

Nahum Goldmann

Statesman Without a State

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Goldmann's Initiative to Meet with Nasser in 1970

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Nahum Goldmann took pride in being an independent thinker, one not bound by convention. He enjoyed his reputation as a devil's advocate. At the same time, he was part of a long tradition of international Jewish *shtadlanim* [intercessors] who used their abilities, their sharp wits, and their intellect to cope with the obstacles that confronted the Jews.¹ These two patterns of thought and action in which Goldmann excelled—nonconformism and *shtadlanut* [intercessionism]—were at the root of his initiative in March and April 1970 to meet with Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. This initiative was Goldmann's last significant public act in the political arena. He was 75 years old at the time and the president of the World Jewish Congress (WJC).

From a political standpoint, the Goldmann initiative came up in the interim between the Rogers Plan of December 9, 1969, which was supposed to be a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict imposed by the major powers (but was rejected by both Israel and the Arabs), and the Rogers Plan that put an end to the War of Attrition on August 8, 1970. This chapter will describe the circumstances in which the idea of Goldmann's mission emerged, examine the controversy over the mission in the government, and survey the public uproar that resulted from it. Underlying the chapter is the question of whether Israel missed

a genuine opportunity, heralded by Goldmann, to normalize relations with Egypt. Then-Prime Minister Golda Meir said in her blunt, straightforward manner that to describe the Goldmann initiative "as letting a chance for peace slip away is such an exaggeration, really, it's like flying to the moon."² This chapter focuses on understanding the covert and overt aspects of the initiative. The basic assumption presented here is that Goldmann never expected to go to Egypt. His actions in March and April 1970 stemmed from this idea. Nevertheless, he did think he would be able to achieve his main goal—to trigger a public debate over Israeli foreign policy—even without setting foot in Egypt.

Because he worked in the shadowy realm of politics, Goldmann was extremely careful, both at the time and years later, to obscure the details of the initiative and the identities of the people involved. Attributing this solely to his character, patterns of conduct, and mannerisms would be wrong. Goldmann acted in this way partly to make tracing his contacts difficult, but also to increase the confusion regarding the initiative on the assumption that vagueness would encourage people to focus on, discuss, and uncover every possible facet and angle of the subject. As usual, he did the manipulation very skillfully. From a research perspective, this makes describing and analyzing the affair difficult. Many works of interest have been written about the Goldmann initiative, among them books by Mordehai Gazit and Raphael Patai.³ But academic research on the period in general is still in its infancy, and not all of the relevant documentation is accessible. The Goldmann initiative was likened from the start to a *rashomon*, as Gazit puts it bluntly. This is evident in all types of sources on the subject. Therefore, deciphering it requires repeated cross-checking of information, some of which was printed in the press at the time with a slant of one sort or another.

Before we look into the Goldmann initiative, a few details about the situation in Israel at the time are worth mentioning. The War of Attrition on the Suez Canal front was being waged in full force; the Americans had decided to suspend the sale of additional fighter planes to Israel; the Egyptians had received sophisticated SAM-3 antiaircraft missiles from the USSR and would soon receive MiG-23 fighters, flown by Soviet pilots; the government had approved permanent settlement in Hebron/Kiryat Arba; and the Cameri Theater was staging Hanoah Levin's play *Queen of the Bathtub*. Israel had a national unity government headed by Golda Meir. Meir, whose appointment as prime minister after the death of Levi Eshkol had been described a year earlier as a "temporary solution," had consolidated her political authority and caused the scornful whispers about "that frail old lady" to subside.⁴ The leading policy-making ministers were Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Minister without Portfolio Israel Galili, and Deputy Prime Minister and Education Minister Yigal Allon. Israel's official attitude toward normalizing relations with the Arab countries was set forth by Meir: "To achieve peace, I am willing to go anywhere at any time to meet with an authorized leader of an Arab country, [and] negotiate with him based on mutual respect and equality and without preconditions. . . ."⁵

I. Stitching Together the Initiative

Since the Six-Day War in 1967, Goldmann had refrained from expressing himself in public about diplomatic means of resolving the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries. Although he did threaten "to end my 'Trappist' period," on the grounds that if Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon were allowed to make far-reaching proclamations, then he, too, as an ordinary citizen, could operate in his own way.⁶ Nevertheless, it remained merely a threat. He had even told Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in jest that silence was his main contribution to Israeli postwar policy.⁷ Goldmann continued speaking frequently with leading figures in Europe and the United States and expressed his views to them. Only when he saw fit to do so did he update Israeli government leaders about his political contacts. From time to time he was the target of venomous comments as a result, especially from Foreign Ministry officials, who had little patience for his independent moves.⁸ His opinions did not always remain behind closed doors. In April 1968, for instance, Goldmann became entangled in a web of denials after recommending to Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the United States press Israel to moderate its stance. Fulbright, under attack for anti-Israel views, defended himself against the accusation, incidentally divulging that he had had a discreet conversation with Goldmann. The latter denied having asked that pressure be brought to bear on Israel and even extracted a letter of apology from Fulbright.⁹ Foreign Ministry officials had predicted that Goldmann would manage to arrange such a denial and would continue his contacts without coordinating them with the Ministry—"at best throwing to us, after the fact, some grain that he calls a report." In accordance with the Foreign Ministry's recommendation, a message was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Israel stating that Goldmann did not represent the Israeli government, that he was not authorized to speak on its behalf, and that anything he said was solely in his own name.¹⁰ The Labor Party used Goldmann's remarks to Fulbright as an excuse to thwart his reelection as president of the World Zionist Organization (WZO). An editorial in *Davar* stated that Goldmann had become "disoriented and [lost] his sense of proportion in his conduct with the Israeli public." However, *Davar* stressed, it would not be among those throwing stones at Goldmann due to his political views. "On the contrary, at times his opinions can cool off hotheads and serve as a counterweight to people with radical tendencies who ignore the considerations of wisdom and the political situation."¹¹

Goldmann's relations with Meir, who had been named prime minister following Eshkol's death in March 1969, were beset by disputes and quarrels. She had been actively involved in the process that led to his ouster as WZO president, and even earlier the two had at times clashed publicly when Meir had been Foreign Minister. Nevertheless, their relationship was not devoid of closeness and appreciation. After she resigned as foreign minister, Goldmann wrote to her that despite their conflicts, "My heart was always full of admiration, and—if I

may say so—affection for you. You are one of the most outstanding and beautiful characters in the State of Israel, which unfortunately is not very rich in such characters.”¹² While visiting Israel in the second half of 1969, Goldmann arranged with Meir that he would express his political opinions when the time came, but he promised to do so when in Israel rather than abroad.¹³

Goldmann started breaching his declared silence on political issues in early 1970. In an interview with Tom Segev in *Al Hamishmar*, he said that he planned to come to Israel for two months (March and April) and present his views. When asked why then, he replied, “I expect perhaps some developments that I don’t want to talk about.” Regarding the national unity government, Goldmann said, “As soon as Israel has to decide something, this government will explode. One of the factors that will lead me to speak, perhaps in March, or in the spring at any rate, is that I see this moment approaching. I want a public debate to start, and not only with professors but with the cognoscenti as well.”¹⁴ He was convinced, he added, that he would come under attack when he started expressing his opinion about Israeli policy, but “the lack of debate in Israel and conformism are hazardous both to political thought in Israel and to the country’s image abroad.”¹⁵

Goldmann decided to publicize an independent alternative on three topics: the essence of the Jewish state in the Land of Israel, the outline of an overall arrangement for the territories that had been captured, and an operative means of initiating political contacts. To promote these measures, Goldmann took three steps:

1. He submitted to *Foreign Affairs* an article that he had written two years earlier. The editor of the journal “was thrilled with it,” as Goldmann put it, and informed him in January 1970 that he was removing two articles from the March issue to make room for it.¹⁶
2. He asked Meir to summon the leaders of the Labor Alignment for an off-the-record conversation in which he could explain his views to them before presenting them in public.¹⁷
3. He wrote a series of articles on Israeli foreign policy and arranged to have them published in *Haarez*.¹⁸

In addition, Goldmann expected another development, as he hinted in his cryptic remark to Tom Segev: maturation of his secret contacts with people who had ties with Nasser. The idea of a Goldmann-Nasser meeting was nothing new. Goldmann had tried to meet with Nasser back in the 1950s. Among the people who had been involved in the preliminary attempts to arrange such a meeting were U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Goldmann’s assistant, Joe Golan. These efforts, made in May–July 1956, were abruptly terminated by the Sinai Campaign before picking up steam again in May 1957. This is not the place to expound on this subject, which deserves separate attention in the context of the secret contacts between Israel and Egypt in the 1950s. The exchanges concerning the content of the

meeting were especially fascinating. For our purposes, however, a few of the features of these conversations are significant because they came up again in similar form in 1970. First, the liaison on the Egyptian side was Colonel Sarwat Okasha, one of the Free Officers who had staged the coup in Egypt in 1952. Second, Nasser laid down certain conditions for the meeting: total secrecy beforehand, a decision on how to disclose the news afterward, and insistence that Goldmann come as a Jewish leader on a private visit and not as an official representative of the state of Israel. Third, Goldmann's response to the Egyptian terms was, "Naturally, Ben-Gurion has to know about it."¹⁹ Although these contacts led nowhere, what is important from our perspective is that a preliminary basis for clarifying the mutual benefit of such a meeting existed in the memories of the two main people involved in the contacts: Nasser and Goldmann.

