

Body and Territory: Women in Israeli Cinema

JACKY IS A DRUG DEALER trying to move up in life: trying to progress from dealing minor, “soft” drugs (grass) to “the real thing,” hard-core, big-money “heavy stuff” (heroin). A request from a client, a Kibbutz member catering for a volunteer to the Kibbutz, serves as the trigger. The only problem is, where to get the stuff: Would the regular dealers welcome the newcomer into their midst, or would they guard their territory? Thus, the struggle over territory, a constant component in commercial life, becomes the backbone of the narrative, as is often the case when illegal commerce (drugs, sex, weapons) is concerned. In *Jacky*, Rachel Esterkin’s short film (script written together with Shemi Zarchin) (1990), which takes place in a development town at the outskirts of Kibbutz territory, or possibly in a neighborhood on the outskirts of bourgeois, Ashkenazi city territory, Jacky tries to carve out a territorial niche within the province of drug commerce.

It is here, on the margins—where the fields of socialist Zionism and Ashkenazi hegemonic Zionism end and the “Other” Israel begins, the Israel of Arab Jews, Jews of North African descent, the Mizrakhi Jews—that the space of the ethnic “home,” the location of the excluded, is situated. The margins can supply such a space, a space for the creation of Otherness as accepted, a “normative” center, since they, the margins, are located far from the centralized gaze of the monitoring, policing hegemony. The margins are where ethnicity can find a home, can create a home, within which it will not be marked as “ethnic otherness,” but will claim for itself the status of the putatively “non-marked,” or “non-gendered”: a status normally reserved for the white, Ashkenazi male, who supposedly constitutes the all-encompassing “universal,” marked neither by ethnicity nor by gender. In the margins, where there is no watching eye to constitute morality,¹ where people are not visible to the gaze of hegemony, where they are outside the frame within which morality happens as the by-product of the upper-class gaze, there otherness can construct itself by itself. It is the gaze of the norm, of the

normative hegemony, which constitutes and structures the subject and the community as moral, and as ethnically marked; it is away from the normative gaze that Otherness can construct life on its own terms.

Thus, for example, the films of Moshe Mizrakhi—*The House on Shlush Street* (1973), *I Love You, Rosa* (1972), *Abu El-Banaat* (1973), or *Love in the Skies* (1986)—create a space for Mizrakhi ethnicity which avoids all relations with Ashkenazi life. In them, the protagonists, all Mizrakhi, live their individual and communal lives in a separate sphere, unrelated to Ashkenazi hegemony, which either does not appear on screen at all, or is there only as a marker of power relations between the two spheres. The protagonists conduct their lives in their languages (Ladino, Arabic, French, and Hebrew), eat traditional, ethnically marked food, and enjoy cultural manifestations which are marked “folklore” (legends, proverbs, fables) and thus are considered inferior by conventional agents of hegemony.

But most importantly—they do not subordinate their lives and the temporal order of their lives to national history. Rather, they ignore national events, or participate only to support their material needs, but not as ideologically committed subjects. They run their private, familial lives parallel to—and not in accordance with, against, or as critique of—the national hegemonic Ashkenazi historical narrative. Had they been related in any way to that story, whether as critics or as adherents, their lives would become derivative of the Ashkenazi normative narrative. By disconnecting from the narrative altogether, by creating a temporal axis and cultural commitments that are separated from the authorial, “exclusive” historical narrative and national commitments, their lives have the representational appearance of independence and may be termed non derivative. Hence, “ethnicity” creates itself, for itself: in Mizrakhi films, power relations with the Ashkenazi hegemony are clear and visible, but do not subordinate the “ethnic other” to their dictate, whether through the hegemony of nationality or through that of culture.²

In the very same way, *Jacky* separates itself from hegemonic norms and narratives. Here, too, the narrative carries no national implications; the story concerns an individual who shows no interest in constructing nationality, in national events, or in participating in creating national history or culture, as is the normative conduct of protagonists of products of Hebrew and Israeli canonical culture. The protagonists’ aspirations are totally material and private, and bear no relevance to the national endeavor. Moreover, Ashkenazi subjects appear only in the guise of purchasers in commercial relations, thus foregrounding the power relations (Ashkenazim with the money, Mizrakhim in need of money) which obtain here. This asymmetry

also hints at a past romance between Jacky and a Kibbutz member, a failed relationship, of course—and one that is certainly insufficient grounds for the Mizrakhi community to structure itself.

