i.e. stored in the mental lexicon (Giora, 1997, 1999, 2003; Peleg et al., 2004). According to Giora, salience is gradable, and affected by e.g., frequency, experiential familiarity, conventionality, and prototypicality. Salient meanings are coded and feature dominantly in the mental lexicon. Consequently, they are accessed automatically, irrespective of contextual information to the contrary; less-salient meanings, however, while coded too, lag behind and often reach a threshold only when contextual information invites them.
Based on the unconditional accessibility of salient meanings, we too assume that
disambiguation does not occur when the salient meaning is also the compatible one.
Therefore, in order to ascertain that disambiguation indeed occurs, we revised almost all the short texts so that the meaning the interlocutor has to zoom in on in order to infer the target sentence is the less-salient one.\(^{73}\) Likewise, our previous experiments did not contain enough items which induce the addressee to attribute additional pragmatic meanings to conjunctions, so some of these had to be added as well. In order to ascertain that the new explicatures were strong, compared to other optional explicatures of the same utterance, a pretest was conducted.

3.4.4.1 Pretest

The pretest consisted of 20 short texts up to four lines long. Each short text ended in an utterance uttered by one of the protagonists of the text. Three possible explicatures appeared following each short text, and the participants were asked to rate each of the explicatures on a 7 point scale of (ranging between 1 =under the circumstances, the speaker did not mean that at all and 7 =under the circumstances, that is precisely what the speaker meant). For example:

(66a) Disambiguation (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 13)

The Doctors at the maternity ward at Sheba Hospital are coming out of a staff meeting.

Nurse: What was the meeting about?

\(^{73}\) There is evidence showing that when the salient meaning is compatible with contextual information, the less salient meaning is not retrieved (Gernsbacher, 1993; Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991; Giora, 1999, 2003; Giora and Fein, 1999). Hence, we made an attempt to make less salient meanings contextually compatible. The data about the more and less salient meanings of the ambiguous words was taken from Peleg and Eviatar (2008).
Doctor: We talked about the patients. (in Hebrew: yolot, = sick (fem, pl). The word yolot also means sands).

Under the circumstances above, what does the doctor actually say?

A. We talked about the land.

B. We talked about the seashore.

A. We talked about the patients in the ward.

(66b) Conjunction enrichment (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 26)

Ruthi meets her friend's neighbor, and she likes him.

Ruthi: What do you know about him?

The friend: He is cute and complicated.

Under the circumstances above, what does the friend actually say?

A. The neighbor is firstly cute, and secondarily complicated.
B. The neighbor is cute, but complicated.

C. The neighbor is both cute and complicated.

The short texts that scored highest on that scale were added to the materials from Experiment 3, yielding a total of 30 short texts. These 30 short texts were used in Experiment 4.74

3.4.4.2 Materials of the main Experiment

Each of the 30 short texts selected on the basis of the pretest provided contexts for an identical “conclusion” (see 52), which served as an explicature (see 52a-e). Below are examples of each of the pragmatic contributions to the explicature.

(67a) Reference resolution (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 29)

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal met Gadi at a party and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on him?

Michal: He's married.

Conclusion: Gadi is married.

74 Naturally, the participants of the pretest were not those who also participated in the main experiment. Thirty-two students of Tel-Aviv University and the Shenkar college participated in the pretest.
Lexical ambiguity resolution (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 13)

The Doctors at the maternity ward at Sheba Hospital are coming out of a staff meeting.

Nurse: What was the meeting about?

Doctor: We talked about the patients. (in Hebrew: xolot, = sick (fem, pl). The word xolot also means sands).

Conclusion: We talked about the patients in the ward.

Default (or Salient) Enrichment (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 12)

Yonni and his friends went on a hike. At 10 o'clock Yonni begins preparing a late breakfast for everyone. He wants to know whether Smadar would like an omelet, but cannot find her.

He asks her friend Rinat: Would Smadar like an omelet?

Rinat: Smadar has already had breakfast.

Conclusion: Smadar has already had breakfast that morning.

Fragment completion (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 17)

Ran and Ofer are visiting the museum. Ran wants to show Ofer a picture he really liked.

Ofer: Well, when are we going to see the picture you talked about so much?

Ran: On your left.

Conclusion: The picture I liked is on your left.

Enriched conjunctions (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 34)

Iris and Yonni go on a night trip in the Judean desert. The next morning, when Iris comes back alone, their friend Dror asks her: Where’s Yonni?

Iris: Yonni felt bad and went to the hospital.
Conclusion: Yonni felt bad and therefore went to the hospital.\textsuperscript{75}

All short texts were inserted into one questionnaire alongside 10 filler items, which included strong implicatures we didn't use in our previous experiments. Each question was always followed by an explanation (here, as in the original questionnaire – in bold). For example:

(68) An example of an item in Experiment 4 (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 17)

Ran and Ofer are visiting the museum. Ran wants to show Ofer a picture he really liked.

Ofer: Well, when are we going to see the picture you talked about so much?

Ran: On your left.

Conclusion: The picture I liked is to your left.

\textbf{Question: Can Ran deny the conclusion (=to what extent will Ran be licensed to say to ofer in the future: "In that situation, I didn't say that the picture I liked was to your left.")}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ccccccc}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 & 7 \\
Very low & & Medium & & & & Very high \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Of the 30 short texts, six tested reference assignment (personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns), six tested lexical ambiguity resolution, six tested default enrichments (some based on common examples from the literature (e.g. Bach, 1994;\textsuperscript{75} Noveck and Reboul (2008) and Pouscoulous and Noveck (2009) have already shown that a strongly biased context facilitates pragmatic inferencing, especially when scalar implicatures or the $\text{and}$-conjunction are involved.

\textsuperscript{75}
Recanati, 2004 inter alia), six tested completion of fragmentary utterances, and 6 tested ‘and’ enrichments (= ‘and then’, ‘therefore’ or ‘nonetheless’). Again, some of these examples were also taken from the literature (Ariel, 2008; Carston, 2002 inter alia). The questions were presented to the participants in a restricted random order. We made sure that consecutive items always concerned different types of explicated inferences.

3.4.5 Procedure

As in Experiment 3.

3.4.6 Results

Table (8): Rating Mean and SD for Each Pragmatic Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pragmatic process</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disambiguation</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjunction enrichment</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Default enrichments</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference resolution</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragment completion</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results support the relatively strong status of explicated inferences. The deniability ratings of the explicated inferences tested here range between 1.85 and 3.71, clearly heavily skewed towards the non-deniable end of the scale.

Note that the higher the mean, the more deniable, and thus the weaker, the inference. These results are illustrated in Figure (6):
Figure (6): Rating Mean for Each Pragmatic Process

The subject and item ANOVAs showed that there are differences between the 5 categories: $F_1(4,124)=35.52$, $p<.001$; $F_2(4,25)=6.49$, $p<.005$. Since, following Maximalists, we had no specific predictions as to the expected hierarchy of the Deniability of the various pragmatic contributions, we first employed a Helmert-contrast analysis (between each category and the mean of all subsequent categories), to establish the statistically significant gradation:

1. lexical disambiguation-(mean of all other 4): $F_1(1,31)=81.87$, $p<.001$; $F_2(1,25)=17.41$, $p<.001$.

2. And-conjunction- (mean of default enrichments, reference assignment, completion of fragmentary answers): $F_1(1,31)=15.53$, $p<.001$; $F_2(1,25)=4.96$, $p<.05$.

3. default enrichment-(mean of reference assignment, completion of fragmentary answers): $F_1(1,31)=31.63$, $p<.001$; $F_2(1,25)=3.60$, $p=.07$.

4. reference assignment-completion of fragmentary answers: $F_1(1,31)<1$, n.s.; $F_2(1,25)<1$, n.s.
Next, we examine the differences between each and the ones positioned next to it by employing a repeated contrast analysis:

1. **disambiguation-conjunction enrichment:** \( F_1(1,31)=16.45, \ p<.001; \)
   \( F_2(1,25)=3.75, \ p=.064. \)
2. conjunction enrichment–default enrichment: \( F_1(1,31)=2.37, \ p=.13, \ \text{n.s.}; \)
   \( F_2(1,25)<1, \ \text{n.s.} \)
3. default enrichment–reference resolution: \( F_1(1,31)=24.88, \ p<.001; \)
   \( F_2(1,25)=2.46, \ p=.13, \ \text{n.s.} \)
4. reference resolution-fragment completion: \( F_1(1,31)<1, \ \text{n.s.}; F_2(1,25)<1, \ \text{n.s.} \)

It should be noted, however, that the analysis by subjects is much more meaningful here. This is because we had a relatively large number of participants for the 'within-subject' analysis, as each participant answered all categories of pragmatic enrichments, whereas item-wise, the Experiment comprised only six items in each category.

Thus, in light of the results received from Subject ANOVA, the hierarchy of strength we got was:

(69) Fragmentary answers completion/Reference resolution > Default enrichment/Conjunction enrichment > Disambiguation

Or:

(70) Group 1: Fragment completion/Reference resolution >

Group 2: Default enrichment/and-Conjunction enrichment >
Group 3: Disambiguation

Figure (7) crudely describes the scale in (69):

**Figure (7): The Formed Hierarchy of Deniability within The Category of Explicature**

As can be seen, results support a three-way division of degree of strength: fragment completions are as strong as reference resolutions, and both constitute the least deniable category; default enrichments and *and*-conjunction enrichments are also equally strong, but they are easier to deny than fragment completions and reference resolutions; explicatures resulting from disambiguation are the weakest category, i.e. the easiest to deny.

It is difficult to compare these results to the results of Larson et al. (2009), since most of their tested categories were not tested by us. However, we can see a difference between the likelihood of their 'conjunction buttressing' category to be counted as 'what is said', and the likelihood of our *and*-conjunction category to be deniable. Their 'conjunction buttressing' category received a total of 25% false responses, which means that 75% of the responses treated them as implicated rather than said. Our category of *and*-conjunction, on the other hand, demonstrated a 2.89 mean rating of deniability. Thus, whereas Larson et al.’s results suggest that enriched meaning of *and*-conjunction was relatively easy to cancel, we found that it was much
harder to deny. This difference may derive from two factors. First, Larson et al. asked for a True or False answer (=Cancelability), whereas we asked the participants to rate the Deniability on a 7 point scale. Second, whereas Larson et al. focused on the literally-conveyed content, we directed the participants towards the PII, which is more discourse-dependent.

3.4.7 Discussion

We will begin with the conclusions which can be drawn from these results, and then propose a post-hoc explanation for the particular gradation found.

First and foremost, the gradation we receive supports Recanati’s (2004 and onwards) division within primary processes into cases of saturation and cases of enrichment. As noted above (Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.1), Recanati (2004) opts for sequential processing, where the output of primary pragmatic processes (=Recanati’s 'what is said_{prag}') is the input for secondary pragmatic processes, which, in turn, yield 'what is communicated'. Whereas primary pragmatic processes are pre-propositional, help determine what is said and its truth-value, secondary pragmatic processes are post-propositional, and are can take place only after a full propositional content was completed. Experiment 4 only tested the output of primary pragmatic processes: saturation and enrichment. Whereas saturation is linguistically-mandated, enrichment is grammatically-optional and context-driven. Thus, we can say that our results reflect this difference exactly: completion of fragmentary answers and reference assignment (Group 1) are included in 'saturation', as they are grammatically-necessary for creating a full proposition, bearing a truth-value. Other processes we examined (Group 2: default enrichments, and enrichments of and-conjunction) are Recanati’s
enrichments, which are processed in a top-down direction, i.e. predominantly influenced by context.

In addition to Recanati’s definition of Group 1 as grammatically-mandated, we found that our Group 1 cases can be further specified in that when completing a fragmentary answer or assigning reference, people rely on linguistic expressions which were already part of the specific discourse. For example (relevant words are in bold, and the relevant components in the trigger utterance are underlined):

(71a) **Fragmentary answers completion** (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 17)

Ran and Ofer are visiting the museum. Ran wants to show Ofer **a picture** he really liked.

Ofer: Well, when are we going to see **the picture** you talked about so much?

Ran: **On your left**.

**Conclusion: The picture I liked is to your left.**

(71b) **Reference assignment** (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 29)

Michal and Anat are talking about **Gadi**, a guy Michal fancies.

Michal has met **Gadi** at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.

Anat: Well, did you check up on **him**?

Michal: Yes, **he** has been married for two years now.

**Conclusion: Gadi is married.**

---

76 The explanation presented here partly corresponds to Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995: 140-141) three ways to extend any context (not necessarily a verbal context): "going back in time", adding encyclopaedic knowledge, and picking up information from the immediately observable environment.
This is not the case when enriching a meaning of an utterance or the linguistic meaning of the *and*-conjunction (group 2) is concerned. In addition to the fact pointed to by Recanati that the processes in this group are grammatically optional, the materials were such that people mainly relied on world knowledge, which they applied to the specific context. The interpretation of Group 2 usually in follows common, stereotypic situations. For example (the relevant components in the trigger utterance and the target sentences are underlined):

(72a) **Default Enrichment** (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 12)

Yonni and his friends went on a hike. At 10 o'clock Yonni begins preparing a late breakfast for everyone. He wants to know whether Smadar would like an omelet, but cannot find her.

He asks her friend Rinat: Would Smadar like an omelet?

Rinat: Smadar already had breakfast.