In the late 1960s, Goldmann met twice with President Tito of Yugoslavia, and they discussed the possibility of a meeting between Goldmann and Nasser. After the second meeting, on May 21, 1968, Goldmann came to Israel and reported on it to Eshkol, Dayan, and Eban. Goldmann's record of the conversation makes no mention of a possible meeting between him and Nasser.²⁰ He may have chosen not to include it in the document that he wrote, or alternatively, he may have been trying to promote such a process. In the wake of Goldmann's report, Dayan wrote to him:

Regarding the possible meeting in Berjoni [Tito's place of residence], as I told you, if it were brought up for discussion in the government, I would support holding the meeting. On the other hand, if the matter is not discussed by the government and does not have its approval or the approval of the Prime Minister, if I were in your place I would not hold the meeting (and not only because of the claims that would be made but due to the *essence* of the matter).²¹

According to Goldmann, Eshkol told him, regarding a possible meeting with Nasser, "It isn't simple. We have to see whether it's serious. I don't believe it is." Around the same time, Goldmann was invited to Russia, too, and in this case Eshkol told him: "I not only agree that you should go—you should run. And it's too bad that you only have two legs for that."²² Both of these meetings remained on paper only. Nevertheless, Goldmann continued to focus on forming secret ties for the purpose of arranging a meeting with Nasser. One after another, Russians,²³ the French Communist and culture expert Roger Garaudy, Eric Rouleau (the Middle East correspondent for *Le Monde*), and the Yugoslavian administration served as intermediaries. Garaudy, who visited Egypt in late November 1969, met with Nasser along with Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, editor of *Al-Abram*. During their conversation, Nasser and Heikal praised Goldmann but expressed skepticism about his influence in Israel. Garaudy replied that Goldmann's views had the backing of various Jewish and Israeli circles. On this point, however, Armand Kaplan told Goldmann that "this foolish Roger

Garaudy did not have the *seikbel* [common sense] to go through with it to the very end in proposing a discrete meeting between you and Nasser."²⁴

The possibility of the meeting was apparently discussed in an off-the-record conversation between Nasser and Rouleau, following an interview that Nasser gave Rouleau in mid-February 1970. A few days later, the Yugoslavian foreign minister brought up the subject in a meeting with Egyptian foreign minister Mahmoud Riad, while Tito was visiting Egypt on February 23–24. Riad presented the suggestion to Nasser, who "didn't say no, but he hasn't agreed yet either." The Egyptian reply was delivered a few days later to the Yugoslavian ambassador in Egypt, who personally brought it to Tito. The Yugoslavian foreign minister then gave it to the Yugoslavian ambassador in Paris, who summoned Armand Kaplan, director of the French bureau of the WJC. Kaplan passed it on to Goldmann. The discussions to arrange the meeting through the Yugoslavian brokers involved no written documents.²⁵ This factor contributed to the contradictory information regarding the terms for the meeting, which were to cause an uproar in Israel. To clarify matters, we have to distinguish between the beginning and the end of the contacts—between the initial terms set forth and the final version after modifications. The initial terms were as follows: (1) Goldmann's meeting with Egyptian leaders was to remain top secret, and (2) Goldmann would have to come with a concrete, detailed plan and not just listen. In reply, Goldmann insisted that he first had to inform the Israeli prime minister and that he could only present his own views and could not be expected to bring a practical plan.²⁶

On March 13, Goldmann sent a message to Golda Meir via the ambassador in France, Walter Eitan, saying that he had important information and had to meet with her urgently.²⁷ Goldmann arrived in Israel on March 23 to present the initiative to Meir. Just before leaving France, he met with Nasser's emissary, Ahmed Hamrush, who had been a member of the Free Officers' group that staged the coup in Egypt in 1952 and was now the editor of the weekly *Rose al-Youssef*. In this conversation, Goldmann was given a direct invitation to meet with Nasser under the following conditions: (1) Nasser reserved the right to publicize the fact of the meeting after it took place; (2) Goldmann would visit as a private individual and not an official representative; and (3) the Israeli prime Minister would be informed in advance of the plan to invite Goldmann. Across the smoke screen that concealed the terms for the meeting at the initiative of both Goldmann and Meir, the two were in total agreement on this matter. Goldmann was careful at the time to obscure the connection between Hamrush and the invitation to Cairo; he portrayed their conversation in an almost folkloristic style—fifteen-minute meeting late at night after the opera. But eventually he admitted the direct connection between his meeting with Hamrush and the finalization of the terms of the invitation.²⁸ In his memoirs, Hamrush consistently attributed the initiative for their meeting to Goldmann and downplayed the operative significance of their conversation. As usual with feelers of this sort, the parties presumably

agreed that as long as there was no mutual agreement on the terms of the trip, the invitation did not exist.²⁹

II. Government Discussions of the Initiative

On March 24, the day after he arrived in Israel, Goldmann met with Dayan and reported to him on the initiative. Goldmann had a warm relationship with Dayan, although he admitted that their views on Israeli foreign policy were radically different. He appreciated his contact with Dayan not only because of his charisma and personality, but also because of the opportunity it gave him to gain a deeper understanding of the "*sabra* [native Israeli] mentality."³⁰ That evening Goldmann spoke with Golda Meir, who was at a rest home in Mötza. No minutes were kept of their meeting. Goldmann asked Meir to consult with her "kitchen cabinet" and not to bring the matter up at a government meeting. Dayan, whom Goldmann had brought along for support, said that if he were prime minister he would take responsibility for Goldmann's trip and would not bring it up with the government. Meir retorted that was easy for Dayan to say because he was not prime minister. If he were, he would do what she was doing. She concluded ironically, "I'm more democratic than he is."³¹ Goldmann told Meir that if she agreed to the initiative, he would refrain from having his articles printed in *Haarez* for the time being. Meir said she would give her answer in a week.

Meanwhile, Goldmann reported on the initiative to Jacob Herzog, director general of the Prime Minister's Office, and to the ministers Abba Eban, Pinhas Sapir, and Israel Barzilai. The large number of these meetings is surprising, considering that the initiative was supposed to be top secret. According to Eban's count, Goldmann had shared information about the initiative to meet with Nasser with at least ten people before the government raised the subject for discussion.³² The implication is that Goldmann had already realized how things would most likely develop and decided that maintaining the secrecy of the initiative was pointless because he had little chance of carrying it out. He was focusing instead on laying the groundwork for the next campaign, which would follow a formal decision killing the initiative and leading to his main objective on his present trip to Israel—to present his political doctrine in such a way as to produce a widespread impact. Looking at things from a different angle, if the initiative for the meeting were really Goldmann's main priority, we should consider whom he had to persuade to make the meeting a reality, insofar as it depended on the Israeli side. A key figure in this context was the junior coalition partner, Menachem Begin, without whom the national unity government could not make any significant move. Goldmann did not meet with him. Moreover, he declared time and again during the first half of 1970 that one of the major objectives of his actions was to launch a process that would lead to the dissolution of the national unity government. It was often said at the time that the Israeli government had a "don't rock the boat policy," that is, it tended to "decide not to decide." This pattern was due in part to the balance of power in the government and to Dayan's

fence-sitting and his frequent threats to bring down the government if its policy diverged from his views. This can be seen in the unwritten doctrine that reflected the little agreed upon by the leaders of the Alignment. The doctrine was based on a consensus that "the government will set its ultimate territorial conditions in negotiations, when there are negotiations with an Arab country" and that no "ultimate terms for peace" should be specified for now in the name of the government.³³ As Meir herself stated at the Knesset on March 31, 1970, "At present the question of peace is academic."³⁴ Peace was not a political issue; it could be left to academia, since there was no negotiating partner on the Arab side. Thus the government did not have to decide on its political path for the moment.

Foreign Minister Abba Eban played a central role in determining how Israel would respond to the Goldmann initiative and what forum would make the decision. Goldmann and Eban were on very good terms. According to Eban, aside from a few members of the government, there was no one with whom he shared secret contacts with Arab leaders and heads of state as often as Goldmann.³⁵ Eban told Goldmann "several times that it would be impossible to refuse such a private invitation if it came from Nasser." In his doorway, while escorting Goldmann out, Eban summed it up as follows: "No doubt the 'lady' won't be happy with the matter," but "[I don't] see how she can refuse."³⁶ Meir vacillated for a few days regarding what forum should make the decision. On March 27 Eban wrote her a personal letter:

Sending Goldmann with the approval of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister is out of the question. There would be a huge, vigorous uproar in Israel. Therefore it seems to me that Goldmann should be given a choice: (1) If he wants to go as an individual, on his own responsibility, and announce that he has no authority to speak in the name of the government, it's his responsibility. . . . (2) If the condition is that he have some backing from us, I suggest that the matter be discussed in the government or in a governmental forum, and that we *not* take M.D.'s [Moshe Dayan's] advice (according to Goldmann) that the Prime Minister take the responsibility for deciding.³⁷