Ethnic territory is separated as well. As in the films of Moshe Mizrakhi, and in films about the Ma'abarot (the small shanty towns built in the 1950s to house new immigrants), so in *Jacky*, territory is totally segregated. Despite the formal, establishment claim, found in government documents and propaganda pamphlets, that the Ma'abarot were built as “rings” in “a chain of settlements” since they were located at the borders to serve the interests of security and territorial expansion (thus portraying the Ma'abarot as part of the pioneering effort and assimilating them to the Halutzic ideological project), the films in question show how the Ma'abarot—and in *Jacky*, the development towns and peripheral neighborhoods which developed from the Ma'abarot—were actually secluded, isolated, and far from adequate for their stated task: the great *effort to assimilate* the newcomers (mostly Mizrakhi) into the hegemonic (Ashkenazi) society and ideology.³ *Jacky* is located entirely in one such closed neighborhood, with people coming from the outside only to purchase drugs, and with Jacky exiting for a short episode to Jaffa to get the heroin, an episode which is engulfed in fear, distress, escape from the police and a quick return to the safety of the enclosed territory. In this secluded territory the hegemonic gaze does not underpin normative morality or judgment: the inhabitants structure their lives according to their own needs, and not those of the “other” ethnicity—the Ashkenazi one.

In *Jacky*, however, there is one further complication: Jacky is a woman. *Jacky* is the story of her attempt to create her own space, both as a professional career woman (an independent drug dealer) and as an independent woman not adhering to the dictates of societal norms. At this juncture of gender, ethnicity and territory, the constitution of the subject comes sharply into focus.

Jacky is a young, single woman who lives in her own space (a small house characteristic of residences in development towns: a single room built of cheap materials, falling apart and almost leaning on other such “houses”) in an undefined, un-named settlement. The place's identification by the viewer is achieved through the visual signs of the social and financial status of its inhabitants, and even more so—by their ethnic makeup. The structure and look of the space, the furnishings, the clothes, the occupations portrayed (Jacky's father owns a run-down, Arak-serving coffee house, while her boyfriend is a drug dealer), as well as the stereotypical modes of behavior (her brother-in-law beating up her sister), all combine to create

that which Igal Bursztyn⁴ describes as Israeli cinema's attempt at a visual language of realism: in this case, that of territory, of realistic site. Jacky refuses to marry her boyfriend and "settle down," as everybody—the boyfriend, her sister, her neighbor—expect and urge her to do. She wants her freedom; even more so, she has her own terms—the boyfriend should study some profession, stop dealing drugs, and most importantly, let her go to work. Jacky's demands try to reverse two accepted patterns: The first is a true-to-life sociological fact: in a development town there is not much other than drug-dealing for the boyfriend to do, and as a Mizrakhi who grew up in such a place, he did not get the kind of education and opportunities that would actually equip him for anything else. The second reversal concerns the stereotypical portrayal of woman as dependent on her husband for support.

For Jacky, too, dealing drugs is the most accessible and feasible way to make a living. As long as she sticks with soft drugs it is accepted by her family and neighbors as one of her eccentricities, to be cured when she finally gets married. It is when she tries to move on to hard drugs that the community rejects her. At this point, she transgresses too many borders: not only of gender—acting as a man—but also of territory: both the territory of men and the actual territories allocated to certain dealers. When she tries to get the heroin, they all try to persuade her to hand the client over to her boyfriend or her brother-in-law; when she refuses, and moves out of the familial territory into the wilderness of street drug-dealings, she is perceived as a messenger for the men in her family.⁵ This, finally, brings about territorial fights, ending with her boyfriend not only leaving her but also being knifed. The short film ends with him being rushed to the hospital and with Jacky, all alone, moving around in an erotic dance in the empty cafe.