**Conclusion:** Smadar already had breakfast **that morning**.

(72b) **And-Conjunction** (Appendices I, II, section 4, item 34)

Iris and Yonni go on a night trip in the Judean desert. The next morning, when Iris comes back alone, their friend Dror asks her: Where's Yonni?

Iris: Yonni felt bad and went to the hospital.

**Conclusion:** Yonni felt bad and **therefore** went to the hospital.

Thus, these differences are in line with Recanati's division of primary processes into saturation (Group 1) and enrichment (Group 2). In light of these characteristics, we may conclude that sources of interpretation also form a scale, which corresponds to the scale of pragmatic processes:
Immediate discourse > World knowledge/common scenarios

Hence, inferences based on common-scenarios tend to be more deniable than inferences based on recovery of material explicitly mentioned in the previous discourse. This suggestion should, however, be tested in future research.

We discussed two differences between the processes in Group 1 and the processes in Group 2. One was Recanati's division into linguistically-mandated processes (group 1) and linguistically-optional processes (group 2). The second difference is related to the source of information interlocutors rely on when undergoing these processes (73 above). We propose that the relationship between these two factors should be examined in future research. While it’s probably not the case that every grammatically mandated process is limited to a “narrow context”-retrieval and every grammatically optional process requires a “wide context”-retrieval, there may very well be some correlation between the two, as is often assumed by Minimalists.

What about disambiguation? The results seem surprising in view of the fact that most researchers, Grice and neo-Griceans included, consider disambiguation a part of 'what is said'. We propose that disambiguation is not a unitary phenomenon, as has been assumed so far. When resolving lexical ambiguity, people base their understanding on the discourse. As noted above, following Giora's (1999, 2003) Graded Salience Hypothesis, we assumed that if the context supports the salient meaning of a word, the less-salient meaning may not be retrieved. Hence

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77 It should also be noted that under closer scrutiny it was found that the group of inferences based on completing default enrichments in this test was not a monolithic group. It was quite diverse in the sense that the enrichment of some target sentences was based on lexical antecedents in the immediate discourse as well as on world knowledge/common scenarios. However, in almost all six cases, understanding the target sentences was predominantly based on world knowledge.
disambiguation might not occur. Therefore, five of our six contexts summoned the
less-salient meaning of the ambiguous word, so that participants would be forced to
engage in disambiguation. In other words, in five of the six items it was the less-
salient meaning that was congruent with the target sentence. For example
(Appendices I, II, section 4, item 13):

(74) The Doctors at the maternity ward at Sheba Hospital are coming out of a
staff meeting.

Nurse: What was the meeting about?

Doctor: We talked about the patients. (in Hebrew: xolot, = sick (fem, pl). The
word xolot also means sands, which is the more salient meaning).

Conclusion: We talked about the patients in the ward.

Recanati considers the pragmatic process of disambiguation as a non-optional
process, like saturation. This is because the content including the ambiguous
component is not literally truth-evaluable. It is not propositional, until the appropriate
semantic value is assigned to the ambiguous component.

However, our results seem to point to the opposite, because the sentences
involving disambiguation in Experiment 4 were the easiest to deny, even more
deniable than the sentences involving default enrichments and and-enrichments.

One possible explanation comes to mind:

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78 One item (appendix II, section 4, item 33) supported the salient meaning. However, although this
item received the lowest deniability grade, its grade was very similar to grades received by a few
other items in the disambiguation category.

79 As already pointed out, the data about the more and less salient meanings of the ambiguous words is
taken from Peleg and Eviatar (2008).
Unlike the contexts in conditions 1-2, which support salient meanings, the contexts in condition 3 are biased in favor of the less-salient meaning. Recall that according to the graded salience hypothesis (Giora, 1997, 2003), salient meanings are retrieved automatically, regardless of contextual strength. When contextually incompatible, interfering with the interpretation process, they must be discarded (Frazier and Rayner, 1990). Such suppression processes are costly, both in terms of effort and processing time (e.g., Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991). It is possible, then, that while comprehenders must have accessed the salient meaning at no cost, they found it hard to suppress it and activate the less salient one, which was therefore easy to deny. While this makes sense, our results seem to refute this option. Let's compare two items (Appendices I, II, section 4, items 13 and 27):

(75) The Doctors at the maternity ward at Sheba Hospital are coming out of a staff meeting.
Nurse: What was the meeting about?
Doctor: We talked about the patients. <in Hebrew: xolot, = sick (fem, pl).
The word xolot also means sands, which is the more salient meaning.>
Conclusion: We talked about the patients in the ward.

(76) The Professor of Medicine was giving a lecture about human anatomy. He presented the students with a human skeleton and asked them about the names of different parts of the skeleton. When a few students failed to answer, the professor became upset with them.
Student: But, Professor, the material you gave us had so many names for so many parts in the body, it's simply impossible to remember them all.

80 In fact, as noted above, the Graded Salience hypothesis suggests that a retrieval of the less-salient meaning can occur only if suppression of the salient meaning has already taken place.
The professor: I asked you to focus on a number of joints (“Prakim”). I mentioned their names in my previous lecture. <The Hebrew word Prakim means either ‘joints of the body’ (= the less-salient meaning), or ‘chapters in a document’ (= the salient meaning).>

**Conclusion:** I asked you to concentrate on the names of a number of joints.

Regarding item (75), although the context (doctor, hospital) should have primed the less-salient meaning of the ambiguous word xolot, i.e. ‘sick/patients (fem, pl)’, the mean rating of deniability given to this item was almost the highest compared to all other items in the disambiguation categories (4.62). In (76), we used the phrase ‘many parts in the body’ in the context, to prime the less-salient meaning of prakim, i.e. ‘joints’. But here, it may still be possible that some participants adhered to the salient meaning (i.e. chapters), as this particular context could be also interpreted as somewhat supportive of the competing salient meaning as well (book chapters about anatomy). Thus, participants could relatively easily deny the conclusion attributed to the professor. Surprisingly, however, this target sentence was found to be less deniable than the one in (1), receiving a lower mean rate of deniability (3.87).

It seems we have no way of generalizing over the deniability ratings. This does not mean that text (75) was not as or more supportive of the less-salient meaning than text (76). But the differences in the results cannot be explained, perhaps due to the small number of items. Further research is required to resolve this issue.
It's also interesting to examine our results in light of Minimalists' predictions. As noted above, they predicted the scale will begin with what Grice (1975, 1989) assumed to be part of ‘what is said’, which he considered quite close to the linguistic meaning. Here, this category is the original 'Explicated_{\text{min}}' (see section 1.2.1.3 above). 'Explicated_{\text{min}}' includes inferences resulting from reference resolution and disambiguation. Advocates of 'Explicated_{\text{min}}' then predict the following scale:

(77) Reference resolution/Disambiguation > Default enrichments/Fragments completion/\textit{and}-Conjunction enrichments

As already noted, 'Explicated_{\text{min}}' was later on broadened by neo-Griceans to include some enriched interpretations of \textit{and}-conjunction, default enrichments and completion of fragmentary answers as well. It should be noted that our materials in the \textit{and}-conjunction category included six items altogether: three items which induced the temporal (one item) or causative (two items) relations interpretation, both are included among Levinson's presumptive meanings; and three items which encouraged the participants to enrich the meaning of \textit{and} with concessive relations. This last group of inferences (summoning the concessive interpretation) is considered an implicature by neo-Griceans. Hence, their predicted scale was:

(78) Reference resolution/Disambiguation > Default enrichments/Fragments completion/\textit{and}-Conjunction enrichments 1 > \textit{and}-Conjunction enrichments 2
The *And*-Conjunction enrichments 1 category refers to temporal sequence or causative connectedness interpretation, whereas the *and*-Conjunction enrichments 2 category includes concessive relations interpretation.

However, the hierarchy revealed was:

(79) Fragment completion/Reference resolution > Default enrichment/Conjunction enrichment > Disambiguation

Minimalists may argue that the three items inducing the temporal/ causative relations could have tipped the scales and strengthen the deniability of the entire *and*-conjunction category. However, when we look at the mean grade of deniability of each item, we find no differences between the two groups of relations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temporal – 2.87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causative 1 – 2.31</td>
<td>Concessive 1 – 2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causative 2 – 3.34</td>
<td>Concessive 2 – 2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 2.84</td>
<td>Total: 2.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, we can say that the results do not support the Minimalist model.

Note that Relevance theoreticians did not predict any particular order of these pragmatic processes. They are all considered contributions to explicatures. However, this gradation does provide support for Relevance theory, as the inferences resulting from enriching the *and*-conjunctions are not weaker than all other
inferences, but are as strong as default enrichments, and even stronger than those involving disambiguation requiring rejection of the salient meaning.

In sum, our conclusion is that these results demonstrate a tendency - a hierarchy of sources which influence the degree of deniability, and hence, the strength of various pragmatic contributions to explicature. The strongest source seems to be the grammatical one, which forces the interlocutor to complete an utterance up to a fully grammatical sentence expressing a proposition. The weaker source is the pragmatic one, which relies on completing sentences according to common or frequent scenarios. This, however, was only a preliminary attempt to point to a possible gradation of interpretations within the category of explicature, and definitely calls for further research.
CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION

The goal of this study was to examine the psychological reality of the proposed notion of the PII (Privileged Interactional Interpretation) vis a vis various well-established levels of interpretation: bare linguistic meaning, explicature, strong implicature, and weak implicature. According to the Interpretation Strength Scale proposed, each of these levels of interpretation may function as the interactionally relevant PII in a given context. Introducing the Interpretation Strength Scale we predicted a gradation of strength, where all levels of interpretation should actually constitute a continuum based on degrees of interpretation strength, measurable by cognitive (psycholinguistic) and interactional (pragmatic) tests. The assumed predictions of two major pragmatic models were compared: the Minimalist model and the Maximalist model. Each of these models supports a different level of interpretation as the PII: ‘bare linguistic meaning + explicated\textsubscript{min}’ or ‘bare linguistic meaning + explicated\textsubscript{max}’ (=explicature), respectively.

This final chapter aims to present the full picture emerging from the quantitative and qualitative analyses performed in this study. We start by reviewing the results of the four experiments conducted in this study (Section 4.1). We then proceed to discuss the implications of the findings for each of the models compared here (Section 4.2). We then turn to considering the contributions of the study to the domain of levels of interpretation in general and to the PII in particular (Section 4.3). We conclude by pointing out at several issues that call for further investigation (Section 4.4).
4.1 An overview of the results

Given that our study focused on the interactional notion of the PII, we begin by reviewing the various criteria which might be usable in determining the PII:

1. First, examining the condition giving rise to inferring each level of interpretation (the Discourse Coherence test, Experiment 1) yielded a graded hierarchy. We relied on Kintsch's (1988) assumption that reading a text is a constant search for connections between all levels of the text, and on Sperber and Wilson's (1986/1995) claim that all the interpretations we come up with in order to decode reality are motivated by the search for relevance of new information to existing data. Following these guidelines, we expected higher degrees of compatibility between all components of the text, i.e., coherence, to characterize the stronger levels of interpretation. Our predictions were supported by our findings. There was a significant difference between the conditions followed by explicatures and strong implicatures, and the conditions followed by strong implicatures and weak implicatures. On the other hand, bare linguistic meanings showed the same behavior as that of the level they were part of – the explicatures. Thus, the gradation reflecting the results of the Discourse Coherence test was:

   (80) Bare linguistic meanings = Explicatures > Implicature[strong] > Implicature[weak]

2. The next criterion was participants’ confirmation of some level of interpretation as the PII. The PII Confirmability test (Experiment 2) showed a very liberal inclusion of speaker-intended inferences. Hence, PII often
diverged quite significantly from what Grice's (1975, 1989) non-Cancelable level of interpretation was, i.e., linguistic meanings. This divergence, we proposed, was strength-dependent. The stronger the meaning level tested, the greater its likelihood to count as the PII. This criterion predicted the difference found between explicatures and strong implicatures, as well as between strong implicatures and weak implicatures. Again, the distinct status of the bare linguistic meanings within discourse was not supported, and the gradation reflecting the results of the PII Confirmability test was:

(81) Bare linguistic meanings = Explicatures > Implicature\textsubscript{[strong]} > Implicature\textsubscript{[weak]}

3. The third criterion was the degree of confidence in the act of confirming each level of interpretation as the PII (the Confidence test, Experiment 2). The gradation revealed in the 2 previous tests, was repeated here:

(82) Bare linguistic meanings = Explicatures > Implicature\textsubscript{[strong]} > Implicature\textsubscript{[weak]}

4. Experiment 2 also included 2 sub-tests: one measured Response Times (RT) when confirming a level of interpretation as the PII, and the second measured RTs when rating the degree of confidence with regard to that confirmation. The first sub-test showed no significant differences, whereas the second yielded a dichotomy – a significant difference between the RTs to the task of determining the degree of confidence for bare linguistic meanings and
explicatures on the one hand, and the RTs to the task of determining the degree of confidence for implicatures, strong as well as weak, on the other hand.