Regarding the first option, Mordehai Bentov wrote, "Is it really hard to imagine how Dr. Goldmann would be publicly 'lynched' here if it became known that he was wandering around Cairo without having informed the Israeli government?" In contrast, Shabtai Teveth maintained that if Goldmann wanted to go to Egypt on his own private initiative, he could do so, but he had never been courageous and was afraid this time, too.³⁸ Changing the focus to fear versus courage was a deliberate diversion of the debate to the realm of psychology. A quixotic move comparable to Abie Nathan's flight to Egypt in 1966 would have turned Goldmann into an "Abie Nathan with top hat,"³⁹ viewed as a moonstruck eccentric and shunted to the sidelines of Israeli politics. Despite the 1968 excerpt from *Davar* quoted earlier, Goldmann was not oblivious to

the limits to what was permissible and possible in Israeli politics. He avoided crossing lines that would make portraying him as a curiosity easy, and thereby ending his political career. Abba Eban, for his part, was not trying to evade accountability by keeping the responsibility for the trip off Meir and himself. He was afraid that, if they authorized the trip, the two of them would be lynched along with Goldmann. The main beneficiary would be Dayan, who ostensibly was in no way responsible for the matter, even if he knew what was going on. Eban was deterred by the prospect of entering a domestic political minefield, although what would be gained from sending Goldmann was not clear. Meir, who understood that the only sure thing that would result from the Goldmann initiative was, as Eban put it, "a huge, vigorous uproar," chose to use the uproar to further her goals. She therefore chose to go along with Eban's suggestion and let the entire government decide. The choice of the government as the forum for discussing the initiative meant that there was an explicit intent to torpedo it. Goldmann said in advance that government approval would kill the initiative. Such an overt, unmistakable deviation from one of the "noes" of the September 1967 Khartoum Conference ("no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it") would entrap Nasser in the Arab world.

As Mordehai Gazit pointed out, despite the ongoing War of Attrition with Egypt, a reliable means of communication with the Egyptian president was not a problem. For example, a few days after the disclosure of the Goldmann initiative, U.S. Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco visited Cairo (April 10) and Jerusalem (April 14).⁴⁰ Yigal Allon went even further, hinting that the Israeli government had had secret preliminary peace talks at that time. He made sure to have the London weekly *The Observer* report that he was Tito's choice for a meeting between an official Israeli representative and Nasser. From another standpoint, the pundit who reported this, Lederer, was close to Goldmann. I have no additional information that might suggest a connection between these two potential meetings.⁴¹ Meir and Eban repeatedly stressed the existence of alternative pipelines for the exchange of messages with Egypt.⁴² Hence, our present information suggests that this issue was irrelevant to Israeli decision-makers when they chose a forum to decide the fate of the Goldmann initiative. A discussion of the matter at a government meeting would rule out the "private trip" option advocated by Dayan because the government is inherently a public forum and anything brought up at its meetings, irrespective of its formal classification, automatically ceases being private.

The real internal debate among Israeli policymakers was not over whether Goldmann should go, but over how to torpedo his trip. Dayan's preference was to undermine the initiative. Absorption Minister Shimon Peres, Dayan's political soul mate, outlined the practical means of doing so in the guise of "hawkish observers." A "wise, complex" response, in his opinion, was to pass a classified internal resolution welcoming his trip to Cairo—despite reservations about Goldmann's views and even though Israel does not consider him its emissary—in keeping with Israel's declared stance that it would not let the slightest chance

for peace slip away. That same day, the resolution would be leaked to the *New York Times*. The next day, Nasser would deny having agreed to meet Goldmann, and thus Nasser, who had set a "brilliant trap," would be seen as the one obstructing dialogue.⁴³ In practice, the Dayan-Peres stance would turn the Goldmann initiative on its head and use it to block Goldmann's efforts to conduct dialogue with Egypt. In this vein, Dayan told university students at the Cinema in Tel Aviv on April 6, "If Dr. Goldmann had come and said he wanted to go as a private individual, no problem. But not on behalf of the government."⁴⁴ Goldmann, we should recall, had not asked to represent the government at all.

In contrast to this approach, which tried "to kill the matter gently" and remove it from the political agenda as quickly as possible, Golda Meir wanted to give the Goldmann initiative lots of publicity to awaken the dormant debate and controversy over the possibility of dialogue with the Arabs. As she saw it, the public impact of failure to go and of the deliberate, public foiling of the trip was the dividend of the Goldmann initiative and of the articles he had authored. Pundits at the time noted the process but attributed it to public relations blunders and failure to weigh the issues thoroughly. The way Meir chose to direct the affair caused them to gaze in astonishment at the bizarre "resurrection" of Goldmann, who had been something of a "dead man," politically speaking.⁴⁵ This does not mean that Meir thought for a moment that Goldmann was a worthy emissary for a meeting with Nasser. In his memoirs, Goldmann conceded that he had tried, through his articles in *Haarev*, to elicit a "powerful debate." In contrast, he attempted to downplay any direct connection between his articles and the initiative to meet with Nasser, because of which, "unexpectedly, the debate raged out of all bounds."⁴⁶ We will return to the meaning of the last part of this quotation shortly. Furthermore, Goldmann clearly knew that the timing of his article in *Foreign Affairs* would cause a scandal, and he understood that even if he did not go to Cairo, the invitation itself was enough to further animate the discussion of his political views. Despite the mutual recrimination and insults between Goldmann and Meir over the thwarting of the initiative, the two of them had a common goal: to put the question of how to end the War of Attrition and move toward negotiations with the Arabs on the public agenda. This was the essence of the Goldmann initiative. To remove all doubt, it should be stressed that professional politicians as skilled as Meir and Goldmann had no need to coordinate their moves explicitly, although of course we have no way of knowing what they said to one another in their private conversations. The common goal presented here is the result of study and analysis of their political views and moves at the time. In other words, the decision to pass on the verdict regarding the initiative to the government made the initiative Meir's rather than Goldmann's or Nasser's. From that moment on, her actions dictated the public agenda. Meron Medzini found that Meir blurred the ideological differences between the Labor Alignment and the Gahal bloc and until mid-1970 worked at preserving the national unity

government.⁴⁷ I believe that she took advantage of the Goldmann initiative to give the issue of peace talks a prominent place on the public agenda. While "doves" were gaining influence in the Labor Party, the Goldmann initiative served Meir's purposes as a prelude to the exacerbation of the differences between the Alignment and Gahal and the breakup of the national unity government over acceptance of the Rogers Plan in August 1970.

The government discussed the Goldmann initiative on March 29 at what was deemed a meeting of the ministerial committee on security affairs. Meir prefaced her remarks by saying, "I have a subject that I was thinking of bringing up with the committee, but I have reason to believe that it would be better brought up here." She didn't bother explaining to the ministers what that reason was. In a newspaper interview, she said it was the absence of Israel Barzilai, the permanent representative of Mapam on the ministerial committee. More likely, however, is that Meir—aware that the resolution would trigger a public debate—wanted to make sure that members of her government, whether from her party or from other parties, would not be able to claim ignorance or lack of involvement in the decision. Meir did not give the government an accurate, trustworthy report on the initiative. For example, she said that the Yugoslavian ambassador had contacted Goldmann "a week or ten days ago," even though seventeen days had already passed since the initial information about the initiative had reached her office on March 18. Meir presented the conditions Nasser set for the meeting as follows: "First, Nasser doesn't believe the matter will remain a secret and he will publicize the fact that he met with him. The second [condition is] that Dr. Goldmann go—and here the matter isn't entirely clear to me—with either the approval or the knowledge of the Prime Minister or the government."⁴⁸ The discussion ended with a decision, made without a formal vote, on across-the-board opposition to the initiative. Except for the first sentence, Dayan drafted the resolution. Israel Galili added the first sentence after Dayan presented his proposal to the ministers. Galili believed that expressing a "positive response in principle" to the idea of dialogue with Egypt was important. This implies that, in Galili's opinion, Dayan did not see much value in emphasizing this facet of the government's stance.⁴⁹ The government resolution, which remained classified, said:

The government of Israel would comply with any sign of willingness on the part of the Egyptian president to meet to clarify problems vital to both of our countries, if each side determines its own representatives. For this reason, in response to Dr. Goldmann's request that the government authorize his meeting with the president of Egypt, the government has decided to respond in the negative. The government does not empower him to fulfill this mission on its behalf—whether it is stated explicitly that he is representing the government or this is implicit in the fact that the Israeli government was asked and authorized such a meeting.⁵⁰

Meir informed Goldmann of the resolution on April 1 and asked him to initiate the rejection of the invitation. She knew full well that Goldmann could not possibly do so because the other people involved in the contacts were liable to see him as all talk if he did. The preceding analysis suggests that Meir was not even interested in having Goldmann do as she asked. The next day, the first of a series of six articles Goldmann wrote on Israeli foreign policy appeared in *Haarez*. The articles were based on five assumptions: (1) the time factor was not working in Israel's favor; (2) taking political initiatives to resolve the conflict with the Arabs was essential; (3) Israel should stop insisting on direct negotiations as a condition for dialogue; (4) Israel should strive for an official contractual agreement to end the state of war rather than a peace treaty; and (5) the feeling that Israel had no choice, which dominated the Israeli public scene, was incorrect. The most pointed assertion in Goldmann's articles claimed, "We are no longer as pathetic as we were before the Six-Day War. We are not threatened with annihilation. We are an occupying power, even if our methods are more humane than those of other occupying countries." He called for withdrawing from the entire Sinai region; making minor border adjustments in the Latrun and Kalkilya areas; letting the Palestinians in the territories decide their political future within the bounds of many practical restrictions on the exercise of the "right of return"; refraining from making a decision regarding the Golan Heights (because the Syrians did not want an agreement at the time); and keeping Jerusalem united without annexing it to Israel.⁵¹