In her insistence on being, and remaining, financially independent—and even more so, in her attempt to become an independent, professional woman who is part of the professional community—Jacky does something very few women, perhaps only one before her, dared do in Israeli cinema: she constitutes her subjectivity via her participation in public life as a working, professional woman. Women in Israeli films have repeatedly been portrayed as housewives, as prostitutes, as related to soldiers (wives of, widows of, mothers of), or as having no occupation or no position in life. When they do work, it is always in a stereotypical female profession (nurse, teacher), or in a profession which has no bearing on the narrative. The center of the public sphere—that of community life and active, professional life—is reserved for the male protagonists. They are the ones to determine not only the narrative and the action on screen, but also the fate of the family

and its relation to the community. In this way, the films genderize—or rather, develop in accordance with the genderization of—the Zionist ethos, in which professional life and community life are the most important components of the individual's daily materialization of ideology. Zionism privileges the working body over the sexual body; the public, communal sphere over the private, intimate sphere; the professional individual over the non-professional, *luft geshlecht* [non-working] money-maker. But this opposition is also genderized: the center of the Zionist scene, that of professional, communal, working life, is totally occupied by men, whereas the periphery, that of private life, is all that is left for women.

Historically, Israeli cinema has not tried to change this strict division of labor between the genders. Women in Israeli movies rarely work, develop a career, or promote a non-stereotypically female profession. The very few female protagonists who have tried to create communal, professional life for themselves have failed. Jacky is a case in point. She tries to penetrate the commercial circle dominated by men, to transcend her function as merchandise and become a merchant herself—not the stereotypical female merchant selling sex but a merchant selling merchandise circulating outside the borders of her own valuable property: her body. The outcome is, of course, that Jacky finds herself all alone, and the cause of disaster. She fails and loses her private, intimate, sexual life, her professional future, and her position and status in the community. Her way of life poses too strong a threat to the accepted separation of the spheres, in which the only valuable item a woman has to negotiate her terms with in the world is her body, her very private sphere. It is when this private sphere of the sexual body, privacy which Peter Brooks⁶ calls the most intimate privacy, becomes public that a woman can become a merchant herself, entering market relations as she who sells that which is usually sold by other men: her own body. Trading her body for money or for any other item of market value (food, a job, familial shelter) she becomes an active participant in market relations, rather than an object of trade only. She then gains entrance into this very guarded public sphere of trade and commerce, of communal life and financial independence, of having control over one's own destiny—the public sphere of male domination.

Nevertheless, even as she becomes thus independent, the woman trading her body does not necessarily also become an active “desiring,” as well as a desired, subject. Her entrance into the circle of market relations and commerce, while enriching her in terms of finance and public visibility, does not free her from her status of an object of desire. On the contrary—rather than being an object of desire in her private home, she becomes a public

object of desire, like the female protagonist on the screen. She becomes a public object of desire when selling her body means prostituting her sex, or submitting its desire to the laws of the market. Jacky avoids such a price, such loss, as she chooses—the only female protagonist in Israeli cinema to do so—not to trade her body, her sex, and not even to settle for control over her sexual body only, but actually to participate in the public sphere trading merchandise which is not her own body.