5. Unlike the PII Confirmability and Confidence tests (Experiment 2), the Deniability test (Experiment 3) tapped what comprehenders might have perceived as deniable by the speaker. This test turned out to be more sensitive than all previous tests: Discourse Coherence, PII Confirmability, and Confidence, which proved to be less sensitive in diagnosing a distinct pragmatic status for bare linguistic meanings:

(83) Bare linguistic meanings > Explicatures > Implicature_{strong} > Implicature_{weak}

6. The findings of the Deniability test also established fine-tuned differences between various explicatures resulting from different pragmatic processes, while fleshing out a rich strength continuum of levels (and sub-levels) of interpretation:

(84) Fragment completion/Reference resolution > Default enrichment/Conjunction enrichment > Disambiguation

All in all, in the Discourse Coherence, the PII Confirmability and Confidence tests, the explicature was the strongest level, and the weak implicature was the weakest (with strong implicatures constituting an intermediate level). However, in the Deniability test, the bare linguistic meaning turned out
stronger than the explicature, hence, each level demonstrated a unique behavior.

7. It is noteworthy that throughout the various tests even weak implicatures proved susceptible to being considered PIIs. This supported the orthogonal relations between the PII and the various levels of interpretation in the literature, given that we showed that each level had the potential to serve as the PII, and the difference pertained only to the propensity of the representation. Hence, the results provided support for strength gradation as the factor determining the interactionally relevant PII. We therefore showed that flexibility and gradability could co-exist, i.e., different interpretations could constitute the PII, and yet some were stronger than others. This reflects our Interpretation Strength Scale. In other words, we found that all levels of interpretation had the potential to be taken as the PII, but each showed a different degree of likelihood to be taken as such.

4.2 Comparison between models

We now consider these results in light of the predictions of two contemporary models - the Minimalist and the Maximalist models. They each offer a well-defined privileged level (‘what is said\textsubscript{\text{min}}’ for Minimalists, the explicature for Maximalists). Following these models, the Interpretation Strength Scale should be described as in (85a-b):

(85a) Minimalist model: Linguistic meaning > ‘What is said\textsubscript{\text{min}}’ > Implicatures\textsubscript{\text{[strong]}} = Implicatures\textsubscript{\text{[weak]}}
Maximalist model: Linguistic meaning > ‘What is said$^{\text{max}}$’ > 
Implicatures$^{\text{[strong]}}$ > Implicatures$^{\text{[weak]}}$

We also adopted Jaszczolt's (2009) and Ariel's (2008) claim that the scales in (85a-b) are orthogonal to the notion of the PII, and hence, orthogonally intersected with the scale in (86):

(86) **Strongly communicated message > Weakly communicated message**

That is, each of the levels mentioned in (85a-b) had the potential to be treated by the addressee as the strongly communicated message, - the PII. This study demonstrated these orthogonal relationships between the various levels included in (85a-b) and the notion of the PII. However, it also reinforced the scale in (85b) as the one which more accurately depicted these relationships. When discourse was involved we witnessed a more complex picture than the one depicted by Grice. At times, bare linguistic meanings and bare linguistic meanings enriched by explicated pragmatic contributions shared the same degree of strength, and hence had the same likelihood to constitute the PII.

Had Grice's (1989) semantic Cancelability criterion won single-handedly, all the tests would have provided a single division of strong versus weak interpretations. Strong interpretations should have, at least theoretically, consisted of linguistic meanings only. Routinely, however, the linguistically communicated aspects of the interpretation were enriched into Explicatures, which combined Bare Linguistic meanings with explicated inferences. These Explicatures were confirmed as the PII, they were preceded by a more coherent discourse, and were deemed undeniable.
An additional interesting finding, also supportive of Relevance Theory, was the participants’ RTs to the Confidence question (Experiment 2). A clear-cut dichotomy was found, drawing the line between bare linguistic meanings and explicatures on the one hand, and strong and weak implicatures on the other. This distinction between the explicated and the implicated has always been one of the major principles promoted by Relevance Theory. Here, it was found that confirming explicated materials as PIIs was faster than confirming implicated materials as PIIs.

In sum, the Maximalists’ predictions were fully borne out. First, the results throughout our Experiments supported the prediction of Relevance theoreticians, expecting the Explicature to have a distinct psychological reality. The differences we found via the Discourse Coherence test, the PII Confirmability and Confidence tests, and the Deniability test were precisely along the strength continuum depicted in (85b), rather than the one in (85a), or some random differences (either a different ordering or else no consistent ordering).

Moreover, we presented some interesting findings regarding Recanati’s Contextualism. His theory was also supported, albeit with some reservations. First, most of the tests we ran (Experiments 1 and 2), did not provide any support for our initial assumption that bare linguistic meanings may be consciously interpreted, and hence may constitute the PII just like other levels of interpretation. On the contrary, bare linguistic meanings repeatedly demonstrated the same behavior as the explicatures throughout the Discourse Coherence test, as well as the PII Confirmability and Confidence tests, as predicted by Recanati. It took, what we presumed to be a more sensitive test (the Deniability test) to find out that, (contra Recanati), bare linguistic meanings may have a distinct pragmatic status after all. The second finding supporting Recanati’s predictions was the Strength Scale concentrating
on explicatures alone (Experiment 4). This scale demonstrated a significant hierarchy of strength where products of saturation (completions of fragmentary utterances and reference resolutions) were stronger, i.e., less deniable, than products of enrichment (adding default enrichments and enriching the meaning of the \textit{and}-conjunction). However, the products of disambiguation, which, according to Recanati, should have been as strong as the products of saturation, turned out as the weakest, i.e., the most deniable.

4.3 Contribution of this study

Several innovations were presented in this study. First, we presented findings which were compatible with the predictions of Relevance Theory. We provided support for the psychological reality of the Explicature, by repeatedly showing its distinct behavior. This level of interpretation has also proven itself as the level having the highest chances to be taken as the PII in all Experiments. In fact, all the pragmatic inferences we tested counted as the PII on most of our tests, even if the rates they received were lower than those of the linguistic meanings alone or the whole explicatures. However, the one level which was more likely than others to be considered the PII was very clearly the explicature.

Second, although not always a pragmatically-independent level of interpretation, the bare linguistic meaning, usually constituting an inseparable part of the explicature, was also shown to potentially demonstrate a pragmatic independent status. We established an interactional strength continuum, which associated different degrees of strength with the various levels (and sub-levels) of interpretation which appear in the literature. The stronger the level, the greater likelihood it has to (a) smoothly cohere with the preceding context; (b) be taken as the PII; (c) more
confidently taken as the PII; and (d) be considered undeniable. Our findings support an internal division within the group of implicatures too, into strong implicatures versus weak implicatures, based on differences of strength.

We also attended a comparison between various explicated inferences deriving from different pragmatic processes. The intuition of the (neo-)Gricean approaches as to the centrality of reference and ambiguity resolutions over other inferences was not supported.

This fine-tuned continuum may help shed light on the debate regarding the semantics-pragmatics division of labor. As noted above (Chapter 1), (neo-) Griceans' views regarding the issue of semantics-pragmatics division differed from those of post-Griceans. Whereas the former tried to find a solution which adhered to the 'truth-conditional content = semantic meaning of a sentence' equation, the latter distinguished between linguistically encoded meanings and pragmatically communicated content, both contributing truth-conditional aspects. Our results support the view that truth-conditional content results from a combination of semantic and pragmatic interpretations.

Another innovative contribution of this study was a methodological one – the introduction of a Deniability test. We showed that when dealing with utterances within discourse, we were in need of more than one type of test. The Deniability test proved to be the most sensitive test, which simultaneously shows clear differences as well as a gradation between the various meaning levels. This lent empirical support to Carston’s (2008) statement that "… the dominant view of semantics as dealing in truth conditions, while appropriate for thought, is largely eroded when it is applied to natural language representations, …" (p. 342). This pragmatic test, which was
independently suggested by Jaszczolt (2009) too, takes into consideration speakers’ intentions, and provides support for our gradation of strength.

All three tests in this study provided very similar, compatible and non-random results. However, since each of the tests in Experiments 1-3 focused on a different feature of level of interpretation, we can argue that all tests presented here complement each other, reinforcing each other’s results.

4.4 Future research

In light of these results, several issues still need to be addressed. First, the Interpretation Strength Scale. As noted above, this thesis promoted a strength scale to depict the behavior of various levels of interpretation within discourse and their potential to constitute the privileged meaning, the PII. This scale, as already noted, is not necessarily built off of distinct and unified concepts representing the various levels. Instead, it constitutes a continuum, where each level of interpretation comes with its own sub-continuum. In this connection we should point out that the hierarchy within-explicatures here depicted requires further testing and validation. The gradation we revealed should be supported by additional tests, which should also include additional types of explicatures, based on other processes not addressed here.

Next, we also supported the strong/weak implicature division addressed by Relevance theoreticians (see Chapter 2) by pointing to a different behavior of the two in almost every test.\textsuperscript{81} However, we believe that this difference between strong and weak implicatures is only the tip of the iceberg. We believe that just like explicatures, strong implicatures, as well as weak ones, may each constitute an internal continuum,

\textsuperscript{81} Except for the sub-criterion testing the degree of strength of the confidence an interlocutor has with regard to her/his decision to confirm a certain level of interpretation as the PII.
based on relative strength. Future research should explore the criteria which determine these degrees of strength.

An additional issue calling for further research is Jaszczolt’s (2009) "potential" secondary meanings and, similarly, Ariel’s (2004, 2008) "truth-compatible inferences". These interpretations are not intended by the speaker, but may still be inferred by the addressee, as long as they are compatible with the speaker’s utterance and the context. Where do they belong in the picture?

Taken together, the analyses performed in this study address major disputes prevalent in the field. They concern the distinct status of each level of interpretation, focusing on the explicature and the nature of the PII.

Three major conclusions are drawn from the findings in this dissertation. First, we show that within discourse, any level may be considered strong enough so as to count as the PII. Indeed, all the inferences examined in this study were shown to be considered by comprehenders as the PII. This supports the well-known Maximalist approaches. At the same time, not all representations are equally likely to function as the PII, and this gradation can be presented on a strength scale. The validity of this scale means that there is neither a dichotomy of levels of interpretation, nor a trichotomy. Rather, we have a continuum of strength, along which certain levels (and sub-levels) of interpretation are stronger than others. This strength, we argue, is revealed through confirmability as the PII, through the contribution to a high degree of coherence, and through the ease/difficulty of deniability for each level of interpretation.

These conclusions, which we have substantiated by detailed empirical examination, coupled with qualitative analyses, underlie perhaps the most challenging
proposal to emerge from this research: that examining discourse requires more sensitive tools, since it does not necessarily obey rigid theoretical categorizations which, should now be revised.
Appendix I

Examples of materials (in English)
Examples of materials used in Experiment 1
The items are numbered as their Hebrew counterparts in Appendix II.

1. [linguistic meaning]
Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, Hannah and the rest of the soldiers are not at base, but went out in the field.

[explicature]
Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, they are not at base, but went out in the field.

[strong implicature]
Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, the officer sent the soldiers to the field.

[weak implicature]
Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, the soldiers sometimes go out in the field.

2. [linguistic meaning]
Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: Jonathan's food will be ready in no time, in a couple of minutes.

[explicature]
Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: It will be ready in a couple of minutes.

[strong implicature]
Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: You know it takes me a few minutes to prepare food.
3. [weak implicature]
Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: He will wait for the food a little longer.

3. [linguistic meaning]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but the meeting will be short.

[explicature]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but it's going to be short.

[strong implicature]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but I don't have much time now.

[weak implicature]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: I wish we could have sat down for a long meeting.

5. [linguistic meaning]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
He proclaims that "the Afro-American population is weaker today," and that "the Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society these days".

[explicature]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
He proclaims that "the Afro-American population is weaker today," and that "it doesn't have much influence these days".

[strong implicature]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
He proclaims that "the Afro-American population should strengthen its influence on the American society".

[weak implicature]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
He proclaims that "a population which does not have many representatives in a position of power has no influence".
6. **[linguistic meaning]**
Yuval organized a party at his home.
Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: Actually, many people I invited came to the party.

**[explicature]**
Yuval organized a party at his home.
Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: Actually, many people I invited have arrived.

**[strong implicature]**
Yuval organized a party at his home. Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: It's good more people didn't arrive. Many complained about how crowded it was.

**[weak implicature]**
Yuval organized a party at his home. Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: Let's just say that all the food I bought was finished.

7. **[linguistic meaning]**
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Today Guy went to the mall and then he finally bought the shirt I have been nagging him to buy.

**[explicature]**
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Today he went to the mall.

**[strong implicature]**
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Only today he went to the mall.

**[weak implicature]**
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Only today he went to the mall.
9. [linguistic meaning]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: I believe he can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

[explicature]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: As I know Guy, he can.

[strong implicature]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: Nothing will please him more.

[weak implicature]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: This kid makes whatever his mother tells him.

13. [linguistic meaning]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: The salt, as usual, is on the shelf to the right.

[explicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: On the shelf to the right.

[strong implicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: The last time I saw it, it was on the shelf to the right.

[weak implicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt. He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: We decided to put it on the shelf to the right.

15. [linguistic meaning]
David and Amalia’s kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents’ committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who’s the new one?
David: The new head of the parents’ committee is Yotam’s father.
David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?

David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
David: Come on, can you think of anyone better-suited for the job than Yotam's father?

David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
David: Yotam's father is better-suited for the job.

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.
Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Yes, Gadi has been married for two years now.

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.
Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.
Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: I called him, but he wasn't home; some kid answered me.
Examples of materials used in Experiment 2
The items are numbered as their Hebrew counterparts in Appendix II.