On April 5, the government again discussed the Goldmann initiative, this time because of leaks to the press. At this meeting, Meir again mentioned the conditions set for the trip: "(1) Nasser will publicize it. (2) It must be with the knowledge or approval of the Israeli government. *Here I do not know whether he said with the knowledge of the Prime Minister or with the knowledge of the government, but there is no difference between the two.*" Meir adopted a formalistic approach here, as if every fundamental matter that reached her desk were presented directly to the government for its review and decision. In view of the leak, a decision was made at the meeting to publicize the government resolution.⁵²

One sentence that ran completely counter to the mood and content of the remarks made at the two government meetings on the initiative was unencumbered by political maneuvering and did not reflect the power struggles and manipulations between ministers. Abba Eban said, "When I heard Dr. Goldmann's story, I couldn't react in a thought-out manner, because I found the idea so surprising and so astonishing."⁵³ It is in this context that we should understand how Israelis received the news broadcast on the Voice of Israel at 11 P.M. on Sunday, April 5. The government communiqué left out the last sentence of the resolution because it might have been interpreted as a personal affront to Goldmann. The following sentence was added instead, "According to Dr. Goldmann, President Nasser stipulated that such a meeting would take place with the knowledge and approval of the Israeli government and that its existence would be made public."⁵⁴ This baseless sentence had nothing to do

with the conditions set at the start, in the middle, or at the end of the contacts. Presumably, it was not inserted into the government communiqué inadvertently. Nevertheless, for the time being I have no information to indicate that this nonexistent condition was deliberately included in an attempt to goad Goldmann into a reaction that would intensify the public impact of the affair, as indeed happened in the days that followed.

III. Disclosure of the Initiative and the Public Campaign

An editorial in *Davar* the day after the disclosure of the initiative said that the news "no doubt astonished the listeners." This "is a vociferous development that did not fail to make an impression on the Israeli listener and will not fail to make an impression on the world."⁵⁵ Total rejection soon replaced the astonishment. The Israeli press gave wall-to-wall backing to the thwarting of Goldmann's mission. Haim Gouri's response was typical. Gouri described the "Goldmania," as he termed the initiative, as the entanglement of "an old, publicity-hungry adventurer in an irresponsible delusion," which was now shown to be "a deception of tremendous proportions, a grotesque fabrication."⁵⁶ The main criticism was directed at the way in which the government had tried to neutralize the initiative, creating the impression that Israel was not making every possible effort to achieve peace. Meanwhile, the totally incorrect claim was advanced that the pedantic, semantic distinction between the government's "knowledge" and its "approval" of the Goldmann initiative had practical significance.

In the political echelon, few people supported Goldmann. The ministers who sided with him were Israel Barzilai and Victor Shemtov of Mapam, Zorach Warhaftig and Moshe Haim Shapira of the National Religious Party (NRP), Moshe Kol of the Independent Liberals, and Pinhas Sapir of Labor. Their support was barely evident at government meetings, partly because the last three ministers were not at the meetings at the time due to travel and illness. Several Knesset members, the most prominent of them being Avraham Ofer, who represented the "doves" in the Labor party, also sided with Goldmann. Nevertheless, the government's position, which enjoyed substantial backing, won a 61-5 majority in a Knesset vote on April 7. That evening, Goldmann attended a meeting of the Alignment's political committee and Knesset faction, where Meir vehemently attacked him. The previous day, at a meeting of the Alignment Knesset faction, Meir had predicted: "I imagine demagogues will now say that peace was in our hands and the government missed the historic moment." Now Meir resorted to demagogic claims of her own, flinging a challenge at Goldmann: Why hadn't he come to Israel before the Six-Day War? She recommended "that he stay in Israel for a while, live our life, go down to the border settlements and outposts, and only afterwards

criticize us and preach to us.”⁵⁷ A member of Kibbutz Maoz Haim, a border locality in the Beit Shean Valley, responded to the Prime Minister’s “attempt to stir up anti-Goldmann hysteria,” stating that many residents of border localities would be happy if Goldmann met with Nasser. Although the emotional, maternal approach that served Meir well in politics was powerful both morally and politically, he argued, focusing her motherly anxiety on the welfare of the soldiers’ bodies and souls, on fostering the aspiration for peace, and on “standing up proudly in-front of the ‘no choice situation’” would have been better instead of “vulgarly” appealing to emotions whenever she spoke of the outposts and border settlements.⁵⁸ Following the government announcement, Goldmann launched a countercampaign in which his supporters released information about the “true” conditions set for the meeting, in a widely attended press conference and a series of media interviews.⁵⁹

A lightning survey of the government resolution conducted on April 6 was presented to Yigal Allon and submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office for its review. The survey was to determine whether the possibility that Goldmann might be invited to Cairo had altered attitudes toward government policy or assessments of Israel’s relations with Arab countries. Interestingly, a comparison of each interviewee’s current answer with his or her answer in the past showed that, after the disclosure of the Goldmann affair, 34 percent had become more optimistic about Arab countries’ willingness to talk about real peace with Israel. Furthermore, 80 percent thought the Israeli government should accede to every initiative for peace talks proposed by Arab countries, although 62 percent believed the government resolution was correct and only 35 percent thought it was incorrect.⁶⁰

For a brief time, Goldmann’s views seemed to be gaining popularity. Demonstrations were held outside the government buildings in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Israel by Hashomer Hazair, the New Communist List, Haolam Hazeh, and Mazpen.⁶¹ The government resolution was criticized in the foreign press, too. A *New York Times* editorial about the Goldmann initiative concluded with the following words: “Israeli officials have often said they are just ‘waiting for the phone to ring’ in order to regain negotiations. It is sad that, when Dr. Goldmann’s phone rang, the Israeli government declined to let him answer.”⁶²

Six Israeli academics (Dan Patinkin, Meron Benvenisti, Shimon Shamir, Yoram Ben-Porath, Michael Bruno, and Amos Tversky) interviewed in *Newsweek* criticized the government policy. The Israeli ambassador to the United States, Yizhak Rabin, described in scathing terms the broad impact of such criticism by Israelis, “especially by what are called intellectuals.”⁶³ Rabin maintained that only real action would demonstrate the vast gulf between Israel and Goldmann. He therefore called for the revocation of Goldmann’s diplomatic passport. Eban, worried about stirring up passions further over an ostensibly procedural matter, quickly assured Rabin that his suggestion would be considered but chose not to follow it.⁶⁴ Meir suggested to Rabin that the embassy ask Marie Syrkin—the daughter of the socialist Zionist ideologue

Nahman Syrkin and, no less importantly, Meir's biographer—to write an article in response to Goldmann's article in *Foreign Affairs*.⁶⁵ These moves demonstrate the effort made, especially in the Foreign Ministry, to divert the debate over Goldmann from the initiative for the meeting to the opinions printed in *Haarev* and *Foreign Affairs* regarding a Jewish-Arab agreement and the future of the state of Israel. This was in response to the furious reactions in certain Jewish circles to the thwarting of the meeting; the influential London banker Sigmund Warburg, for instance, briefly threatened to suspend his ties with Israel. The initiative for the meeting was described in Foreign Ministry correspondence as an episode that had been blown out of proportion and would be better forgotten. The main danger on the international level, in their opinion, was that Goldmann's ideology—which advocated turning Israel into a protectorate, giving up sovereignty over Jerusalem, and withdrawing almost completely from the territories captured in 1967 in return for the vain allure of an agreement—would gain support. Eban even went to the trouble of explaining that “in fact, he [Goldmann] has the views of a radical pro-Arab. . . .”⁶⁶

The Egyptian government issued an official announcement stating that the reports that Goldmann had almost been sent an invitation were fabricated and groundless. The fear that Nasser would try to gain propaganda value from the affair and depict Israel as opposing negotiations faded away. To Egypt, the gain was not worth the harm the country might suffer in the Arab world by being seen as deviating from the Khartoum resolutions. If Nasser was attempting, however slightly, to use the initiative for the meeting to signal a desire for coexistence with Israel despite being pressured to accept increased Soviet military aid, the message got across. Hamrush admitted having been in Paris, but naturally he denied having spoken with Goldmann. In his memoirs he recounted that, upon returning to Paris, he wrote to Nasser, describing the circumstances of the meeting with Goldmann, and the Egyptian president instructed him “to continue the contacts with Goldmann and to try to make friends with him.”⁶⁷ Goldmann did his best not to “burn” Hamrush and the Yugoslavian ambassador in Paris, both so as not to jeopardize their political futures and for the sake of future ties with them or with other people who would know that he would not abandon those with whom he had secret contacts.⁶⁸ Against this backdrop, we can also understand the aforementioned vagueness regarding the existence of a formal invitation from Nasser to Goldmann. To David Ben-Gurion, who doubted the authenticity of the initiative in view of the haze surrounding information about it, Goldmann wrote:

You are familiar enough with diplomacy to know that one must not reveal names on such occasions. Incidentally, you, too, have mentioned several times an attempt on your part to meet with Nasser, and you never publicized the names of the intermediaries. Naturally, I told the Prime Minister the name of the statesman who initiated the matter and the name of Nasser's friend who came to encourage me to

accept the invitation, saying how much Egyptian public opinion would welcome the prospect of such a visit. I added to Golda, and I announced publicly, that there was no promise to invite me, just willingness in principle, provided that I come as a private individual and that the Prime Minister of Israel be aware of it, since Nasser did not want to pledge to keep the matter secret.⁶⁹