Her failure then becomes unique. The only other woman in Israeli cinema who tries to constitute herself via her profession, Tikva, the protagonist of the third episode in the film *Tel-Aviv Stories* (Ayelet Menachmi and Nirit Yaron, script with Shemi Zarchin, 1992) fails, since, even when she succeeds, she cannot carry out her own ambitious, liberating plan and gives it up. After managing to create an alternative setup which will enable her long overdue divorce, she changes her mind and opts for the normative, hegemonic mode of conduct, which objectifies her, and in which she becomes the stereotypical woman: one who prefers revenge over freedom. Jacky's failure, on the other hand, is not so much her own, as society's failure—the result of society's inability to create a basis for the independence of Mizrakhhi women. Thus, *Jacky*, the film, is a critique of Israeli society on several scores: gender, ethnicity, class, and social structure. On one hand, the film follows the normative representation of women in Israeli cinema in that it, too, does not have the power to change the social structure within which men occupy the communal, professional center and women are pushed to the periphery. But on the other hand, in its failure to enable its protagonist to carry out her plan, it also offers harsh criticism of the social structure and cultural depictions which are the cause of exactly this crippling positioning of women. It is probably in place to stress the point that it is the only film in Israeli culture to do so: other cinematic texts have had to resort to different modes of subjectivization, not so much through criticism as through subversion. *Jacky's* uniqueness, though, does not make this film a milestone, since it does not have precursors and other films have not, to date, followed in its footsteps. The attempt to shake the center, the domination of professional and communal life, and locating a woman in this center, remains one of a kind. Which only goes to show that the domination of the center by men is still so strong within the Zionist ethos that it cannot be challenged without having to pay too high a price. Subversion, then, is still the more available mode of representing women as self-constituting subjects in Israeli cinema. Subversion, and not change—not even up-front resistance; subversion is that which is practiced when overall change, or a revolution, are unavailable. Subverting hegemony thus be-

comes the principle way of exposing oppressive apparatuses, or of actually practicing some alternative kind of control even when under hegemonic oppression.

This type of subversion is present in *Jacky*, as well. Even though it is a film dealing with the very exclusion of women from the center of communal, professional action, it is not willing to give up the very special mode of subversion developed in Israeli films to focus on female experience. Hence the ending of *Jacky*, which seems to many spectators superfluous—her erotic dance, which adds nothing to the story nor to her characterization—is, finally, a remnant of the specific kind of subversion found in films such as *Sharon Motek*, in *Tel-Aviv Stories*, and *A Thousand and One Wives* (Michal Bat Adam, 1989). In these films, since the woman cannot gain control over her public, professional life, she transfers the focus of control to the sexual body. She does not sell her sexuality to gain financial control over her life; rather, her control empowers her to practice this sexuality in her own way and with the partners she chooses. She becomes a desiring subject, rather than remaining the peripheral, inactive desired object. In these films, interested in representing female experience and in supplying their protagonists with modes of controlling their destiny in some manner—be it minor and futile, but still some manner of control—the focus of subject constitution is transferred to constructing active desire. Sexuality, marginalized in Zionist culture,⁷ becomes an empty cultural space ready to house the marginalized: woman. Whereas the power of Zionist culture renders difficult any effort to position women as the center socially and professionally, through the very act of rendering the sexual body as Other and marginalizing it, Zionism has also provided women artists with an empty space in which to constitute a female subject.

In the case of films, the move to place the sexual body and its control at the center entails not only a thematic focus on the corporeal, but also the return of the gaze. The apparatus of the gaze, dominant in Hollywoodian movies, which reifies the female body and marginalizes women as Other, as passive desired objects, is now used, not in order to objectify woman as the object of male sexual voyeuristic gratification, but as means of female control. The corporeal takes center stage, not as male property and not as a means of commerce, but as actual matter that occupies actual space, and as the focus of desire and activity. Jacky, who is shown in the film to have practiced sexuality, controlled her sexual body, and gratified her desire, dances erotically in the film's final scene but to herself, for herself. There is no gaze other than that of the camera, but the camera serves also as the point of view of the above-mentioned critique of her exclusion to the margins as

an Other. Hence, the camera's gaze in itself, since it is also a point of departure for criticism, is not an objectifying apparatus. The only control left for Jacky to practice is over her sexual body, and that she does: she externalizes this control in her slow movement, explicitly sexual but also explicitly her own.⁸