1. [linguistic meaning]
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, Hannah and the rest of the soldiers are not at base, but went out in the field.
   You can call again tomorrow.
   **According to the soldier, Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

   [explicature]
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, they are not at base, but went out in the field.
   You can call again tomorrow.
   **According to the soldier, Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

   [strong implicature]
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, the officer sent the soldiers to the field.
   You can call again tomorrow.
   **According to the soldier, Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

   [weak implicature]
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, the soldiers sometimes go out in the field.
   You can call again tomorrow.
   **According to the soldier, Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

2. [linguistic meaning]
   Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
   The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
   Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
   Yael: Jonathan's food will be ready in no time, in a couple of minutes.
   Could you please tie his apron?
   **According to Yael, Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.**
Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event. The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: It will be ready in a couple of minutes.
Could you please tie his apron?
According to Yael, Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.

Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event. The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: You know it takes me a few minutes to prepare food.
Could you please tie his apron?
According to Yael, Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.

Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event. The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: He will wait for the food a little longer.
Could you please tie his apron?
According to Yael, Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but the meeting will be short.
Please, have a seat.
According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but it's going to be short.
Please, have a seat.
According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but I don't have much time now.
Please, have a seat.
According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.

A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: I wish we could have sat down for a long meeting. Please, have a seat.  
According to the Professor, the meeting will be short.

5. [linguistic meaning]  
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem. He proclaims that "the Afro-American population is weaker today," and that "the Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society these days". The audience is attentive.  
According to the politician, The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

[explicature]  
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem. He proclaims that "the Afro-American population is weaker today," and that "it doesn't have much influence these days". The audience is attentive.  
According to the politician, The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

[strong implicature]  
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem. He proclaims that "the Afro-American population should strengthen its influence on the American society". The audience is attentive.  
According to the politician, The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

[weak implicature]  
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem. He proclaims that "a population which does not have many representatives in a position of power has no influence". The audience is attentive.  
According to the politician, The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

6. [linguistic meaning]  
Yuval organized a party at his home. Dafna, who couldn’t come, meets him after the party. Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it? Yuval: Actually, many people I invited came to the party. It's a pity you couldn't come.  
According to Yuval, many people he invited came to the party.

[explicature]  
Yuval organized a party at his home. Dafna, who couldn’t come, meets him after the party. Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it? Yuval: Actually, many people I invited have arrived. It's a pity you couldn't come.  
According to Yuval, many people he invited came to the party.
[strong implicature]
Yuval organized a party at his home.
Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: It's good more people didn't arrive. Many complained about how crowded it was.
It's a pity you couldn't come.
According to Yuval, many people he invited came to the party.

[weak implicature]
Yuval organized a party at his home. Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: Let's just say that all the food I bought was finished.
It's a pity you couldn't come.
According to Yuval, many people he invited came to the party.

7. [linguistic meaning]
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher’s strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Today Guy went to the mall and then he finally bought the shirt I have been nagging him to buy.
It really took him some time.
According to Bracha, Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

[explicature]
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Today he went to the mall and he bought a shirt.
It really took him some time.
According to Bracha, Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

[strong implicature]
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Today he went to the mall and the problem was finally solved.
It really took him some time.
According to Bracha, Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

[weak implicature]
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Only today he went to the mall.
It really took him some time.
According to Bracha, Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.
9. [linguistic meaning]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her
friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: I believe he can make his famous salad for tomorrow.
Call him.
According to Sara, Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

[explicature]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her
friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: As I know Guy, he can.
Call him.
According to Sara, Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

[strong implicature]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her
friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: Nothing will please him more.
Call him.
According to Sara, Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

[weak implicature]
Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her
friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: This kid makes whatever his mother tells him.
Call him.
According to Sara, Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

13. [linguistic meaning]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: The salt, as usual, is on the shelf to the right.
And stop yelling.
According to Dalit, the salt is on the shelf to the right.

[explicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: On the shelf to the right.
And stop yelling.
According to Dalit, the salt is on the shelf to the right.

[strong implicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: The last time I saw it, it was on the shelf to the right.
And stop yelling.

**According to Dalit, the salt is on the shelf to the right.**

[weak implicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can't find the salt. He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: We decided to put it on the shelf to the right.
And stop yelling.

**According to Dalit, the salt is on the shelf to the right.**

15. [linguistic meaning]
David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
David: The new head of the parents' committee is Yotam's father.
It was head to head.

**According to David, Yotam's father is the new head of the parents' committee.**

[explicature]
David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
It was head to head.

**According to David, Yotam's father is the new head of the parents' committee.**

[strong implicature]
David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
David: Come on, can you think of anyone better-suited for the job than Yotam's father?
It was head to head.

**According to David, Yotam's father is the new head of the parents' committee.**

[weak implicature]
David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
David: Yotam's father is better-suited for the job.
It was head to head.

**According to David, Yotam's father is the new head of the parents' committee.**

24. [linguistic meaning]
Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies.
Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Yes, Gadi has been married for two years now.
That’s a bit surprising.

**According to Michal, Gadi is married.**
Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Yes, he has been married for two years now.
That’s a bit surprising.
**According to Michal, Gadi is married.**

[strong implicature]
Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.
That’s a bit surprising.
**According to Michal, Gadi is married.**

[weak implicature]
Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: I called him, but he wasn't home; some kid answered me.
That’s a bit surprising.
**According to Michal, Gadi is married.**
Examples of materials used in Experiment 3
The items are numbered as their Hebrew counterparts in Appendix II.

1. **[linguistic meaning]**
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, Hannah and the rest of the soldiers are not at base, but went out in the field.
   **Conclusion: Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

   **[explicature]**
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, they are not at base, but went out in the field.
   **Conclusion: Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

   **[strong implicature]**
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, the officer sent the soldiers to the field.
   **Conclusion: Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

   **[weak implicature]**
   Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, the soldiers sometimes go out in the field.
   **Conclusion: Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.**

2. **[linguistic meaning]**
   Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
   The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
   Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
   Yael: Jonathan's food will be ready in no time, in a couple of minutes.
   **Conclusion: Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.**

   **[explicature]**
   Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
   The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
   Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
   Yael: It will be ready in a couple of minutes.
   **Conclusion: Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.**
Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event. The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: You know it takes me a few minutes to prepare food.
**Conclusion:** Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.

[weak implicature]
Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event. The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
Yael: He will wait for the food a little longer.
**Conclusion:** Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.

3. [linguistic meaning]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but the meeting will be short.
**Conclusion:** The meeting will be short.

[explicature]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but it's going to be short.
**Conclusion:** The meeting will be short.

[strong implicature]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: Yes, but I don't have much time now.
**Conclusion:** The meeting will be short.

[weak implicature]
A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
Professor: Yes?
Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
Professor: I wish we could have sat down for a long meeting.
**Conclusion:** The meeting will be short.

5. [linguistic meaning]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem. He proclaims that "the Afro-American population is weaker today," and that "the Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society these days".
**Conclusion:** The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.
[explicature]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
He proclaims that "the Afro-American population is weaker today," and that "it doesn't have much influence these days".
Conclusion: The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

[strong implicature]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
He proclaims that "the Afro-American population should strengthen its influence on the American society".
Conclusion: The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

[weak implicature]
An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
He proclaims that "a population which does not have many representatives in a position of power has no influence".
Conclusion: The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

6. [linguistic meaning]
Yuval organized a party at his home.
Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: Actually, many people I invited came to the party.
Conclusion: Many people he invited came to the party.

[explicature]
Yuval organized a party at his home.
Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: Actually, many people I invited have arrived.
Conclusion: Many people he invited came to the party.

[strong implicature]
Yuval organized a party at his home.
Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: It's good more people didn't arrive. Many complained about how crowded it was.
Conclusion: Many people he invited came to the party.

[weak implicature]
Yuval organized a party at his home. Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
Yuval: Let's just say that all the food I bought was finished.
Conclusion: Many people he invited came to the party.

7. [linguistic meaning]
Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher’s strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
Bracha: Today Guy went to the mall and then he finally bought the shirt I have been nagging him to buy.

**Conclusion:** Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

*[explicature]*

Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.

Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?

Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Today he went to the mall and he bought a shirt.

**Conclusion:** Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

*[strong implicature]*

Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.

Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?

Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Today he went to the mall and the problem was finally solved.

**Conclusion:** Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

*[weak implicature]*

Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.

Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?

Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Only today he went to the mall.

**Conclusion:** Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

9. *[linguistic meaning]*

Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.

Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?

Sarah: I believe he can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

**Conclusion:** Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

*[explicature]*

Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.

Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?

Sarah: As I know Guy, he can.

**Conclusion:** Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

*[strong implicature]*

Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.

Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?

Sarah: Nothing will please him more.

**Conclusion:** Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

*[weak implicature]*

Dorit is supposed to have fifteen people over for coffee and cake. She remembers that Guy, her friend Sarah’s son, is an expert at making a special, impressive guava salad. She turns to Sarah.
Dorit: Can your son make his famous salad for tomorrow?
Sarah: This kid makes whatever his mother tells him.
Conclusion: Guy can make his famous salad for tomorrow.

13. [linguistic meaning]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: The salt, as usual, is on the shelf to the right.
Conclusion: The salt is on the shelf to the right.

[explicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: On the shelf to the right.
Conclusion: The salt is on the shelf to the right.

[strong implicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt.
He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: The last time I saw it, it was on the shelf to the right.
Conclusion: The salt is on the shelf to the right.

[weak implicature]
Noam is preparing soup for himself but can’t find the salt. He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
Dalit: We decided to put it on the shelf to the right.
Conclusion: The salt is on the shelf to the right.

15. [linguistic meaning]
David and Amalia’s kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents’ committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who’s the new one?
David: The new head of the parents’ committee is Yotam’s father.
Conclusion: Yotam’s father is the new head of the parents’ committee.

[explicature]
David and Amalia’s kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents’ committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who’s the new one?
Conclusion: Yotam’s father is the new head of the parents’ committee.

[strong implicature]
David and Amalia’s kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents’ committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who’s the new one?
David: Come on, can you think of anyone better-suited for the job than Yotam’s father?
Conclusion: Yotam’s father is the new head of the parents’ committee.
David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
David: Yotam's father is better-suited for the job.
Conclusion: Yotam's father is the new head of the parents' committee.

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Yes, Gadi has been married for two years now.
Conclusion: Gadi is married.

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Yes, he has been married for two years now.
Conclusion: Gadi is married.

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: Oh, yes, if I like someone, he must have a ring on his finger.
Conclusion: Gadi is married.

Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal fancies. Michal has met Gadi at a party, and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
Michal: I called him, but he wasn't home; some kid answered me.
Conclusion: Gadi is married.
Examples of materials used in Experiment 4
The materials are categorized by types of explicatures, and are numbered as their Hebrew counterparts in Appendix II.

Completion of Fragmentary Utterances
4. David and Amalia's kids are in the same kindergarten.
   David: Did you hear that the head of the parents' committee was replaced?
   Amalia: Really? Who's the new one?
   Conclusion: Yotam's father is the new head of the parents' committee.

11. Noam is preparing soup for himself but can't find the salt.
   He calls to Dalit, his roommate.
   Noam: Dalit, where is the salt?
   Dalit: On the shelf to the right.
   Conclusion: The salt is on the shelf to the right.

17. Ran and Ofer are visiting the museum. Ran wants to show Ofer a picture he really liked.
   Ofer: Well, when are we going to see the picture you talked about so much?
   Ran: On your left.
   Conclusion: The picture I liked is to your left.

30. Dan invited a few friends for dinner.
   About an hour before dinner his wife Dalit enters the kitchen.
   Dalit: mmmm, smells good. Did you bake cookies again?
   Dan: just bread.
   Conclusion: This time Dan didn't bake cookies, but bread.

Reference Resolution
3. Eran and Yael drive home after an exhausting event.
   The babysitter waits for them at home with their son, Jonathan.
   Eran: Oh, man! We still need to feed Jonathan his bottle of milk.
   Yael: It will be ready in a couple of minutes.
   Conclusion: Jonathan's food will be ready in a few minutes.

23. Hannah's family was worried that she might encounter difficulties in the army, because she chose to serve in a fighting unit.
   They knew the soldiers were often sent to the field and were afraid it would be hard on Hannah.
   They decided to call her military base and ask how she was.
   The soldier who answered her mother's phone call said: Ma'am, they are not at the base, but went out in the field.
   Conclusion: Hanna and the rest of the soldiers went out in the field.

29. Michal and Anat are talking about Gadi, a guy Michal is really fond of. Michal met Gadi at a party and it seemed to her that he was flirting with her.
   Anat: Well, did you check up on him?
   Michal: He's married.
   Conclusion: Gadi is married.
35. A student knocks on the door of her professor's office.
   Professor: Yes?
   Student (slightly opening the door): Excuse me. Could I meet with you now?
   Professor: Yes, but it's going to be short.
   Conclusion: The meeting will be short.

Default Enrichments

4. An American politician gives a campaign speech in front of an audience in Harlem.
   He proclaims that "the Afro-American population is weaker today," and that "it doesn't have much influence these days".
   The audience is attentive.
   Conclusion: The Afro-American population doesn't have much influence on the American society today.

12. Yonni and his friends went on a hike. At 10 o'clock Yonni begins preparing a late breakfast for everyone. He wants to know whether Smadar would like an omelet, but cannot find her.
   He asks her friend Rinat: Would Smadar like an omelet?
   Rinat: Smadar already had breakfast.
   Conclusion: Smadar already had breakfast that morning.