Nevertheless, at Ben-Gurion's initiative—in an effort to delegitimize Goldmann—reports appeared in the Israeli and foreign press describing the lack of seriousness of peace signals that had come from Nasser in the past.⁷⁰ Ben-Gurion's comments were not just statements of solid truth about the present; more important, they were intended as a means of molding the historical memory of such contacts and leaving in people's minds a residue of untrustworthiness and lack of expectation regarding signals for dialogue coming from Nasser's circles. This is not a post factum observation of the events or an analysis of the assessment of an experienced observer just before he left political life (Ben-Gurion resigned from the Knesset about a month later). At government meetings about the Goldmann initiative, Peres insisted that a written invitation from an authorized source—Yugoslavian or Egyptian—be demanded. The justification he gave is more important than the demand itself: "Myths have power. . . . I know a myth will grow out of this. I know how many myths roaming around among us are unfounded."⁷¹ In his remarks supposedly made by "hawkish observers," Peres said the day after the government meeting on April 5: "There are several dangerous myths about negotiations in Israel's brief history, and the most dangerous one of all was born yesterday." He went on to explain that he was referring to the myth that Israel had turned down negotiations with Egypt by embarking on retaliatory action in Gaza and to contacts the Maltese prime minister mediated.⁷² For our purposes, the historicity of events in the 1950s is secondary. More important is a remark by *Al Hamishmar* journalist Benko Adar in reference to the events of 1954–1956: "there are those interested in transferring things that happened to the realm of myth, because the events of those years can teach us an important lesson for our times, too, as well as for the future."⁷³ Peres, who I believe had a good understanding of the common interests of Meir and Goldmann, explained that he was concerned mainly about "the impression that would form in Israel," especially among the youth.⁷⁴ His "concern for the youth" was really concern about the political doctrine that held that the issue of dialogue with the Arabs should not be put on the agenda and that, for the time being, maintaining the status quo would be preferable. Dayan, too, was engaged in this struggle for the minds of the youth, trying to prevent them from falling victim to the delusion that an opportunity for preliminary peace talks with Egypt had been lost. In an address to university students, Dayan expressed sorrow over the reported skepticism and unwillingness of "high school seniors and *Goldmannists* to volunteer for the IDF, to fight, and to do so with their hearts and souls."⁷⁵

Dayan was reacting to a letter to Golda Meir from fifty-six Jerusalem high-school students. The letter, written on April 8, stated:

Madam Prime Minister, we, a group of high-school students who are about to be inducted into the IDF, protest the government's policy regarding the Goldmann-Nasser talks. Until now we believed that we were going to fight and serve for three years because there was no choice. After this affair, it has been proven that even when there is another option, however slight, it is ignored. In light of this, we and many others question how we can fight an incessant, futureless war when our government is steering its policy in such a way that chances for peace are allowed to slip away. We call on the government to take advantage of every opportunity and every chance for peace. Give Goldmann a chance!⁷⁶

Meir passed on the letter to Allon, who invited the students to meet with him. In his invitation, Allon expressed his concern about the suspicions that the government was letting a chance for peace slip away. However, he regarded their letter as "a faithful expression of our nation's aspiration and of the government's policy to achieve a sustainable peace treaty between us and the Arab countries."⁷⁷ Meir did not ignore the message in the students' letter. Referring to the shock wave that it had caused, she said that *Siab Iohamim* (published in English as *The Seventh Day: Soldiers' Talk about the Six-Day War*), Bertha Hazan's remarks on the behavior of the children in the Six-Day War, and Yizhak Rabin's speech on Mt. Scopus should be included in anthologies for youth and that every youngster should be familiar with them.⁷⁸ The expressions of yearning for peace that appeared in journalistic interviews with the signers of what quickly became known as the "seniors' letter" were hazy. The vast majority were inducted into combat units a few months later. A flood of letters and petitions from other teenagers, harshly criticizing the Jerusalem students' attitude, reached the Prime Minister's Office. Nevertheless, the "seniors' letter" became a sort of political initiation rite for young Israelis, who from time to time discover politics and are almost astonished at its impact on the lives of individuals and society.⁷⁹

"The Future of Israel," a subject that could be expected to appeal to many young people, was the title of Goldmann's article in *Foreign Affairs*, which appears to have been written in late 1967. His attempt to establish a different path for realizing the Zionist idea within the state of Israel failed. As usual when seeking to promote his views, he relied on his nonconformism. Before publication, Goldmann showed his article to five public figures—Henry Kissinger, Isaiah Berlin, Raymond Aaron, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Stan Rothman—and asked for their reactions. Their responses, he said, were "more than positive." Kissinger, a member of the editorial board of *Foreign Affairs*, wanted the article published immediately in the quarterly, but Goldmann preferred to wait for a politically

opportune moment. The article, an analysis imbued with Ahad Haam's "spiritual Zionism," expressed doubt whether a Jewish state with the same structure and image as other countries was a genuine application of Zionism. Instead of relying chiefly on military force and political strength, Goldmann claimed, Israel's existence should be accepted and guaranteed by all the nations of the world, including the Arabs, and safeguarded permanently by all of humanity. To achieve this goal, Israel would have to be a neutral state, and such neutrality could serve as the basis for a Jewish-Arab peace accord. At the time, Goldmann was pushing to be regarded as one of the leaders of the Zionist movement in its struggle for an independent state, along with Chaim Weizmann, Ben-Gurion, and Moshe Sharett. In a discussion in the Executive of the Jewish Agency about his views on the future of the Jewish state, Goldmann retreated somewhat, saying that he still advocated the existence of Israel as a sovereign state and did not propose that it be demilitarized. The neutrality plan was a vision for the distant future, he explained, after years of peace with the Arabs and a change in the political climate of the Middle East.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, in his writings Goldmann continued to promote his vision of neutrality, despite time and again encountering chilly reactions in Israel and enraging many people, who questioned his loyalty to the state's very existence. Meir set the tone, stating vehemently: "Not a trace of Zionism remains in him [Goldmann]."⁸¹

Goldmann spent the month after the disclosure of his initiative traveling around the country, expressing his views at dozens of conferences of party institutions, in rural settlements, in universities, and in urban lecture halls. As time passed, he encountered increasingly hostile reactions. Typical was Eliezer Livne's judgment that, "Peace is too serious for pacifists to be permitted to deal with it."⁸² Passions flared at Goldmann's meetings. People waved signs, shouted objections and derogatory comments, and clashed violently. Sometimes meetings were even broken up. The final chord in the public debate over the Goldmann initiative was sounded by Israeli president Zalman Shazar, who defended Goldmann's right to voice his opinion and compared him to Uriel da Costa.⁸³

Goldmann also met with West Bank Arab personalities, including former ministers in the Jordanian government. In their conversation, the Arabs declared their willingness to permit Jews free access to the Western Wall in exchange for a return to the 1947 partition borders and recognition in principle of the refugees' right to return to their homes. Reports on this meeting stated with some satisfaction that it had once again been proven that there was no one with whom to talk.⁸⁴

Goldmann left Israel on May 7. Just before leaving, he expressed his satisfaction with the debate that had followed his presentation of his political views and summarized the affair surrounding the initiative in his typical manner, "Everything should have been kept in proportion and not exaggerated." The warning against "exaggerations" that would portray Israel as not wanting peace was directed especially at Yoram Sadeh (the son of Palmah founder Yitzhak Sadeh), whose article alleging that "the moral basis for my being an

Israeli" had suddenly been wiped out had elicited widespread reactions.⁸⁵ On a previous occasion, Goldmann had admitted: "I am by nature not one to bear a grudge. My life is not exclusively political. I would rather be at a festival in Salzburg. Read a good book. Politics is not my livelihood."⁸⁶ Goldmann continued coming to Israel from time to time for short trips. His contact person in Israel on political affairs was Yeshayahu Weinberg, managing director of the Cameri Theater,⁸⁷ who also found himself in the eye of the storm due to the play *Queen of the Bathtub*, which premiered on April 17. One of its peak moments was the song "Promise," sung by the defense minister, based on Winston Churchill's well-known speech from World War II:

I promise you blood and tears / and my word is a word / and if I
 promise you blood and tears / then everyone knows that it's blood
 and tears / not to mention sweat. / Soon you'll have it very bad / and
 my word is a word / and if I say it will be very bad / then you can be
 sure it will be very bad / and maybe even worse than bad. / You'll
 keep living without the slightest hope / and my word is a word / and
 if I say you'll keep living / then a few will really keep living / but don't
 ask for what.⁸⁸

Amnon Rubinstein recounted that on the night he saw *Queen of the Bathtub*, Moshe Dayan was in the theater. His presence was a way of challenging his detractors. In the scene in which the defense minister promises blood and tears and keeps his promise, many people in the audience stood up "to see how *he* was responding."⁸⁹ Two days before the premiere of *Queen of the Bathtub*, Allon told a writers' conference that he was afraid it might be true that when the cannons roar, the muses fall silent. "And perhaps they fall silent amid this terrible noise, which destroys the still, small, creative voice. . . . Every work of art is a case of overcoming paralysis and the silence of the soul, and the sounds of war certainly do not help with this heroic task."⁹⁰ The biting satire closed after just a few weeks due to the fierce public outcry that its message evoked. What is relevant to our purposes is that the irate reaction to Hanoach Levin's play reflected the dominant mood at the time when Goldmann was trying to point out a different direction in which he believed Israel's relations with its neighbors should be rerouted. An apocalyptic political climate prevailed in Israel, in tense expectation of a dramatic military clash with the Soviet Union. The confrontation between Israeli and Soviet pilots on April 18 led to cessation of the Israeli bombings deep in Egypt. The "no choice" formula that had been repeated over and over again was evident, for example, in statements by the outspoken dovish professor Jacob Talmon about "willingness to fight to the last soldier."⁹¹