The final scene of the film leaves the spectator with no objectifying agency: s/he is left to decide whether to join the position of critique, offered by the lack of male gaze to watch (over) Jacky's sexual and moral conduct, or the position of the absent gaze. The cinematic apparatus, the camera, offers both positions: that of the hegemonic, patriarchal, Ashkenazi norm, criticizing Jacky and the other characters for lack of normative behavior, and that of critical leverage, suggesting to the viewer a means of subversion even as she is being oppressed. The camera, then, while assuming hegemonic norms when it does not let Jacky succeed, also teaches the female viewer, indeed any other viewer from the margins; teaches all oppressed viewers, how to negotiate these norms, and how to create some measure of control—control, for instance over her sexualized body in a situation where it is not yet possible to change woman's positioning altogether. For the viewer, then, hegemonic norms are exposed both as powerful (causing Jacky's failure)—and as an apparatus—that is, a man-made means of oppression—rather than biological givens. Women are so positioned in society and culture as part of a normative, ideological apparatus and not because “that's the way they were born.” Subversion, then, becomes a possibility: whereas it is useless to try to change positioning in the case of biological determination, it becomes possible when ideological apparatuses are exposed. Their very exposure makes it possible to undermine them.

The strength enabling such subversion arises here, and in many other cultural products, out of the stereotype, since the representation of woman solely as a sexual being is, of course, highly stereotypical. This strength is the result of appropriating stereotypical characterization as a starting point for self-constitution. Empowerment occurs when the name of the characteristic is internalized—but not its evaluation, and when the empty space thus created is colonized and adopted as subject-location. The space of the stereotype is thus an empty niche available for the marginalized, the oppressed, the excluded and the repressed to occupy, to be there in her/his place and not in the place of (an)other as only its guardian.⁹ The stereotype provides, then, a space for self-construction. When Jacky focuses on her sexual body, she does not strengthen the stereotype, but uses it as a site for herself: her body, not as the stereotypical focus of male gaze or sexual commerce, but as a corporeal, space-occupying, desiring active agent.

Jacky constitutes herself, finally, as a sexual and self-owned subject. The empty space of the stereotype is rendered concrete through the empty cafe, the public domain of patriarchy; and Jacky's failure (her lack of communal participation) is replaced by the exposure of apparatuses of oppression: the apparatus of economics and commerce, the market value of woman, or gender relations as commercial relations. Finally, territory becomes a major constituent of subject-construction and position-location: territory is that which marks the limits of professional conduct, the borders of community, the location of the ethnic, and the space of gender. The territory of the drug dealer marks the limits of Jacky's ability to act as an independent merchant; the territory of the development town marks the border of the assimilation of Arab Jews into Israeli Ashkenazi society; and the private territory marks the boundaries of female self constitution. For Jacky, there is no transcending of boundaries, no crossing of borders, no breaking the limits; but within the territory she is able to occupy, the ethnic, gendered, and national subject is finally located as itself. Even though Jacky fails, and does not manage to break out, the space she occupies now becomes home to her own corporeal body and its cultural markers. Ethnic, gendered, and part of nationality on her own terms, Jacky is located on national territory and speaks the national language, but rejects its belief system and ideological norms — politics of identity as location politics. Territory becomes the site of struggle over identity and subjectivity.

The traditional Zionist-Palestinian struggle over national territory is replaced with a gendered, ethnic struggle over naming the territory. Jacky is not party to the national struggle: she is not a soldier, nor is she related to one, and fighting over land and territory to be claimed as "Israeli" is not part of her heritage. Rather, she is in the process of changing the function of each of the territories she occupies: the house, the "home," the settlement. Since all of them are feminized (the house and the home as the female's traditional domain, and the settlement as part of the feminization of the Mizrakhi in Israeli culture¹⁰), claiming them as spaces of action, as the spaces of an active agent, would mean re-naming them as "male" spaces. In *Jacky*, this means marking these territories as spaces for her action, she, the woman, acting differently. They are not marked as "male" since they are feminized and since Jacky does not "become" "a man." But they lose their mark as "female," since their femaleness is contaminated by Jacky's masculine name and profession, by her active rather than passive conduct, and by her appropriation of female stereotypes as locations of power. Hence, "house," "home," and "Mizrakhi space" are marked, not by the dichotomous opposition of genders, which means genderizing the private and the public spheres, nor by