18. Naomi and Ron went to see a movie that Naomi wanted to see.
    When they left the cinema, Naomi asked Ron if he enjoyed the movie.
    Ron: I enjoyed very much. [*Hebrew enables such a use of this verb.*]
    Conclusion: Ron enjoyed the movie.

21. Yuval organized a party at his home.
    Dafna, who couldn't come, meets him after the party.
    Dafna: So, you were afraid that only a few people would come to the party. How was it?
    Yuval: Actually, many people I invited have arrived.
    Conclusion: Many people Yuval invited came to the party.

Enrichments of 'and'

7. Rami works at a sporting goods store. He tells his wife about his new boss.
   Rami: He is inexperienced, and he was appointed manager of the store.
   Conclusion: The new boss is inexperienced, and yet he was appointed manager of the store.

14. Guy, a 10th grade student, is staying at home during a teacher's strike. Rina, a friend of his mother Bracha, asks her what he's doing.
    Rina: So, what did Guy do this morning?
    Bracha: Guy went to Dizengof st., and looked all over for a new shirt for a family wedding. Today he went to the mall and he bought a shirt.
    It really took him some time.
    Conclusion: Guy went to the mall and then he bought a shirt.

26. Ruthie meets her friend's neighbor and she seems to like him.
    Ruthie: What do you know about him?
    The friend: He's cute and complicated.
    Conclusion: The neighbor is cute but complicated.
34. Iris and Yonni go on a night trip in the Judean desert. The next morning, when Iris comes back alone, their friend Dror, asks her: Where is Yonni?
Iris: Yonni felt bad and went to the hospital.

**Conclusion:** Yonni felt bad and therefore went to the hospital.

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### Resolution of Lexical Ambiguity

13. The Doctors at the maternity ward at Sheba Hospital are leaving a staff meeting.
   Nurse: What was the meeting about?
   Doctor: We talked about the patients (“xolot”). *<The Hebrew word xolot means either ‘sick (f., pl)’ or ‘sands’.*

   **Conclusion:** We talked about the patients in the ward.

22. Yonni enters a clothing shop to buy his girlfriend a present. He's uncertain whether to buy a shirt or a scarf.
   The saleswoman: I recommend a scarf. It's a much safer choice.
   Yonni: I don't really understand what you base that assumption on.
   The seller: Let me tell you what the basis for my assumption (“hanaxa”) is. *<The Hebrew word Hanaxa means either ‘an assumption’ or ‘a discount’.>*

   **Conclusion:** Let me tell you what the basis for my assumption is for recommending a scarf.

27. The Professor of Medicine was giving a lecture about human anatomy. He presented the students with a human skeleton and asked them about the names of different parts of the skeleton. When a few students failed to answer him, the professor became upset with them.
   Student: But professor, the material you gave us had so many names to so many parts in the body, it's simply impossible to remember them all.
   The professor: I asked you to focus on a number of joints (“Prakim”). *<The Hebrew word Prakim means either ‘joints of the body’ or ‘chapters in a document’.*

   **Conclusion:** I asked you to concentrate on the names of a number of joints.

38. Shelley tells Eric about her visit to her cousins, David and Jenny, in Canada during the previous winter.
   Shelley: It was so cold. But David and Jenny, my cousins, insisted on taking me on long trips every day. I came back literally frozen each time.
   Eric: So did you take a hot shower when you came back?
   Shelley: No, I enjoyed the heat coming from the fireplace in their living room. *<The Hebrew word ax means either ‘a fireplace’ or ‘a brother’. ‘Heat’, xom in Hebrew, can come from a person too.*

   **Conclusion:** I warmed myself in front of the fire in the living room.
Appendix II

Materials (in Hebrew)
ה châuים המובאים כאן אינם מחולקים לארבעה שאלונים (כמו שהיה بالنיסוי). לנוחות.

הלוח מקראי:

[אקספליקטוריה] הניסוי

שאלה 1

(משמעה של לוחות)

שאלה 2

(משמעה של לוחות)

שאלה 3

(משמעה של לוחות)

מרצה

אותה החידה שולחה הצרפתית.

שאלה 4

(משמעה של לוחות)
בחברה שלו ولחברים שש.

אין האמריקאית השחורים לילד הולדת החברה?

סליחה, אפשר להיפגש איתך עכשיו!

כיום - יום, על איתך השפעתה.

בהארלם היה, באrganization באrganization באrganization המסיבה בעמדות המבימה למסיבה כיום.

למסיבה כיום.

הלוואי שיכולנו לקיים פגישה ארוכה לשון圆形ה ה她ughterית.

המרצה ביולא השחורים היחידה:

אותו של אנשים נהנתה השחורים בחברה.

ל בחדרה.

ל사항.

לשם圆形ה השון圆形הに向 אופי.

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יובל ארגן מסיבה בביתו. דפנה, שנגלה להйти, פוגשת אותו לאחר המסיבה.

דפנה: נו, חששת שהרי לא הרבה אנשים יגיעו למסיבה. איך היה?

יובל: טוב שלא היו יותר, רבים באים למסיבה וזו התלוננו על צפיפות.

דפנה: שתי המסיבות, שלישית מגיעה אך קטנה בזמןクロוז．
האחת

גמר

תעודת

השיעורים

והיא

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המבוא

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השונים

מיוחד

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שאלה 12
[משמעת לשונית]
דני יורד עם הכלב. אפרת אשתו קוראת אחריו.
אפרת: דני, אל תשכח, נגמר החלב!
דני: אני מבטיח שאקנה חלב.

[אקספליקטורה]
דני יורד עם הכלב. אפרת אשתו קוראת אחריו.
אפרת: דני, אל תשכח, נגמר החלב!
דני: אני מבטיח שאקנה חלב.

[אימפליקטורה חזקה]
דני יורד עם הכלב. אפרת אשתו קוראת אחריו.
אפרת: דני, אל תשכח, נגמר החלב!
דני: ה侮 כי קל לי לקנות חלב בדרך חזרה מהעבודה.

שאלה 13
[משמעת לשונית]
נועם מכין לעצמו מרק, ולא מוצא את המלח. הוא קורא לדלית, ישותו לדירה.
דלית: דלי, איפה המלח?
דלית: על המדף המימין.

[אקספליקטורה]
נועם מכין לעצמו מרק, ולא מוצא את המלח. הוא קורא לדלית, ישותו לדירה.
דלית: דלי, איפה המלח?
דלית: על המדף המימין.

[אימפליקטורה חזקה]
נועם מכין לעצמו מרק, ולא מוצא את המלח. הוא קורא לדלית, ישותו לדירה.
דלית: דלי, איפה המלח?
דלית: הרי приняנו 决定了 将他在那邊的مدף המימין.

dלית: הרי приняנו 决定了 将他在那邊的מדף המימין.

שאלה 14
[משמעת לשונית]
ליורם שלוש אקסיות (ex-girlfriends) יוספים החייכנית, היפה ומור המבריקה.
יורם מתלונן בפני חברו שכל לילה הוא חולם על מישהי אחת מהן.
החבר: על מי חלמתי אתמול: על החייכנית, היפה או המבריקה?
יורם: לא תאמין - על נועם.

[אקספליקטורה]
ליורם שלוש אקסיות (ex-girlfriends) יוספים החייכנית, היפה ומור המבריקה.
יורם מתלונן בפני חברו שכל לילה הוא חולם על מישהי אחת מהן.
החבר: על מי חלמתי אתמול: על החייכנית, היפה או המבריקה?
יורם: אי אפשר לברוח לעסום אף על נועם.

[אימפליקטורה חזקה]
ליורם שלוש אקסיות (ex-girlfriends) יוספים החייכנית, היפה ומור המבריקה.
יורם מתלונן בפני חברו שכל לילה הוא חולם על מישהי אחת מהן.
החבר: על מי חלמתי אתמול: על החייכנית, היפה או המבריקה?
יורם: אם שיאמר דברי מנסים את זה בצלום.
החדש. היו ומור. גבוה��ב. היה הטלפון נועמה? יוצאת. היא היא היא. היא שדיבר. היא 아이יל על. היא יוספה לאחר. החולם, היא. הוא הוא הוא הוא. דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דני הוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דניהוא דן
גיא ונדב הם שותפים לדירה. גיא שם לב שנדב יושב ומסתכל בטלוויזיה כבר שעתיים.

גיא: מי אתה מסתכל כל כך הרבה זמן?

נדב: אני רואה תוכנית על ביל קלינטון ועל מוניקה לוינסקי.

גיא:有何 significaanza לגיא ולנדב ב рамках הלחימה לשון? ישנה אינטלקטואלית חזקה.

גיא ונדב הם שותפים לדירה. גיא שם לב שנדב יושב ומסתכל בטלוויזיה כבר שעתיים.

גיא: מי אתה מסתכל כל כך הרבה זמן?

נדב: אתה יודעOSP ענייני מיני בבית הלבן, ומוניקה לוינסקי מספקת את הסחורה.

גיא:有何 significaanza לגיא ולנדב ב рамках הלחימה לשון? ישנה אינטלקטואלית חזקה.

השוטר חוקר איך הגנב נכנס לבית.

השוטר: האםａמいった החלונות פה?

בעלת הבית: כן, אבל לדעתי הגנב נכנס דרך הדלת.

גיא:有何 significaanza לሕודד את כלת אתブラון ב рамках הלחימה לשון? ישנה אינטלקטואלית חזקה.

נעמי ורון הלכו לסרט שנעמי בחרה. כשיצאו מהסרט, שאלה נעמי את רון אם נהנה מהסרט.

רון: מעולם לא חשבתי שיסתיים כך быстро! זה היה נהדר.

גיא:有何 significaanza ל骕_death בסיפור על הגנוב ב рамках הלחימה לשון? ישנה אינטלקטואלית חזקה.
רמי עובד בחנות למוצרי ספורט. הוא מספר לאשתו על הבוס החדש.
רמי: הבוס החדש מונה למנהל החנות למרות שהיינו לו ב了半天 ניסיון.

אקספליקטורה
רמי עובד בחנות למוצרי ספורט. הוא מספר לאשתו על הבוס החדש.
רמי: הוא חסר ניסיון והيمن למנהל החנות.

אימפליקטורה חזקה
רמי עובד בחנות למוצרי ספורט. הוא מספר לאשתו על הבוס החדש.
רמי: אני לא מבין איך מינו אותו למנהל החנות, הרי אין לו בכלל ניסיון.

אימפליקטורה חלשה
רמי עובד בחנות למוצרי ספורט. הוא מספר לאשתו על הבוס החדש.
רמי: לא חשבנו שביבחרו מישהו כל כך צעיר בתור הבוס.

רן ועופרيان מבקרים במוזיאון. רן רוצה להראות לעופר תמונה שאמוד שאהב.
עופר: נו,מתי כבר נראו את התמונה שאתה דיבר עליה כל כך הרבה?
רן: התמונה שאמתי נמצאת לשמאל, עופר.

אקספליקטורה
רן ועופרيان מברים במוזיאון. רן רוצה להראות לעופר תמונה שאאמודי שאהב.
עופר: נו,מתי כבר נראו את התמונה שאתה דיבר עליה כל כך הרבה?
רן: משמאלך.

אימפליקטורה חזקה
רן ועופרيان מברים במוזיאון. רן רוצה להראות לעופר תמונה שאאמודי שאהב.
עופר: נו,מתי כבר נראו את התמונה שאתה דיבר עליה כל כך הרבה?
רן: אני מ脱贫致富 שתסתכל שמאלה.

אימפליקטורה חלשה
רן ועופרيان מברים במוזיאון. רן רוצה להראות לעופר תמונה שאאמודי שאהב.
עופר: נו,מתי כבר נראו את התמונה שאתה דיבר עליה כל כך הרבה?
רן:חלק מהתמונות הטובות תלויות משמאל.
Dan הזמין כמה חברים לארוחת ערב. כ-sixה לפני הארוחה דליתnEnter to the kitchen.

דלית:emmメン、איזה ריח. יש פסט ישוניות?

Dan:אני לא יכול לאכול מרק בليل תום.

שאלה 24

[משמשת ל":מיכל וענת מדברות על גדי, בחור שמצא חן בעיני מיכל. מיכל פגשה את גדי במסיבה, ונראה היה להם�พอיטטס.

מיכל:אני מתכוננת לשנה דר, בוחר ש’autres ומאת ביניים. מיכל:אני מתכוננת לשנה דר, בוחר ש’autres ומאת ביניים. מי מותק את דרי ביניים, ונראה היה להם�พอיטטס.

Dan נירות לעניין של גדי, בוחר ש’autres ומאת ביניים. מיכל:אני מתכוננת לשנה דר, בוחר ש’autres ומאת ביניים. מי מותק את דרי ביניים, ונראה היה להם�พอיטטס.

מיכל:אני מתכוננת לשנה דר, בוחר ש’autres ומאת ביניים. מי מותק את דרי ביניים, ונראה היה להם�พอיטטס.

מיכל:אני מתכוננת לשנה דר, בוחר ש’B الأخرى ומאת ביניים. מי מותק את דרי ביניים, ונראה היה loro�พอיטטס.