While the Foreign Ministry was explaining to its emissaries around the world that their job was persuade Jewish figures to exert pressure on Goldmann so he would feel isolated in his stance,⁹² Goldmann continued to maintain secret political contacts. He met again with Tito and Hamrush. On June 9,

Hamrush again invited Goldmann to meet with Nasser, this time on a private visit with no preconditions. Goldmann told only Dayan about the invitation because the latter had advised him just before he left Israel to accept if he were invited for a visit of this sort. Although Goldmann's purpose in writing to Dayan was to consult with him, Dayan refrained from giving advice and added: "You know all the considerations and you will decide what you decide."⁹³ We do not know why the trip never took place. In late June, Goldmann met with King Hassan of Morocco, who tried unsuccessfully to convince him to meet with Arafat.⁹⁴ A year later, Goldmann brokered an attempt to arrange for Meir and Dayan to meet with their counterparts in Egypt, again with Hamrush's assistance. The contacts ended in failure in late 1971 and were leaked to the press in February 1972. Goldmann did not give up. He asked Tito to suggest to Egyptian president Anwar Sadat talks over a separate agreement based on a withdrawal from the entire Sinai in exchange for demilitarization of the vacated territory, but to no avail.⁹⁵

IV. Conclusion

In the history of Israel between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, the Goldmann initiative is remembered as a fleeting episode, one of many public political storms. Meir, Dayan, and Eban left it out of their memoirs, whether intentionally or not. The initiative gave Goldmann an extraordinarily powerful public platform, which he had wanted as early as January 1970, as well as countless opportunities to express his opinions. The hostile public reaction is not only indicative of Israelis' attitudes toward Goldmann's views but, more important, is evidence of the rapid erosion of *shtadlanut* as a Jewish pattern of activity, especially for Jews living in Israel.⁹⁶

In this context, the classic question of "what if" comes up: If the Israeli government had authorized Goldmann's trip, would Nasser have actually extended the invitation? If so, what would have "come out of it," as Goldmann put it? He himself thought there was a 50 percent chance that Nasser would really extend the invitation and "80 percent that nothing would come out of it." On a different occasion he added, "I told Golda: I assume with 80 percent certainty that nothing will come out of it versus 20 percent that something might come out of it. I could have said 90 percent versus 10 percent that nothing will come out of it. But the gesture is important."⁹⁷ In other words, the meeting was important as a gesture, irrespective of what would be discussed at it, what would happen next, and whether it would pave the way to a peace accord. Moreover, Goldmann's "extreme nonchalance" in his public appearances, and especially at the press conference that he called on April 8 to present his version of the affair, is salient here, too. The way Goldmann presented the matter, which touched a raw nerve for Israelis, left many of his listeners with "a heavy, bitter feeling, as if even he himself did not treat the matter with the solemnity and seriousness it deserved."⁹⁸

In the center of the stormy dispute was Goldmann himself. The question was whether his personal behavior and his views regarding a future political agreement and the character of the state of Israel disqualified him from faithfully representing Israel's interests on such a life-and-death issue. Eliahu Sasson, who was considered an authority in this realm due to his experience with contacts with Arabs, believed that a meeting with Nasser could achieve an important goal: "ending the freeze between us and the Arabs and proving that dialogue between Israel and the Arab countries is possible." Sasson added that despite Goldmann's experience and achievements in international contacts, he should not be the first Israeli to hold such a meeting; the first person should be someone more solidly rooted in Israeli life.⁹⁹ In addition, there was the question of whether Israel had too hastily torpedoed a peace mission, while adhering to the principle of direct negotiations with the Arab countries and insisting that the ongoing military conflict was due to the lack of an alternative and the absence of a partner on the Arab side.

The idea of categorizing the initiative as one of the opportunities for peace that Israel let slip away is fundamentally flawed. The significance of the initiative is to be found elsewhere: in Goldmann's willingness to sacrifice an ostensible opportunity to meet with Nasser for the sake of the interest he had in common with Meir, that is, in encouraging Israeli politicians and society to focus on options for peace with the Arabs as a vital step toward achieving peace. From this perspective, and on the assumption that politics is not just an arena for clashes between different stances, power struggles, fights over seats in the legislature, and insults but also a first-rate educational arena, the Goldmann initiative had valuable significance. It was meant in part to show Israelis that a meeting with the Arab leadership was possible and that practical guidelines for Jewish-Arab dialogue and understanding could be drawn.

Moving to the perspective of today, it is worth mentioning that in the Knesset debate over the Goldmann initiative, Meir Wilner, the "untouchable" leader of the New Communist List, read out Yaakov Rothblitt's "Song for Peace."¹⁰⁰ This was twenty-five years before the song became saturated with the blood of slain Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin who was assassinated in 1995. After two wars and the signing of peace treaties with two Arab countries, the protest song that had been banned in 1970 turned into a canonical symbol for broad segments of Israeli society.

In a discussion held in the Zavta Hall in Tel Aviv on April 22, 1970, Goldmann related that after the Six-Day War, at a French Jewish committee meeting, which had mobilized during the tense prewar days to raise funds, send volunteers, and express public support for Israel, one person proposed:

Now let's move to Israel. But a very important, big-name Jew, not a Rothschild, not a Zionist, but a man who had worked day and night to help Israel, got up and said, "Absolutely not." He told his listeners: "I have a nephew. An assimilated Frenchman, doesn't know Judaism.

Before the Six-Day War my nephew came to me and said, 'I want to go to war.' I replied, 'All right.'" I knew he could be killed; no one knew that we would win in six days and he would be sent back home. But if that fellow came and asked me whether he should move to Israel, I would tell him absolutely not. Israel is a country worth dying for, but not worth living in.¹⁰¹

The Goldmann rhetoric appears here in its full glory. As a storyteller he was an artist. For the Israelis living in Israel, this sort of story did not obscure the fact that Goldmann himself chose to live abroad during the tense days of "waiting" just before the Six-Day War. That was not the whole issue. From Goldmann's point of view, the anecdote that he used for illustration embodied the core of his attitude—an exilic attitude—toward the need for normalization of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Goldmann never met with Nasser. The latter died a few months later. The political, public, and media drama that would have occurred had the meeting taken place remained one more of those elusive options that are again left in the margins of history. Due to the balance of power among the different players at the time, the initiative for the meeting could only be placed on the public agenda. Nothing more.

Notes

1. Chaim Herzog, "Sbtadlanut vemediniyut," *Haarev*, Apr. 10, 1970.
2. "Zevet Al Hamishmar besibab im rosh bamemshalab," *Al Hamishmar*, May 10, 1970.
3. Mordehai Gazit, *Tahalikh hashalom, 1969–1973* (Tel Aviv, 1984); Raphael Patai, *Nabum Goldmann: His Missions to the Gentiles* (Tuscaloosa, 1987).
4. Dr. H. Rosenblum, "Beshabor-lavan," *Yediot Abronot*, Apr. 10, 1970; Dan Margalit, *Sheder mehabayit halavan* (Tel Aviv, 1971), 83.
5. Minutes of Knesset meeting, May 26, 1970, *Divrei haknesset*, vol. 57, 1864.
6. Goldmann to Yaakov Herzog, Aug. 20, 1967, Central Zionist Archives (hereafter CZA), Z6/1148.
7. Yisrael Neuman, "Yesb alternativah, veyesh lehavhirab laam," *Davar*, Jan. 2, 1970.
8. On the Foreign Ministry's years-long hostility to Goldmann, see, for example, the cable from Moshe Bitan to Harman, June 24, 1965, Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA), government files, 6689/18/C.
9. Goldmann to Levi Eshkol, Apr. 5, 1968, CZA, Z6/1151; "Senator Fulbright: Doctor Goldmann bikesh sheef 'al lemitum yisrael,'" *Maariv*, Apr. 3, 1968; "Doctor Goldmann: sobabti im Fulbright," *Maariv*, Apr. 10, 1968.
10. Moshe Bitan to Foreign Minister, Apr. 4, 1968, ISA, Foreign Ministry files, 4155/6; Moshe Rivlin to Abba Eban, Apr. 15, 1968, *ibid.*; Michael Elitzur to Ambassador in Washington, Apr. 16, 1968, *ibid.*

