


This volume is dedicated  
to the memory of  
LOUIS A. PINKUS  
Chairman of the  
Executive of the World Zionist Organization  
A faithful friend of the Institute for Zionist Research  
of Tel-Aviv University



# ZIONISM

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT  
AND OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN PALESTINE

IV

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
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## CONTENTS

### ARTICLES

- Mattityahu Mintz**  
Ber Borochov at the Seventh Zionist Congress at Basle 9
- Rafael Frankel**  
Yoseph Busel, the Hedera Commune and the Birth of the Kvutza 44
- Yosef Gorni**  
The Roots of Awareness of the Jewish—Arab Confrontation  
1900—1918 72
- Moshe Rinott**  
The Struggle between the Teachers Union and the Zionist Or-  
ganization for the Hegemony in Hebrew Education in Palestine 144
- Evyatar Friesel**  
The Parting of Ways between Brandeis and Weizmann at the  
London Zionist Conference of 1920 146
- Elhanan Orren**  
Tel-Amal — Pioneer of 'Stockade and Watchtower' Settlement:  
From Tactical Initiative to the Evolution of a Policy and  
Strategy of Settlement in 1936—37 165
- Elkana Margalit**  
The Debate in the Labour Movement on Bi-Nationalism 183
- Gabriel Cohen**  
Churchill and the Establishment of the War Cabinet Committee  
on Palestine (April—July 1943) 259
- David Shaary**  
The Legal Basis for the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Immigrants from  
Palestine and Their Detention in Cyprus 337
- SOURCES
- Yitzhak Enav (Winchouse)**  
Naphtali Herz Imber — an Unpublished Correspondence 363
- Shlomo Lev-Ami**  
The Minutes of the Irgun Zvai Leumi (I.Z.L.), July—November  
1944 391
- ENGLISH SUMMARIES [VII] 455



## SUMMARIES

### BER BOROCHOV AT THE SEVENTH ZIONIST CONGRESS AT BASLE

*by Mattityahu Mintz*

The article takes issue with the accepted theory that, at the Seventh Zionist Congress, Borochov was already closely associated with Poalei Zion and that his actions at the Congress were motivated by this fact. The author believes that Borochov's Poalei Zion-oriented stand was a stratagem devised by the Ussishkin group. The latter consolidated a pressure group which acted behind the scenes and went to all lengths in order to ensure the victory of the extremist wing of Poalei Zion, which as ideologically identified with Ussishkin. Borochov was entrusted with the Poalei Zion sector and given the task of attempting to influence those members of Poalei Zion who were under the influence of the Vozrozhdeniye. His appearance as a Poalei Zion adherent caused general amazement. He succeeded in checking the Vozrozhdeniye sympathizers, at least within the Congress, and a large number of those delegates who defined themselves as Poalei Zion rallied to Ussishkin's group.

### YOSEPH BUSEL, THE HEDERA COMMUNE AND THE BIRTH OF THE KVUTZA

*by Rafael Frankel*

The workers of the Second Aliya considered their main task to be the 'conquest of labour' in the older settlements, the creation of a Jewish agricultural proletariat. The leaders of the two workers' parties were categorically opposed to workers settling on the land as independent farmers. However, 'the conquest of labour' in the settlements of Judea (Petach-Tikva etc.) was to a large extent a failure.

Galilee was different. Settlements were younger, poorer and smaller. The main crop was wheat, not fruit as in Judea, and each settler

usually employed only one worker. As a result, the workers felt they were needed and for the first time became attached to agricultural work. In Galilee, however, there was no room for a permanent agricultural proletariat.

Thus the start of work at Dleika (Kinereth), the first farm established by the Zionist Organization (June 1908), aroused hopes that there, perhaps, solutions to the problems would be found.

Despite the initial enthusiasm, relations between the workers and M. Berman, the agronomist in charge on behalf of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization, deteriorated, until finally Berman decided to employ Arab labour to trash the first harvest, and a strike was declared (October 1909).

As a result, 'Hahoresht' (the workers' organization in Galilee) negotiated an agreement by which a chosen group of six workers farmed the land at Umm Djuni for one year, on their own responsibility.

At the same time a group of workers left the farm at Kinereth to form the Hedera Commune.

The Umm Djuni group finished the harvest with a profit, but at the end of the year, the group dispersed and the Hedera Commune took the land at Umm Djuni.

The leader of the Hedera Commune was Y. Busel, who already in 1908 had conceived the idea of founding communal settlements.

On their way from Hedera to Umm Djuni, the Commune participated in the 6th conference of Hapoel Hatzair (October 1910). There Busel declared that 'the creation of an agricultural proletariat is neither possible nor necessary', and made it clear that the Commune believed that in settling at Umm Djuni they were leading the way for the workers' movement as a whole. The leaders of both parties, however, still regarded settlement as heresy, and Busel's words were ignored.

At the same time, other groups of workers (Kvutzot) were formed that carried out work of various kinds on a contractual basis. These 'kvutzot' moved from place to place, but Busel persuaded the Commune not to move on to new tasks but to make Degania (Umm Djuni) their permanent home (1912).