מיכל:אני מתכוננת לשנה דר, בוחר ש’B الأخرى ומאת ביניים. מי מותק את דרי ביניים, ונראה היה loro�พอיטטס. }
ה/materialים המובאים כאן אינם מחולקים לארבעה שאלונים (כמו שהיה בניסוי). לנוחות
ללקוח
בזזה
קרבית
תתקשה
לצאת
בזזה
לחיילות
ולפעמים
שחנה
לא
בחרה
ואחששו
כי
בצבא
לא
לחיילות
החיילות
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שלו והחברים...

ולחברים...

שше בן הולדת...

עכשיו - יום מסיבת איתך להיפגש בארגון...

המסיבה מהנה Возможно לעזר...

הזהטת המשותפת יותר...

 DriverManager הסיבה...

ל德拉 מ葡ראPNG נגשה ההיה קעדו.

 assezה.png

שלא הצה שולו (משוטט פקט על לול הדור שנחרצה).

 Дмитрז: בק.

أستاذ, ל腨ד את הלינכyle, אופשים ליחוף את התצי.

 Дмитрז: בק.

德拉 מפרט, הפגישת הנקה קעדו.

 assezה.png

שלא הצה שולו (משוטט פקט על לול הדור שנחרצה).

 Дмитрז: בק.

德拉 מפרט פגע השתי קעדו.

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שלא הצה שולו (משוטט פקט על לול הדור שנחרצה).

 Дмитрז: בק.

德拉 מפרט, הפגישת הנקה קעדו.

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שלא הצה שולו (משוטט פקט על לול הדור שנחרצה).

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 assezה.png

שלא הצה שולו (משוטט פקט על לול הדור שנחרצה).

 Дмитрז: בק.

德拉 מפרט, הפגישת הנקה קעדו.
ברכה, דפנה, רינה והן למדות אידיאולוגיות שונות, אך בהרי שבהם הם נמצאים, אין להם מענה על השפעה.

האמריקאית נתיימה בלתי נמנעת, שהשחורים בחלקה הם בני קומונה שבה השפעה הוא בולע על כל🎵.

בארי המפלטיאן, האול القضيري לשון אחרים, ואיבד את השפעה בחלקה האימפריאלית.

ברכה, גיא הלך לקניון, ואחרי הנגד בחברת קניון, הוא קנת חולצה.

לדברי ברכה, גיא הלך לקניון, ואז הוא קנה חולצה. רבים הגיעו למסיבה, מרבים הגיעו למסיבה. במסיבה, הספר, והתלונינו שהן לא קיימו למסיבה.

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גיא הוא תלמיד כיתה י', ומבליה בבית בשל שביתת המורים. רינה, חברתה של ברכה אימו, שואלתאותה למעשיו של גיא.
רינה: אז מהעשה גיא הבוקר?
ברכה: גיא חיפשלקנות חולצה מתאימה לחתונה משפחתי בדיזנגוף. היום הוא הלךלקניון, והבעיה נפתרה סוף סוף. באמת לקח לו זמן.
לדברי ברכה, גיא הלך לקניון, והם קנה חולצה.
ד"ר שרה, אני מבטיח לך שתוכל להכין את התשלות המפורשות של הקורס.

לדברי ד"ר לוי, קרן לא תעבור את הקורס. על HOLGOC, אנשי חברה ikke יוכלו.

למרצים של הקורס, אם הם לא יוכלו, הם>:</p>
אני מקווה שרשמת את זה לדברי הפרופ', היא מצטערת שדפנה לא תתקבל תעודת גמר.

אימפליקטורה חזקה
הפרופ' מבקשת מהמזכירה להכין את תעודות הגמר של הסטודנטים השונים.
המזכירה: ומה לגבי דפנה? אני זוכרת שהיתה איתה בעיה.

הפרופ': מה אפשר去做, דרישת הנוכחות בכל השיעורים היא ברורה, ולצערי מי שלא עמד בו לא ממקבל תעודת גמר.
אני מקווה שרשמת את זה.

אימפליקטורה חלשה
הפרופ' מבקשת מהמזכירה להכין את תעודות הגמר של הסטודנטים השונים.
המזכירה: ומה לגבי דפנה? אני זוכרת שהיתה איתה בעיה.

הפרופ': בכל זאת, דרישת הנוכחות בכל השיעורים היא ברורה, ולצערי מי שלא עמד בו לא ממקבל תעודת גמר.
אני מקווה שרשמת את זה.

 שאלת 12
[משמעה ליוונית]
יד זורד על הכף. האפרח אושט קוראת חורווי.
האפרח: יד זורד על הכף.
יד: ינא, בתיישך שקאפק החלב. הלתרחואת סוחרתיו.
דלייב, יד זורד על הכף הקטן בלבל.

דלייב, יד זורד על הכף הקטן בלבל.
[אמסגלטורה חיה]
האפרח אושט קוראת חורווי.
האפרח: יד זורד על הכף.
יד: ינא, בתיישך שקאפק החלב. הלתרחואת סוחרתיו יתב.
יד, יד זורד על הכף הקטן בלבל.

דלייב, יד זורד על הכף הקטן בלבל.
[אמסגלטורה+]
יענה ממילט על מכור, ולא זמאן או המלח.
הוא הוכין למד vej למקרא, ולא מוצא את המלח.
הוא קורא לדליית, שתפהו לדירה.
דליית: נועם, איפה המלח?
דליית: הרי,.Entבנוộtנו את זה על המדף מימין.
ותפסיק לצעוק.
לדברי דלית, המלח נמצא על המדף מימין.
שאלה 14
[משמעת לעונית]
ילוד של אישה (ex-girlfriends) יוספה היא, נועם היפה ומריה בברקה.
יורם מתלונן בפני חברו: כל הלילה הוא חולם על מישהי מהן.
חברו: על מי חלמת אתמול: על חייכנית, היפה או מבריקה?
יורם: אי אפשר לברוח נועמה אף בחלום.
הלילה נחמד.
לדברי יורם, הוא חלם על נועמה.
שאלה 15
[משמעת לעונית]
ילוד של אישה (ex-girlfriends) יוספה היא, נועם היפה ומריה בברקה.
יורם מתלונן בפני חברו: כל הלילה הוא חולם על מישהי מהן.
חברו: על מי חלמת אתמול: על חייכנית, היפה או מבריקה?
יורם: אין כמו ק Stamford.
הלילה נחמד.
לדברי יורם, הוא חלם על נועמה.
שאלה 16
[משמעת לעונית]
ילדיהם של דוד ועמליה נמצאים בבית גן - ילדים.
דוד: 들어תי שדוד מספר עמליה להוחלף?
עמליה: צריך את מי?
דוד:ياه אבא של יותם הוא יוה"ש""רodka של ההורים החדש.
היה מאבק צמוד.
לדברי דוד, אבא של יותם הוא "רodka של ההורים החדש".
ילדיים של דוד ואומליה נמצאים בו同じ גן - ילדים.

דוד: שמעתشو"ר ועד ההורים החלף? 
עמליה: وبאמת? מי החדש? 
דוד: הוא באמת, את תוכלחשוב על מישהו מתאים יותר לאבא של יותם לתפקיד. היה מאבק צמוד. לדבריו דוד, אבא של יותם הוא יו"ר ועד ההורים החדש.

שאלה 16

רותי ביקשה מחברתה נעמהشتכיר홍יה. 
נעמה ידעה שלרותיחשוב מאדשהבחורשהאיתיהיוצאתיהיהגבוה. 
נעמה: בכיף, אבל אייל לא באמת גבוה. את בטוחה שאת רוצה? 
לדבריו נעמה, אייל לא גבוה.

שאלה 17

מוטי מתעניין ברותי, השותפה של דני, אחרי שדיבר איתה בטלפון. 
מוטי: איך היא נראית? 
דני: לדעתי רותי לא נראית כל כך טובה. אני יכול לשלוח לך תמונה. 
לדבריו דני, רותי לא נראית טוב.
מוטי מתעניין ברותי, השותפה של דני, לאחר שדיבר איתה על הטלפון.

מוטי: איך היא נראית?

דני: מה זה חשוב איך היא נראית? אני יכול לשלוח לך תמונה.

לדברי דני, רותי לא נראית טוב.

שאלה 18 [משמעת לועזית]

גם נorderby ומחסיפו 디יר. även שכ blev שדורב וישמשסככר בטלוזי בכר שעםיה.

גם נorderby ומחסיפו 디יר. även שכ blev שדורב וישמשסככר בטלוזי בכר שעםיה.

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גיא ונדב הם שותפים לדירה. גיא שם לב שנדב יושב ומסתכל בטלוויזיה כבר שעתיים.

גיא: במי אתה מסתכל כל כך הרבה זמן?

נדב: אני רואה תוכנית על ביל קלינטון ועל מוניקה לוינסקי.

זה מעניין.

לדברי נדב, הוא מסתכל בתוכנית על ביל קלינטון ועל מוניקה לוינסקי.

שאלה 19 [משמעת לועזית]

השוטר 查ック בלוורו את שלושה ומחסיפו דיר. השוטר: האם השארת חלונות פתוחים?

בעלת הבית: כן, אבל לדעתי הגנב נכנס לבית דרך הפתח.

מה דעתך?

לדברי בעלת הבית, הגנב נכנס לבית דרך הדלת.

שאלה 20 [משמעת לועזית]

השוטר 查ック בלוורו את שלושה. השוטר: האם השארת חלונות?):

בעלת הבית: כל מיני סיפורים עסיסיים על הנשיא קלינטון.

זה מעניין.

לדברי נדב, הוא מסתכל בתוכנית על ביל קלינטון ועל מוניקה לוינסקי.
שאלה 20

contenido לשונית

נעמי ורון הלכו לסרט שנעמי בחרה. כשיצאו מהסרט, שאלה נעמי את רון אם נהנה מהסרט.

רון: מהסרט הזה ניהמתי במיוחד. עכשיו מתחשק לי קפה.

לדברי רון, הוא נהנה מהסרט.

אימפליקטורה חלשה

רמי עובד בחנות למוצרי ספורט. הוא מספר לאשתו על הבוס החדש.

רמי: הבוס החדש מונה למנהל החנות ולמרות שבאין לו ניסיון, זה ממש מעצבן.

לדברי רמי, הבוס החדש חסר ניסיון, ולמרות זאת מונה למנהל החנות.

אימפליקטורה חלשה

רן ועופר מבקרים במוזיאון. רן רוצה להראות לעופר תמונה שמואד אהב.

עופר: נו, מתי כבר נראה את התמונה שדיברת עליה כל כך הרבה?

רן: התמונה שאהבתי נמצאת לשמאלך, על הקיר ההוא.

לדברי רן, התמונה שאהוב נמצאת לשמאלו של עופר.
רן וועופר מבקרים במוזיאון.
רן רוצה להראות לעופר תמונה שאמוד האים.
ועופר: נו,מתי כבר נראת התמונה שאתה דיבר עליה כל כך הרבה?
רן: משמאלך. על הקיר ההוא.
לדברי רן, התמונה שאםוד האים נמצאת לשמאלו של עופר.

ה الرقم 23
[משמעות של yönית]
ודوحים ממח בחרים עלאuckland.
וכشعور לפניך vườn הלילה דואת נכסת למסכת.
 productList: ממום. זהר. יש בוש פאיות Hơnות?
וד: במסלול לא אמיתיות, אלא חול.
ירח, בוש, איה?!

דיברי ו CODE: לא אמצ אעוגות, אלא על.

ה номер 24
[משמעות של yönית]
ודوحים ממח בחרים עלאuckland.
וכشعور לפניך園кур הלילה דואת נכסת למסכת.
 productList: ממום. זהר. יש בוש פאיות Hơnות?
וד: ודוקוס חול. זהר, בוש, איה?!

דיברי ו CODE: לא אמצ אעוגות, אלא על.

ה номер 25
[משמעות של yönית]
ודوحים ממח בחרים עלאuckland.
וכشعور לפניך園кур הלילה דואת נכסת למסכת.
 productList: ממום. זהר. יש בוש פאיות Hơnות?
וד: ודוקוס חול. זהר, בוש, איה?!

דיברי ו CODE: לא אמצ אעוגות, אלא על.

מיכל וענת מדברות על גדי, בחור שמצא מאוד חן בעיני מיכל. מיכל פגשה את גדי במסיבה, ונראה לי שפלירט את vậy.
ענת: נו, ביררת לגביו?
מיכל: כן. גדי נשוי כבר שניים.
זה קצת מפתיע.
לדברי מיכל, גדי נשוי.
מיכל וענת מדברות על גדי, בחור שמצאочרף מאוד בעיני מיכל. מיכל פגשה את גדי במסיבה, ונראית היהلهสภาילטרס.

אשתה.

ענה: נו, ביררת לגביו?

מיכל: הוא נשוי כבר שנתיים.

זה קצת מפתיע.

לדברי מיכל, גדי נשוי.

[איןアップקפלטרורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורורר
יתרשמים מהובאים כאן ואינו מחולקים לארבעה שאלונים (כומן משותף בינוני). לחתות הקורא/ת,อารבעה הגרסאות של כל תקסט מובאות כפריט אחד.

1. [משמעויות שונים]

וב משמעויות של הנה לאראפ את התיקות בקופסיו בבב, כי בחורה להים קרית.

שה ידע 숲ית קורבון צפיגיותuseum רוחית והיתקוש בוב.

שה ידע 숲ית קורבון צפיגיותuseum רוחית והיתקוש בוב.