11. Editorial, "Hasarat muamaduto shel Doctor Goldmann," *Davar*, Apr. 9, 1968.
12. Goldmann to Golda, Feb. 14, 1966, CZA, Z6/1146.
13. Avraham Rotem, "Dayan ve-Eban hiskimu sheesa le-Nasser," *Maariv*, Apr. 9, 1970; Goldmann, minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive, Apr. 29, 1970, CZA, S100/1073.
14. Tom Segev, "Hasagotav shel Doctor Goldmann al medinyut hamemshalah," *Al Hamishmar*, Jan. 9, 1970 (emphasis added).
15. Neuman, "Yesb alternativah."
16. Goldmann, meeting of the Mapam secretariat, Apr. 22, 1970, Hashomer Hazair Archives, 63.90 (1); Goldmann, minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive, Apr. 29, 1970, CZA, S100/1073; Nahum Goldmann, "The Future of Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 48, no. 3 (Apr. 1970): 443–59. The issue appeared in March but was dated April.
17. Goldmann to Golda Meir, Feb. 11, 1970, CZA, Z6/2394.
18. See Goldmann to Gershom Schocken, Feb. 11, 1970, CZA, Z6/2395.
19. See letters on this subject from Joe Golan and Nahum Goldmann, CZA, Z6/1612 (the quotation is from Goldmann to Golan, May 20, 1957). See also Patai, *Nahum Goldmann*, 207–20; Mordehai Bar-On, *In Pursuit of Peace: A History of the Israeli Peace Movement* (Washington, 1996), 19–20.
20. For Goldmann's records of his talks with Tito in September 1967 and May 1968, see CZA, Z6/2720.
21. Dayan to Goldmann, June 5, 1968, CZA, Z6/1151 (emphasis in the original).
22. Goldmann to Eshkol, Oct. 10, 1968, CZA, Z6/1151.
23. On the Russian involvement, see Gil Kesari, "Paris: Moskvah omedet meahorei haparashah," *Maariv*, Apr. 7, 1970.
24. Kaplan to Goldmann, Dec. 5, 1969, CZA, Z6/2720.
25. Cable from Ron to Foreign Ministry, Apr. 8, 1970, ISA, 7054/19/A; Edwin Eitan, "Makor yodea davar beparis," *Yediot Ahronot*, Apr. 8, 1970; "Gilui daat shel Goldmann," *Haarez*, Apr. 24, 1970. On Kaplan's involvement as a liaison between the Yugoslavian ambassador in Paris and Goldmann, see Patai, *Nahum Goldmann*, 226, 301, n. 60; for Riad's version, see Mordehai Gazit, "The Goldmann Affair: An Invitation to Cairo that Never Was" in *Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace* (London, 2002), 86. Although Gazit disagrees, Riad's presentation of the subject suggests that he was one of the Egyptian decision-makers who opposed the initiative. This alludes to the nature of the difficulties that Nasser had to contend with if he were to promote the process; it does not mean that the initiative was sheer nonsense.
26. Gazit, "The Goldmann Affair," 79–89. With a synchronism strongly suggestive of an attempt at disinformation and an effort to protect sources and ties, two versions of the terms for the meeting were released on April 7–8, by two sources in Paris who were close to Goldmann and were in on the contacts, although how intimately they were involved in all the stages is not clear. According to Eric Rouleau's version, printed in *Le Monde*, Nasser set three conditions for the meeting: that the visit be public, that it

be authorized by the Israeli government, and that Goldmann promise to present his personal opinions on making peace (Gazit, *Tabalikh hashalom*, 45, 51, n. 7). According to Armand Kaplan, who “secretly conveyed the following ‘true version’” to Ambassador Walter Eytan in Paris, the conditions were that the meeting remain a complete secret, that Goldmann come with the consent of the Israeli government, and that he bring a concrete proposal (cable from Ron to Foreign Ministry, Apr. 8, 1970, ISA, 7054/19/A). Kaplan also passed on the “secret” information to a *Yediot Ahronot* reporter in Paris, with the stipulation that his name not appear, although that he is the source is perfectly clear from the article (Eitan, “*Makor*”). During the debate about the Goldmann initiative in the Knesset plenum, Uri Avnery said he had spoken “a short time ago” with Eric Rouleau, who had told him that Nasser “was insisting that the Prime Minister be aware of Goldmann’s visit” (minutes of Knesset meeting, Apr. 7, 1970, *Divrei hakeseset*, vol. 57, 1593). This contradicts what Rouleau wrote in *Le Monde*. Considering the variety of versions attributed to Rouleau, we can only conclude that information coming from him should be taken with a large grain of salt.

27. Exchanges of cables between Eytan and Dinitz (director of the Prime Minister’s Office), Mar. 13, 1970, Mar. 15, 1970, Mar. 18, 1970, ISA, 7054/19/A.

28. Goldmann’s testimony, in Yeshayahu Ben-Porat, *Sihot* (Jerusalem, 1981), 36.

29. For Hamrush’s memoirs, see Yossi Amitai, *Mizrayim veyisrael—mabat mismol: hamsmol hamizri vehasikhsukh haaravi-yisraeli, 1947–1978* (Haifa, 1999), 222–23.

30. Nahum Goldmann, *Autobiography* (Jerusalem, 1972), 286. The nature of Goldmann’s relationship with Dayan and the character of the two men can be seen from friendly letters that the two exchanged in the midst of the furor over the Goldmann initiative. On April 2, 1970, Dayan wrote to Goldmann: “Thanks a lot for the leather chair. You really shouldn’t have, but since you did, I’m enjoying it. In the Israeli context, I don’t think power corrupts but ‘seats’ definitely do—in all parties, in all governments, and among all age groups and countries of origin (including *sabras*). But if you’re going to be corrupted over seats, at least do it for a deluxe seat!” On April 26, 1970, Dayan sent Goldmann a Passover letter: “I spoke to you about antiquities from the region that are not glass vessels. Enclosed is a bronze axe found in northern Jordan. It belongs to the period of the patriarchs (though I’m not sure Abraham used it) and it was one of the four main weapons! The sword—for hand-to-hand combat. The spear—to be thrown from a distance. Bow and arrows (the artillery). And the axe—to split the helmet on the enemy’s head. I hope you find it interesting.” Goldmann replied on April 29, 1970: “I received your letter with the axe. Thank you very much for the lovely gift. I appreciate it for its value and also because it was given to me by you. If I decide sometime to do as you advise and collect antiquities, I will gladly take you up on your promise to advise me, and I promise to accept your opinions in this field without objection and without reservations.” CZA, Z6/2393.

31. Shlomo Nakdimon, “*Goldmann: Nasser biskim sheekanes bedarkon yisraeli*,” *Yediot Ahronot*, Apr. 8, 1970.

32. Minutes of Knesset meeting, Apr. 7, 1970, *Divrei hakeseset*, vol. 57, 1600.

33. Galili to Golda, Aug. 7, 1969, Yad Tabenkin Archives, Hakibbutz Hameuhad Archives (hereafter: YTA, HHA), Division 15—Galili, Box 32, File 4.

34. Minutes of Knesset meeting, Mar. 31, 1970, *Divrei haknesset*, vol. 57, 1485.
35. Goldmann to Eban, July 31, 1970; Eban to Goldmann, Aug. 11, 1970; Goldmann to Eban, Aug. 27, 1970, CZA, Z6/2393.
36. Goldmann to Eban, July 31, 1970, CZA, Z6/2393.
37. Eban to Golda, Mar. 27, 1970, ISA, 7434/11/A (emphasis in the original).
38. Mordehai Bentov, "*Hasbegiah bagedolab shel memshelet yisrael*," *Yediot Ahronot*, Apr. 17, 1970; Shabtai Teveth, "*Mebumah al meumah*," *Haarev*, Apr. 9, 1970.
39. The phrase is taken from the title of an article by Shalom Rosenfeld, "*Abie Nathan bezilinder*," *Maariv*, Apr. 10, 1970.
40. *Gazit*, *Tabalikh hashalom*, 49.
41. "*Allon: Yisrael mekayemet gisbushei-sbalom sodiim*," *Davar*, Apr. 10, 1970; Nissim Kiviti, "*'Observer': Nasser asuy lehipagesh im Allon—bizkbut Tito*," *Yediot Ahronot*, Apr. 12, 1970.
42. Minutes of Knesset meeting, Apr. 7, 1970, *Divrei haknesset*, vol. 57, 1572–73, 1586.
43. Dan Margalit, "*Hamevukhab biyerushalayim*," *Haarev*, Apr. 7, 1970. Cf. the version that Margalit presents in *Sheder mehabayit halavan*, 89. For more on Peres's remarks to Margalit under the code name "hawkish observers," see page 312 of this chapter.
44. Avraham Rotem, "*Dayan: Rak hamemshalah tikba mi meyazeg otab*," *Maariv*, Apr. 7, 1970. Dayan had expressed this opinion at the government meeting on the previous day, too.
45. See, for example, Aryeh Tzimuki, "*Sbarsheret shel mishgim taktiim beparasbat Goldmann*," *Yediot Ahronot*, Apr. 12, 1970. Mordehai Bentov expressed this angrily, writing: "Many of our people are apparently complete idiots. The more capable they are of thinking for themselves, the less they understand government policy. They understand its official announcements even less" (Bentov, "*Hasbegiah bagedolab*").
46. Goldmann, *Autobiography*, 282–83.
47. Meron Medzini, *Hayehudiyah bageab: Golda Meir vebazon Yisrael* (Jerusalem, 1990), 392.
48. Minutes of government meeting, Mar. 29, 1970, Meir Chazan's personal archives (emphasis added). Golda called the part drafted by Dayan "the worst part." "*Maariv shoel—rosb hamemshalah meshivab*," *Maariv*, Apr. 20, 1970.
49. See also Ben-Porat, *Sihot*, 77.
50. Government secretary Michael Arnon to Prime Minister, Mar. 30, 1970, ISA, 7434/11/A. Arnon noted that "the aforementioned resolution was not included in the Government minutes due to its secret nature; it is being kept by the Government secretariat."
51. Nahum Goldmann, "*Medimiyut habuz shel yisrael*," *Haarev*, Apr. 2, 1970, Apr. 3, 1970, Apr. 5, 1970 (the quotation is from here), Apr. 6, 1970, Apr. 8, 1970, Apr. 9, 1970. Goldmann advocated making Jerusalem autonomous, giving it a special administration,

ensuring a Jewish majority in the city, keeping the capital in the new part of the city, and instituting international supervision of the holy sites.