the limitations placed over Mizrakhi territorial expansion. “Territory” becomes a site of critique and is marked by the critical stance of the camera’s point of view. National struggle over land, commercial struggle over street-control, gender struggle over public and private spheres, ethnic struggle over settlement expansion are replaced by the struggle over the limits of criticism, the limits of resistance, and the limits of change.

Jacky is not trying to gain control over any of those territorial markers. Rather, she is trying to constitute her own subjectivity at the juncture where they intersect. Her control over who she is will be gained as a result of their juxtaposition, which also means their mutual constitution. Thus, none is rendered exclusive nor is granted absolute authority; each territory, each territorial marker becomes only one option for subject-constitution, but never the only one, never the leading one. As a result of this collision between axes of subjectivity, ethnic oppression is exposed through gender oppression and vice versa; and the national repression of the Palestinian “other” is revealed through his absence from the ethnically-marked settlement.

Territory is the site, not of struggle over actual land, but of the struggle over identity markers. The Palestinian-Israeli struggle over territory is the struggle of marking territory as national; Jacky’s struggle over territory is virtual—she is not fighting for control over certain streets for drug dealing, nor is she looking for control over the “home” and “backyard” territory. Rather, she marks territory, not by controlling it, but by placing her corporeal body in it—in the café at the end, and en route as she looks for the drugs to buy. For her, the placing of her body, her material and sexual flesh-and-blood body, serves as marker, as a virtual marker, which does not end up with placing national flags in its stead nor in guarding the entrance door, but in the residues left behind by her body: scent, footsteps, acts. Thus, she both places her corporeal body in an actual space, and wins that space, not by remaining there, but by marking it, by naming it differently, by undermining the name it has. This she achieves by contaminating, in her dual presence as active (male) and stereotypically sexual (female), as independent (male) and unsuccessful (female), both male and female markers of house, settlement, and nation.

Territory becomes a site. “Site” is where subjectivity can be constituted. As in the films portraying the *Ma’abara*, and in Moshe Mizrakhi’s films, the enclosed territory—the development town, the *Ma’abara*, the backyard, the home—becomes the site of ethnic constitution. Through the feminization of the Mizrakhi in Israeli culture and the location of the ethnic within the feminized domain (the home and the backyard), this site is marked not only

as ethnic, but also as genderized. It is there that the axes of nationality (Israeli), ethnicity (Arab Jew), and gender (woman) intersect and simultaneously constitute each other—and collide and collapse onto each other. The juncture of identity-axes, located at the backyard of the Mizrakhi private home in Zion, is also the site of their mutual exposure as apparatuses of control and oppression. As such, this juncture is also the site of the constitution of alternative subjectivities of the kind that Jacky represents: a woman marked both corporeally and culturally, both as sexual and as independent, both as active and as critical, as resistant and subversive, but also bearing the mark of failure. Thus, Jacky is an aberrant subject, an ethnic Mizrakhi who is nevertheless central, someone who in her self-marking also marks that which is usually not marked: the “universal” Ashkenazi. Jacky is both marginalized to the periphery—where she offers a critique of hegemonic morality as a non-hegemonic agent—and positions herself as central in her disregard of that hegemony. Finally, the territorial mark of nationality—which supposedly endowed development towns with the mark of Halutzic participation, and which excludes women from their public sphere to their private, underprivileged sphere—is replaced with the marking of the territory, and the control over it is the mark of weakness. Jacky, in her virtual territorial marking, locates her corporeal body at the center of the narrative: the men’s control over territory, both on the streets and in the home (her brother-in-law beating up her sister), turns out to be insufficient and is not strong enough to exclude Jacky. “Territory” is conquered, rather, by her marking it and not by a man asserting his control over it. In naming her body her own, she will mark and name, through her body’s presence, the sites she populates as she moves along as sites for her subject-constitution. Jacky realizes that conquering a street or a home will not lend her power; it is through her marking locations with the presence of her actual body that she changes their function and their names.