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שה ידע 숲ית קורבון צפיגיותuseum רוחית והיתקוש בוב.

משמעון: הנה נואר ירחית ירחית ירחית ירחית.

2. [משמעויות שונים]

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משמעון: הנה נואר ירחית ירחית ירחית ירחית.

3. [משמעויות שונים]

בם המשמעויות של הנה לאראפ את התיקות בקופסיו בבב, כי בחורה להים קרית.

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משמעון: הנה נואר ירחית ירחית ירחית ירחית.

סודרטמיטימפוקט על תלדה של הדידה.

שאלה:occo

סודרטמיטימפוקט על תלדה של הדידה.

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שאלה:occo

משמעון: הנה נואר ירחית ירחית ירחית ירחית.
בחברה השפעה שלו veel ולחברים כיום אמריקאית השחוריםʾ לילדי ʿאימפליקטורה חלשה ʿאקספליקטורה נורא ʿאקספליקטורה חזקה ʿאקספליקטורה שש כילה: "אין לי ʿאקספליקטורה שש כילה: "אין לי ʿאקספליקטורה שש כילה: "אין לי ʿאקספליקטורה שש כילה: "אין לי ʿאקספליקטורה שש כילה: "אין לי
גיא הלך לקניון, ואז הוא קנה חולצה.

בכל דיזנגוף בבלארוס, הואיל שה✤ה הになור דרומיות הוא במשפחה בחברה, גיא הלך לקניון, ואז הוא קנה חולצה.

ה:bothochacter גיא בלארוס, והב כניסה העבירה, הואיל שה✤ה הになור דרומיות הוא במשפחה בחברה, גיא הלך לקניון, ואז הוא קנה חולצה.

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בכל דיזנגוף בבלארוס, הואיל שה✤ה הになור דרומיות הוא במשפחה בחברה, גיא הלך לקניון, ואז הוא קנה חולצה.

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בכל דיזנגוף בבלארוס, הואיל שה✤ה הになור דרומיות הוא במשפחה בחברה, גיא הלך לקניון, ואז הוא קנה חולزة.
שאלה 8

有意思的 לשונית

יוני וחבריו יצאו לטיול בשטח. בשעה עשר מתחיל יוני להכין ארוחת בוקר מאוחרת לכולם. הוא רוצה לדעת אם סמדר תרצה חביתה, אך אינו מוצא אותה.

הוא שואל את חברתה רינת: סמדר תרוצה חביתה?

רינת: סמדר כבר אכלה ארוחת בוקר היום.

המסקנה: סמדר כבר אכלה ארוחת בוקר באותו יום.

אקספליקטורה

יוני וחבריו יצאו לטיול בשטח. בשעה עשר מתחיל יוני להכין ארוחת בוקר מאוחרת לכולם. הוא רוצה לדעת אם סמדר תרצה חביתה, אך שומע שהיא יצאה להליכה.

הוא שואל את חברתה רינת: סמדר תרוצה חביתה?

רינת: אם סמדר יצאה להליכה, היא אכלה.

המסקנה: סמדר כבר אכלה ארוחת בוקר יום.

אימפליקטורה חזקה

יוני וחבריו יצאו לטיול בשטח. בשעה עשר מתחיל יוני להכין ארוחת בוקר מאוחרת לכולם. הוא quiere לדעת אם סמדר תרצה חביתה, אך אינו מוצא אותה.

הוא שואל את חברתה רינת: סמדר תרוצה חביתה?

רינת: סמדר כבר לא רעבה.

המסקנה: סמדר כבר אכלה ארוחת בוקר באותו יום.

שאלה 9

有意思的 לשונית

דורית צריכה לארח חמש עשרה אנשים לארוחה ערב.

היא נזכרת שאיבה, בתנה של שרה, חברתה, מתמחה בהכנת סלט יאורוב מיוות ומרסים.

היא מאמינה שאברה, בן של שרה, יכול להכין את הסלט המפורסם של גיא.

המסקנה: גיא יכול להכין את הסלט המפורסם של אבר.

אקספליקטורה

دورית necesita armar a quince personas para la cena.

ella se llama la hija de Sara, su amiga, se especializa en cocinar un ensalada especial y icónico.

ella cree que la hijo de Sara, el hijo de ella, puede cocinar la ensalada icónica de Gia.

la conclusión: Gia puede cocinar la ensalada icónica de Ebra.

אימפליקטורה חזקה

دورית necesita armar a quince personas para la cena.

ella se llama la hija de Sara, su amiga, se especializa en cocinar un ensalada especial y icónico.

ella cree que la hijo de Sara, el hijo de ella, puede cocinar la ensalada icónica de Gia.

la conclusión: Gia puede cocinar la ensalada icónica de Ebra.

אימפליקטורה חלשה

دورית necesita armar a quince personas para la cena.

ella se llama la hija de Sara, su amiga, se especializa en cocinar un ensalada especial y icónico.

ella cree que la hijo de Sara, el hijo de ella, puede cocinar la ensalada icónica de Gia.

la conclusión: Gia puede cocinar la ensalada icónica de Ebra.

שאלה 10

有意思的 לשונית

בישיבת מרצים בחוג עוברים המרצים על מצבם של הסטודנטים בקורס המבוא.

דר"ר כהן: טוב, הגענו לקרן.

דר"ר לוי: את הקורס הזה caravan לא יוכל לעבור.

המסקנה: caravan לא תעבור את הקורס.
מי שידף בחלב, ברה אמרה, ולא כיון שידף נשים ורבו, הוא יורד עם הכלב. המסקנה: אימפליקטורת חלשה.

11 שאלה
[משמעת ליוונית]

המרץ מבקש את מתוכן של תעודת חוזה ואת תעודת התמוהן של הסטודנטים בשכינה. המסר: איך למד את שוהיה או אותה?

המרץ: המסר של תעודת התמוהן, אך היא לא כתוב בין השורות.

הס嬗ון: איום neuוטועה סדנה או הקבלת דרגה נמר.

[אקספליקטוריה]

המרץ מבקש את מתוכן של תעודת התמוהן של הסטודנטים בשכינה. המסר: איך למד את שוהיה או אותה?

המרץ: המסר של תעודת התמוהן, אך היא לא כתוב בין השורות.

הס _______, איום neuוטועה סדנה או הקבלת דרגה נמר.

[אקספלייקטוריה]

המרץ מבקש את מתוכן של תעודת חוזה ואת תעודת התמוהן של הסטודנטים בשכינה. המסר: איך למד את שוהיה או אותה?

המרץ: המסר של תעודת התמוהן, אך היא לא כתוב בין השורות.

הס _______, איום neuוטועה סדנה או הקבלת דרגה נמר.

12 שאלה
[משמעת ליוונית]

יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.

אפרת: יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.

יד: יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.

יד: יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.

יד: יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.

יד: יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.

יד: יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.

יד: יד ויד של חלב.

הסרון: אמן קראת אחורי.
דני יורד עם הכלב. אפרת אשתו קוראת אחריו. אפרת: דני, אל תשכחו, נגמר החלב! דני: המכולת ליד העבודה שלי פתוחה עד הלילה. המסקנה: הוא מבטיח לקנות חלב.

שאלה 13

[Implication]


[Explicitation]

ליורם שלוש אקסיות (ex-girlfriends:) 添加了活泼可爱的，美丽的，闪亮的。约尔莫在朋友面前抱怨说整晚做梦都梦到她们。朋友：昨天你梦见了谁？约尔莫：昨天只梦见了那个可爱的，美丽的，闪亮的。的朋友：约尔莫太离谱了！朋友：不可能从那女人摆脱，甚至连做梦的时候！約尔莫：不，朋友。約尔莫：没有像美丽的。结论：他梦见了阿里亚。

שאלה 14

[Implication]

ליורם שלוש אקסיות (ex-girlfriends:) 添加了活泼可爱的，美丽的，闪亮的。约尔莫在朋友面前抱怨说整晚做梦都梦到她们。朋友：昨天你梦见了谁？约尔莫：昨天只梦见了那个可爱的，美丽的，闪亮的。的朋友：约尔莫太离谱了！朋友：不可能从那女人摆脱，甚至连做梦的时候！約尔莫：不，朋友。約尔莫：没有像美丽的。结论：他梦见了阿里亚。
יתת ה싶י על תינת הוריה תחתול.
וד: ישתיי על הוריה תחתול.
עומל: באח: עתיי.
וד: מי את המשותף! אמא אתishi.
המסקנה: באח על תינת הוריה תחתול.

[אקספלקרטורי]
יתת ה싶י על תינת הוריה תחתול.
עומל: באח: עתיי.
וד: נמא באח אתishi תושע על מת_sampling למאח אתishi על תינת הוריה תחתול.
המסקנה: באח על תינת הוריה תחתול.

16 שאלת
[ XM유וגאנ]
יתת ה싶י על תינת הוריה תחתול.
עומל: באח: עתיי.
וד: נמא באח אתishi.
המסקנה: באח על תינת הוריה תחתול.

[אקספלקרטורי]
יתת ה싶י על תינת הוריה תחתול.
עומל: באח: עתיי.
וד: נמא באח אתishi.
המסקנה: באח על תינת הוריה תחתול.

17 שאלת
[ XM유וגאנ]
יתת ה싶י על תינת הוריה תחתול.
עומל: באח: עתיי.
וד: נמא באח אתishi.
המסקנה: באח על תינת הוריה תחתול.

[אקספלקרטורי]
יתת ה싶י על תינת הוריה תחתול.
עומל: באח: עתיי.
וד: נמא באח אתishi.
המסקנה: באח על תינת הוריה תחתול.
אימפליקטורה חזקה

אימפליקטורה חלשה


נעמי ורון הלכו לסרט שנעמי בחרה. כשיצאו מהסרט, שאלה נועמי את רון אם התחי. רון: מהסרט הזה נהנתי במיוחד. המסקנה: הוא נהנה מהסרט.
נעמי ורון הלכו לסרט שנעמי בחרה.
כשיצאו מהסרט, שאלה נעמי את רון אם נהנה מהסרט.
رون: מאד נהניתי.
המסקנה: הוא נהנה מהסרט.

אימפליקטורה חלשה

רמי עובד בחנות למוצרי ספורט.
הוא מספר לאשתו על הבוס החדש.
רמי: הבוס החדש מונה למנהל החנות למרות שיאוי לו ניסיון.
המסקנה: הבוס החדש חסר ניסיון, ולמרות זאת מונה למנהל החנות.

אימפליקטורה חזקה

רני וועפר מבקרים במוזיאון.
רני רוצה להראות לעופר תמונה שמאודי האב.
ועפר: לנו, מתי כבר נראת התמונה שדיברת עליה那么多 כל כךホーム?
רני: מימין, אחרי האשמאלית של המוזיאון.
המסקנה: התמונה שאהב נמצאת לשמאלו של עופר.
אימפליקטורה חלשה

רן ועופר מבקרים במוזיאון.
רן רוצה להראות לעופר תמונות שמאוד איבד.
עופר: ננו, מתי כבר נראית התמונה שדיברת עליה כל כך הרבה?
רן: חלק מהתמונות היפות תלויותemann המ,GL זיצי 3 נלחים. הסכם: התמונה שאיבד נמצאת לשמאלו של עופר.
שאלה 23 [عكسית]
דן הזמין כמה חברים לארוחת ערב. כשעה לפני הארוחה דלית אשתו נכנסת למעחתה.
דלית: מממה, למה ריח דל פ-required עוגיות?
דן: כמה אני ידוע? ב外贸�א ג'אמ ג'אמ.
המסקנה: הפעם הוא לא אפה עוגיות, אלא לחם.
שאלה 24 [عكسית]
מיכל וענת מדברות על גדי, בחור שאיבד מאוד חן בעיני מיכל. מיכל פגשה את גדי במסיבה, ונראה היה לה שפלייט את הניה.
ענת: ננו, ביררת לגביו?
מיכל: הוא נשוי כבר שלוש שנים.
המסקנה: גדי נשוי.
שאלה 25 [عكسית]
מנע העונת המדהימה על דרי, בחור שאימל מאוד מעון ג'אמ דיא ג'אמ. מיכל פגשה את דרי במסיבה, ונראה היה לה שפלייט את הניה.
ענת: ננו, ביררת לגביו?
מיכל: התקשרתי אליו, אבל הוא לא היה בבית, ענה לי איזה ילד.
המסקנה: גדי נשוי.
ניסוי
לנוחת הקורא, האקספליוטורות ממוינות לפי תחילת הטקסט (מספור הפריטים – כמ
בשלאן).

ונלוע בכ使う
4 פריט
וד:山村は何だっけ？
ונלוע בכשעה:そうですね。

המסקנה:山村は何だっけ？

11 פריט
עם של כל יום, לא מ الخام מתלמעלה.
עם של כל יום, לא מ الخام מתלמעלה.

המסקנה:עם של כל יום, לא מ الخام מתלמעלה.

17 פריט
כי אם אתה מתורף, או אם אתה מתורף, או אם אתה מתורף.

המסקנה: כי אם אתה מתורף.

24 פריט
ילך שלוש אישהות (ex-girlfriends) של יוסה, נעמה והמריה.

ילך שלוש אישהות (ex-girlfriends) של יוסה, נעמה והמריה.

המסקנה: ילך שלוש אישהות (ex-girlfriends) של יוסה, נעמה והמריה.