52. Minutes of government meeting, Apr. 5, 1970, Meir Chazan's personal archives (emphasis added). Even though Goldmann was presumed to have been the one who leaked the affair, he consistently and vehemently denied this. See also Patai, *Nabum Goldmann*, 233, 237-38; Margalit, *Sheder*, 90-92.

53. Minutes of government meeting, Mar. 29, 1970, Meir Chazan's personal archives.

54. "Hahodaah harishmit," *Davar*, Apr. 6, 1970.

55. Editorial, "Drushab bavharab meleah," *Davar*, Apr. 6, 1970.

56. Haggai [Haim Gouri], "Hakoz vehakfufah," *Lamerhav*, Apr. 8, 1970.

57. Minutes of Knesset faction meeting, Apr. 6, 1970, Labor Party Archives, 11-7-1; "G. Meir le-Goldmann: Tehom beinkba umemshelet yisrael," *Davar*, Apr. 9, 1970.

58. Eyal Kafkafi, "Festival Goldmann: Mab omeret baverat Maoz Haim al parasbat Goldmann," *Ramzor*, 4 (June 1970): 18-19.

59. For example, S. Nakdimon, "Goldmann: Ilu hayiti nifgash im Nasser," *Yediot Abronot*, Apr. 7, 1970.

60. "Seker bazak sbeneerakh be-6.4.1970 beikvot hablatat hamemshalah beinyan Doctor Goldmann, mugash lasar Yigal Allon," Apr. 9, 1970, ISA, A/7054/19.

61. "Hamafginim karu: Tnu shans le-Goldmann," *Maariv*, Apr. 9, 1970. On the activity of "peaceniks" at the time, see Bar-On, *In Pursuit of Peace*, 56-58.

62. Editorial, *New York Times*, Apr. 9, 1970.

63. Cable from Rabin to Foreign Ministry, Apr. 15, 1970, ISA, 7434/11/A; Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Israel: Criticism from Within," *Newsweek*, Apr. 20, 1970, 12-14.

64. Cable from Rabin to Foreign Ministry, Apr. 13, 1970; cable from Eban to Rabin, Apr. 15, 1970, ISA, 7434/11/A.

65. Cable from Dinitz to Rabin and Argov, Apr. 14, 1970, ISA, 7434/11/A.

66. Cable from Aharon Remez, the ambassador in London, to Foreign Ministry, Apr. 14, 1970; cable from Eban to Rabin, Apr. 15, 1970; cable from Eban to Ambassador Eytan in Paris, Apr. 15, 1970 (the quotation is from here); cable from Dibon to Remez, Apr. 16, 1970, ISA, 7434/11/A.

67. Amitai, *Mizrayim veyisrael*, 223-24; Shmuel Segev, "Kabir: Hayediot al bazmanat Goldmann alyedei Nasser—beduyot umeshulelot yesod," *Maariv*, Apr. 7, 1970; "'Abram': Goldmann himzi et sippur babazmanah alyedei Nasser," *Maariv*, Apr. 8, 1970; "Hamrush: Lo nifgashti im Goldmann," *Lamerhav*, Apr. 9, 1970.

68. Rouleau told Gil Kesari, *Maariv's* correspondent in Paris, "The Egyptian who had contacts with Goldmann has nothing to do with the invitation," *Maariv*, Apr. 8, 1970.

69. Goldmann to Ben-Gurion, June 9, 1970, CZA, Z6/2393.

70. For example, "Ben-Gurion: *Hayu magaim sodiim im mizrayim*," *Al Hamishmar*, Apr. 28, 1970; a report in the *Sunday Telegraph* stating that in 1963 Nasser had suggested meeting with Ben-Gurion and then changed his mind. "Nasser *biziah pegisbah le-Ben-Gurion—vehitbare*," *Maariv*, May 10, 1970. See also Margalit, *Sheder*, 89.

71. Minutes of government meetings, Mar. 29, 1970, Apr. 5, 1970, Meir Chazan's personal archives (the quotation is from the second meeting).

72. Margalit, "Hamevukhab."

73. Benko Adar, "Kesbe-Nasser *kataav mikhtavim el 'abi Sharet*," *Hotam* (supplement to *Al Hamishmar*), Apr. 17, 1970.

74. Minutes of government meetings, Mar. 29, 1970, Apr. 5, 1970, Meir Chazan's personal archives (the quotation is from the second meeting).

75. Moshe Dayan, "Mul *bakfafah barusit shenizrekab*," *Maariv*, May 8, 1970 (emphasis added).

76. Hashomer Hazair Archives, 21.7-95 (3).

77. Allon to the signers of the "seniors' letter," Apr. 16, 1970, YTA, HHA, Division 15—Yigal Allon, Box 21, File 4.

78. "Zevet *Al Hamishmar*." Bertha Hazan's remarks were published in *Habinukh bamesbutaf*, no. 6 (63) (Aug. 1967): 1.

79. Simcha Dinitz to Allon and Galili, May 3, 1970, YTA, HHA, Division 15—Allon, Box 21, File 4.

80. Goldmann, "The Future of Israel"; minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive, Apr. 29, 1970, CZA, S100/1073.

81. Golda, meeting of the Negev extension of the Beit Berl central ideological circle in the Labor party, *Davar*, Apr. 22, 1970.

82. Eliezer Livne, "Gisbah *mistit el hamoledet*," *Haarez*, May 7, 1970.

83. "Hanasi *Zalman Shazar al bofesh badibur*," *Haarez*, May 8, 1970.

84. For example, "Pegisbat *nikkhadim araviim im Goldmann nistaymah beakbzavab badadit*," *Davar*, Apr. 29, 1970.

85. "Goldmann: *Ein safek shebamemshalah rotzab beshalom*," *Haarez*, May 3, 1970; Avraham Rotem, "Doctor Goldmann: *'amarti leishbi: baalekh mathil leshaamem oti* . . ." *Maariv*, May 5, 1970; Goldmann, minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive, Apr. 29, 1970, CZA, S100/1073; Yoram Sadeh, "Hitpakbut *mebaemunab birezon yisrael beshalom*," *Haarez*, Apr. 19, 1970.

86. "Goldmann *hayahid shelo bitragesb*" (interview by Yehoshua Tadmor with Nahum Goldmann), *Lamerhav*, Apr. 10, 1970.

87. For example, Goldmann to Weinberg, July 26, 1970, CZA, Z6/2395.

88. Hanoch Levin, *Malkat haambatyah in Mab ekhpat lazipor* (Tel Aviv, 1987), 88.

89. Amnon Rubinstein, "Malkat *haambatyah eromab*," *Haarez*, May 4, 1970 (emphasis in the original).

90. Allon's words of welcome at the writers' conference, Apr. 15, 1970, YTA, HHA, Division 15—Yigal Allon, Box 21, File 4.

91. [Jacob] Talmon, "*Meaz yatza matok*," *Haarez*, May 1, 1970; Yeshayahu Weinberg to Goldmann, May 17, 1970, CZA, Z6/2395. On the military situation at the time, see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969–1970* (New York, 1980), 151–59.

92. Cable from Gazit to Rabin and Argov, May 29, 1970, ISA, 7054/19/A.

93. Goldmann to Dayan, June 10, 1970; Dayan to Goldmann, June 14, 1970, CZA, Z6/2393.

94. The meeting was arranged through the mediation of Jean Daniel, editor of the French weekly *Nouvel Observateur*. Cable from the embassy in Paris to the Foreign Ministry, June 28, 1970, ISA, 7054/19/A.

95. Goldmann to Golda, Jan. 4, 1972, CZA, Z6/8680; Goldmann to Tito, Dec. 30, 1971, CZA, Z6/2720; Gil Sedan, "*Golda Meir: isharti le-Goldmann*," *Yediot Abronot*, Feb. 15, 1972.

96. A typical expression of this by a member of the Palestine-born generation is Yigal Allon's statement that Goldmann should have obtained the Prime Minister's consent "before going so far with his feelers and his *sbtadlanut*." Eliyahu Egers, "*Reayon im segan rosh hamemshalah*," *Davar*, Apr. 20, 1970.

97. Rotem, "*Dayan ve-Eban*"; Goldmann, minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive, Apr. 29, 1970, CZA, S100/1073.

98. H. Yaad, "*Goldmann mevater lelo krav*," *Maariv*, Apr. 9, 1970.

99. Yosef Harif, "*Imut—baim zarikh bayah lebasim she-Goldmann yisa le-Nasser?*" *Maariv*, Apr. 7, 1970.

100. Minutes of Knesset meeting, Apr. 7, 1970, *Divrei hakeneset*, vol. 57, 1588.

101. Conversation between *Al Hamishmar* editor Yaakov Amit and Nahum Goldmann, Zavta Hall, Tel Aviv, Apr. 22, 1970, ISA, 7054/19/A.