Jacky presents an option for Israeli woman on screen: to use the position of to-be-looked-at-ness¹¹ (the apparatus of the objectifying gaze) in order to undermine through it the price paid because of it: the loss of agency. In using her corporeal body as the marker of virtual territory she uses the stereotypical mark of female sexuality as a mode of subversion. The corporeal body is the agent of action, and the to-be-looked-at-ness—the marker of passivity and female stereotype—becomes an inflection of the mode of subversion practiced by women in Israeli cinema. By not adhering to the territorial markings of ethnicity, gender, and nationality, Jacky undermines the power of territory and replaces it by the power of the site, the virtual territory marked by the corporeal body, which creates the alternative

gendered, ethnic, and national subject. *Jacky*, then, is a catalogue of the possibilities and options of critical representation of woman's experience in national culture and society as they are manifested and actualized in Israeli cinema.

NOTES

1. Mary Poovey, "The Production of Abstract Space," in Susan Hardy Aiken, Ann Brigham, Sallie A. Marston and Penny Waterstone (eds), *Making Worlds: Gender, Metaphor, Materiality* (Tucson, AZ, 1998) 69–89; see esp. 72–7.

2. For a reading of Mizrakhi films, esp. *The House on Shlush Street* and *I Love You, Rosa*, see Orly Lubin, "Nationality, Ethnicity, and Women," *Cinematique*, 75 (Sept–Oct 1994) 16–9.

3. On the formal and cinematic representations of the *Ma'abarot*, see Orly Lubin, "From Periphery to the Center: The Subversion of the *Ma'abarot* Movies," *Zmanim*, 39–40 (Winter 1991) 141–9.

4. Igal Bursztyn, "From 'The Little Coins' to 'The Master Version'" in Renne Schorr and Orly Lubin (eds), *Scripts 1*, published by The Jerusalem Film and Television School and Kinneret Publishing House (1990) 5–24. See especially pp. 22–4 on *Coordania* by Dina Zvi-Riklis, in which Bursztyn describes the efforts made regarding the visual code of the *Ma'abara*.

5. On the impossibility of street-independence, see Judith Butler's ingenious reading of the plaintiffs' discourse in the New Bedford gang rape case in her article "Contingent Foundations," in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds), *Feminists Theorize the Political* (New York & London, 1992) 3–21; see esp. 12–13.

6. Peter Brooks, *Body Work: Objects of Desire on Modern Narrative* (Cambridge, CT, 1993), esp. Chap. 2, "Invasions of Privacy: The Body in the Novel," pp. 28–53.

7. See, for example, David Biale, *Eros and the Jews: From Biblical Israel to Contemporary America* (New York, 1992).

8. For a longer discussion of women in Israeli cinema see Orly Lubin, "Woman as Other in Israeli Cinema," in Laurence J. Silverstein and Robert L. Cohn (eds), *The Other in Jewish Thought and History* (New York & London, 1994) 305–25.

9. Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY, 1985) 76.

10. On the feminization of the Mizrakhi (Sephardi) Jew, and on the stereotyping of Mizrakhi Jews, and especially on the relations between Mizrakhi and Ashkenazi Jews, see Ella Shohat, *Israeli Cinema: East/West and the Politics of Representation* (Austin, TX, 1989); and her, "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of its Jewish Victims," *Social Text*, 19–20 (Fall 1988) 1–35.

11. Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Screen*, 16(3) (Autumn 1975); see also, Mulvey, *Visual and Other Pleasures* (Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1989) 14–26; Constance Penley (ed), *Feminism and Film Theory* (London & New York, 1988) 57–68.

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