30 פריט
אם לא נמצאת, או אם לא נמצאת.
אם לא נמצאת, או אם לא נמצאת.

המסקנה: אם לא נמצאת.

36 פריט
אם יש פעמים Бесשקוף בleine, או אם יש פעמים Бесשקוף בleine.
אם יש פעמים Бесשקוף בleine, או אם יש פעמים Бесשקוף בleine.

המסקנה: אם יש פעמים Бесשקוף בleine, או אם יש פעמים Бесשקוף בleine.

חטאת רפואר
3 פריט
ועריא עלراس鹍 ב却没有 שלחאר אוורר מעיף.
ועריא עלراس鹍 ב却没有 שלחאר אוורר מעיף.

המסקנה: עיריא עלراس鹍 ב却没有 שלחאר אוורר מעיף.

9 פריט
ורובי לאין מסבקכת גם לא את אלי.ורובי לאין מסבקכת גם לא את אלי.

המסקנה:ורובי לאין מסבקכת גם לא את אלי.

16 פריט
וכölü מוחית עם עלייה, או הכול מוחית עם עלייה.
ocölü מוחית עם עלייה, או הכול מוחית עם עלייה.

המסקנה: תוכölü מוחית עם עלייה, או הכול מוחית עם עלייה.
פריט 23

בני בני המשפחה של חנה דאנגו לה שמחה בתיקון לישון, כי חנה בחרה להישאר בצבא. הם ידעו שלעיתים קרובות מוציאים את החיילות לטרף, ויש חשש שהחיילית בתיקון יתקשה בעזה. הוא וחיילות אחרות ליוו אותה ולא בדסו. ויצא לשיח.

מסקנה: חנה ולשאר החיילות יצאו לטרף.

פריט 29

מיכל וענתת מדברות על גדי, בחור שמצא מאורח חן בעיני מיכל.

מיכל פגשה את גדי במסיבה, וראה היא לה שפלרטט איתה.

ענת: נו, ביררתי לגביו?

מיכל: הוא נשוי כבר שתי שנים.

מסקנה: גדי נשוי.

פריט 35

סטודנטית דופקת על דלת חדרה של המרצה.

מרצה: כן?

סטודנטית (פתוחת מעט את הדלת): סליחה, אפשר להקדים את הפגישה שלנו?

מרצה: כן, אבל זה יהיה קצר.

מסקנה: הפגישה תהיה קצרה.

פריט 5

פוליטיקאי אמריקאי נושא נאום בחירות מול קהל בהארלם.

הוא טוען כי "אין לאוכלוסיית השחוריםכיום הרבה השפעה, ولانصرת מ בקרבית האמריקאי.

מסקנה: לאוכלוסיית השחורים איןכיום הרבה השפעה בחברה האמריקאית.

פריט 12

יוני וחבריו יצאו לטיול בטרף.

בשעה עשר יוני להכין ארוחה בוקר לכולם. הוא רוצה לדעת אם סמדר תרצה החבילה, אך שומע שהיא יצאה למסיבה. הוא שואל את חברתו רינת:

רינת: סמדר תרצה החבילה?

רינת: סמדר כבר אכלה ארוחה בוקר.

מסקנה: סמדר כבר אכלה ארוחת בוקר באותו יום.

פריט 18

נעמי ורון הלכו לסרט שנעמי בחרה.

כשיצאו מהסרט, באה לעונה את רון אם נהנה מהסרט.

רות: מאד נהנתי.

מסקנה: רון נהנה מהסרט.

פריט 21

יובל ארגן מסיבה בביתו. דפנה, שהלאה לפגוש את יובל, פוגשת אליו לאחר המ себאה.

דפנה: נו, חששתשהלא הרבה אנשים יגיעו למסיבה. איך היה?

יובל: דווקא הרבה מאוד מוזמנים הגיעו.

מסקנה: מוזמנים רבים הגיעו למסיבה.

פריט 28

הפרופ' מבקשת מהמזכירה להכין את תעודות הגמר של הסטודנטים השונים.

המזכירה: ומה לגבי דפנה? אני זוכרת שהיתה איתה בעיה.

הפרופ': זה באמת מצער, אבל דפנה לא תקבל תעודת גמר.

מסקנה: הפרופ' מצטערת שדפנה לא תקבל תעודת גמר.

פריט 40

בשבוע בינתיים, בוחנים את שביקושם של הסטודנטים בקריסי מבנים.

 brunette: ראה, זה יכול להיות פגיעה Hữuירה!?

ィר: יי, אני סבור שמאזנו זה לא הולך טוב יותר.

מסקנה: הבוח ויתר ילין שבר מ التابعة מלהת cellar.

פריט 7

הфессל של משה נ쇠 בניו, הוא מסר להב את מלאכתו וה zobowiąz את המשרתים.

מסקנה: הבוח היה רס יניס, עוד ידוע והקריבים מבריא התחנה.
פריט 14
גיא הוא תלמיד כיתה י’, וملابשה בבית שבשימור של ביתת המורים. רינה, חברתה של ברכה אימו, שואלת אותה לשאלה של גיא.
רינה: אז מה עשה גיא הבוקר?
ברכה: גיא חיפש לקנות חולצה מתאימה לחתונה משפחתית. היום גיא הלך דווקא לקניון, וקנה חולצה.
מסקנה: גיא הלך לקניון, ואז הוא קנה חולצה.

פריט 15
ענת הלכה להצגה לאחר שחברתה נילי המליצה לה לצפות בה. לאחר שענת צפתה בהצגה, נילי שואלת אותה: נהנית?
ענת: הבנתי את כל הרעיונות היפים, ולא נהנתתי מההצגה.
מסקנה: ענת הבינה את כל הרעיונות היפים, בכל זאת לא נהנתה מההצגה.

פריט 16
רותי פוגשת את השכן של חברתה, והוא מוצא חן בעיניה.
רותי: מה את יודעת עליו?
החברה: השכן שלי חמוד מתוסבך.
מסקנה: השכן חמוד, אבל מתוסבך.

פריט 17
איריס ויוני יצאו לטיול לילי במדבר יהודה. למחרת בבוקר, כשאיריס חזרה לבדה, שאלתה חברה דרור: איפה יוני?
איריס: יוני הרגיש רע, והלך לבית החולים.
מסקנה: יוני הרגיש רע, ולכן הלך לבית החולים.

פריט 18
יוספה וצביה נפגשות ברחוב. יוספה: נו, את עדיין עובדת באותו משרד עורכי דין?
צביה: לא. הסתדרתי עם הבוס, ועזבתי את המשרד.
מסקנה: צביה לא הסתדרה עם הבוס, ולכן עזבה את המשרד.

פריט 19
בארוחה משפחתית חזרה סבתא ושאלה את נכדתה בת ה-30, חזרה של ישאר את משפחתה, שליהاختה המחלה, שליהاختה המחלה. בתvara עיקמה את פניה. בסוף הארוחה, לאחר שסבתא כבר חזרה ליטה, פנה האב אל הבת בת ה-30.
אבא: נו, מה את אומרת הבת: קודם כל, אני רוצה לבקר את סבתא.
מסקנה: הבת רוצה להביע את אי שביעות רצונה מהתנהגותה של סבתא.

פריט 20
הרופאים במחלקה ליולדות בבית החולים שביבא יוצאים משיחת צוות. אחות: על מה היו הישיבה?
רופאה: דיברנו על החולים.
מסקנה: הרופאים דיברו על המאושפזות במחלקה.

פריט 21
הפרופסור לרפואה ערך הרצאה בנושא האנטומיה של גוף האדם. הוא הציג לפני הסטודנטים שלד, ושאל אותם לגבי שמות של נקודות שונות השלד. כאשר מספר סטודנטים לא ידעו לענות לו, התרגז עליהם הפרופסור.
סטודנט: אבל פרופסור, בחומר שנתת לנו היו כל כך הרבה שמות של כל כך הרבה נקודות בגוף, שפשוט אי אפשר לה珑 את כולם.
המרצה: ביקשתי מכם להتركي דוגמה של מספר פרקים ואת שמותיהם ציינו בהרצאה הקודמת.
מסקנה: המרצה ביקש מהסטודנטים להぶり בשמות של מספר פרקים בגוף.

פריט 22
אסף מחכה לבועז בבית הקפה. בועז נכנס, ואת אסף: איך הגעת כל כך מהר? הרי כשהתקשרת היית בצד השני של הכיכר! בועז: אני חוצה את הכיכר במהירות.
מסקנה: בועז מגיע מקצה אחד של הכיכר לקצה השני במהירות.
שלי מספרת לאריק על ביקורה אצל בני דודיה: דיויד וג'ני בקנדה בחורף אחרון. היה כל כך קר. אבל דיויד וג'ני, בני הדודים שלה, התמקשו להעניק לה את האירוס زمن החורף. היה הם.

שלי: היה כל כך קר. אבל דיויד וג'ני, בני הדודים שלי, התעקשו להעניק לי את האירוס כל היום. הם חורדו.

המחקר בוחן את קיומן ומעמדן הפרגמטי של ארבע רמות מובן: המשמעות הלשונית (סמנטית), האימפליקטורה החזקה, האימפליקטורה החלשה, וה롬ת המובהקת – האקספליקטורה, תוכן כל הנמדד בברמה האטומית. הפרמטרים של כל רמת המובהק חוללו מספר השיטות הרשויות לשאלת מתכון/ת הדובר/ת או השプリン/ת משני מודלים, המחלד המינימליסטי (גרייס) וגרייסיאנים) והמודל המקסימליסטי (טאוריות הרלוונטיות והקומנטסואליסטים)

(Ariel, 2008; Jaszczolt, 2010)

cerr. בלשונים, הוא שומרי את רמת ייחודה ש以习近平

(Bach, 1994; Horn, 1972; Levinson, 2000).

1. המודל המינימליסטי או ה(ניאו-)גרייסיאני תומך בהכנסת היסקים בסיסיים לצד המשמעות הלשונית, מה שיצר את רמה 'מה שנאמר מינימלי'.

2. המודל המקסימליסטי, הננקט בידי תיאוריות הרלוונטיות או הקומנטסואליסטים, דוגל ב-

(Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004; and mainly Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995)

במחקרים שונים איבד含义ו, שחברה נעה משימה בלשונית, ש主要领导ה אותו משימה לברור. שולש טו

ה二字: המבדקים הם:

1. מבדק הקוהרנטיות, שמטרות לדיר את מודיך הקוהרנטיות של הקומנטסואליסטים של המשמעות של המובן. מבדק זה הוא

2. מבדק אישור רמה 'המשמעות הראשית', הוא מבדק בו לוחמי בברור ממדעים מיום ש主要领导ה קול. שולש סוף

3. מבדק ההכחשוט, ממבדק את רמת ההכחשוט של הבדיקות של המובן. תופס זה את

כל המבדקים של מהי צורך עם ממונים בברור של הקומנטסואליסטים והברורים והברורים

בעבר מהעובר על-ידי הדובר. ההבדלים בין אלו הם בברורים מלאים (למשל.
The results obtained from these checks support the maximilistic model, as they strengthen and assert the uniqueness of the explicature as an independent meaning level. These checks differ in their behavior from other meaning levels. The results also raise the 'scale of interpretative power', which ranks different meaning levels, including sub-levels, based on their relative strength:

- Semantics > explicature-based deductions > explicature-based grammar > strong implicatures > weak implicatures.

The aim of this sequence is to describe the different status of the various meaning levels in a conversation. On this sequence, some meaning levels are stronger than others, as they raise the coherence level of the previous context, they are more likely to be considered as meaning, and they are more difficult to conceal. When focusing on the explicature level, differences are also found within it. Five types of explicature inferences were examined through different pragmatic processes, and they were ranked on the power scale, as we see in the table below.

The research also offers a new methodological tool—checking test, which is similar to Grice's principle of expediency, and can measure the level of leveling of different meaning levels within a conversation.

This work is organized as follows: the first chapter reviews the models examined here and the most significant experiments that support each of them. The second chapter presents the criteria for measuring power, which are the basis for this sequence. This chapter also explains the rational of the three checks, and describes the predictions of each model for the results of these checks.

The third chapter includes the experiments themselves, where each is accompanied by a short discussion. The general discussion is in the fourth chapter.
ל缢כם, מחקר זה לא רק תומך בקיומה של האקספליקטורה כפרמה מובחנת, אלא אם כן כל עוד עוסקים בחקור המשמעויות בתוך השיח, כל רמות המובנים מסודרים על אותו רצף של חוויה, והם מעברים את המשמעות הראשית, על אף שלחלק מהם סיכוי גבוה יותר לכך מלאחר всем. 

ועש吁吁 חוה והמשמעויות החראשות, על אם שלחלק מקום סיכמי nowrap orders כל השלחות.
הפקולטה למדעי הרוח על-שם לסטר וסאלי אנטי
בית הספר למדעי החנויות עד-שם שירלי וסאלי פורטר

רמות משמעיות:
משמעיות לשקית ורסקירה

ה보호 לשם קבלת התואר "דוקטור לפילוסופיה"

מות

מרית שטרנאו

הנהלת הספרות של אוניברסיטת תל-אביב
אוקטובר 2013
 çalışma זו נועשת בהדרכת
פרופ' מירה אריאל
פרופ' רחל גיורא

עדות וענישה בבדרפת