The problem of women in the Kvutza was at first one of equality: they demanded the right to work in agriculture. The problem of integrating the family into the commune only arose at a later date (1915—18). Busel then convinced his comrades that without communal



child-care and education the Kvutza as a way of life could not survive.

The 'kvutzot' (groups of workers — in contemporary terminology) of the Second Aliya were formed as a result of the workers' failure to create an agricultural proletariat, on the one hand, and of their refusal to become labour employing farmers, on the other; and as a result of their revolt against the 'officials'. However, the first kvutza in the modern sense of the term (a communal settlement) — Degania — was set up by one of these groups thanks to the leadership of Busel, who from the very beginning had a clear aim and the perseverance and devotion to achieve it.

### THE ROOTS OF AWARENESS OF THE JEWISH—ARAB CONFRONTATION

1900—1918

by Yosef Gorni

The article attempts to clarify several problems. To what extent were the Jewish settlers in Palestine before the First World War aware of the existence of an Arab problem? Was this question publicly discussed, can different approaches be discerned and did they correspond to specific social groupings? Finally, what effect did historical events have on these attitudes?

The author presumes that all these attitudes were rooted in Zionist ideology, based on four principles: the desire for Jewish territorial concentration in Palestine; the demand for a Jewish majority there; the desire to create a new Hebrew culture, and the yearning for a social revolution and 'productivization' of the Jewish people (reflected in the struggle for the employment of Jewish labour).

Accordingly, four basic approaches to the Arab question are identified:

a) Altruistic integration, advocated by a group of intellectuals who favoured reintegration of the Jewish people in the East and the extension of aid to the Arabs. They believed that Zionism could not be implemented without Arab assent.

b) Separatism, supported by many of the settlers, particularly the younger generation. They claimed that the Jews had an absolute claim to Palestine and were willing to accord Arabs only the bare right of

THE PARTING OF WAYS BETWEEN BRANDEIS  
AND WEIZMANN AT THE LONDON ZIONIST CONFERENCE  
OF 1920

*by Evyatar Friesel*

Relations between Brandeis and Weizmann already became strained during the first Zionist Conference in which they participated together, the London Conference of August 1919. The final crisis in their relations occurred during Weizmann's visit to the United States in 1921 (the so called 'Brandeis—Weizmann struggle'). But the actual parting of ways between the two Zionist leaders, in the personal and political sense, happened during the London Zionist Conference of July 1920.

Certain steps of Weizmann during the night of 15 to 16 July 1920 moved Brandeis to refrain from any further contact with him, having been deeply offended by what he regarded as a breach of faith on Weizmann's part. Brandeis maintained that Weizmann had brought about the failure of a plan for Zionist activity that had been agreed between them.

There are several versions regarding what happened during that night. Through a critical analysis of these versions, an effort is made in the article to establish the actual facts. All the versions are more or less unfavourable to Weizmann, but since they come from people close to Brandeis's point of view, they have to be examined carefully. The analysis of the facts leads to several conclusions, both on the personal and on the more general level.

On the personal level, it seems strange that Weizmann, who generally explained himself extensively, never told his version regarding the events of that night session. But no less strange is the fact that Brandeis, who was famous for his imperturbability during his many public struggles, even when his adversaries employed the meanest tactics, reacted to Weizmann's maneuver with such uncharacteristic sharpness.

On a more general level, the analysis of the circumstances leading to and emanating from the personal misunderstanding between Weizmann and Brandeis at the London Conference seems to indicate that the parting of ways between them was due more to political and ideological factors than to personal issues.

TEL-AMAL — PIONEER OF 'STOCKADE AND WATCH-TOWER' SETTLEMENT: FROM TACTICAL INITIATIVE TO THE EVOLUTION OF A POLICY AND STRATEGY OF SETTLEMENT IN 1936—37

by Elhanan Orren

Tel-Amal was founded in Chanuka 5697 (Dec. 1936), as the first 'Stockade and Watchtower' settlement. But contrary to a widely held view, this operation did not result from centrally adopted policies and plans as a response to the Arab challenge of the 1936 disturbances. Rather, the initiative originated within a 'Hashomer Hatzair' group of settlers, displaced from its land near Tel-Shokh, east of Bet-Alpha, by bedouin attacks. The Halutzim sought ways and means to resettle in the face of renewed attacks, and evolved the tactics and the techniques of a prefabricated and defensible settlement, to be set up between dawn and dusk.

They had to win an uphill struggle to convince the Harod Regional Council and its venerable authority on Haganah affairs, Haim Sturman, that their scheme was feasible, and they succeeded in winning over Avraham Harzfeld of the Agricultural Centre and Yosef Weitz of the Jewish National Fund, who agreed to support and finance their venture.

Only the success of Tel-Amal and other settlements applying the new 'drill', opened the eyes of the Jewish Agency to the new possibilities for settlement initiative, at a time when the Peel Commission was drawing up its report and was about to recommend separate statehood for Jews and Arabs through the partition of Palestine.

In the spring of 1937 Moshe Shertok (Sharett) became the prime mover in the formulation of a policy and strategy of settlement designed to concentrate men and means and to fix the timing and the direction of all settlement efforts, in order to gain the maximum political, strategic and economic effects.

The first objectives of this strategy, implemented in the week preceding the publication of the Peel Report (7 July 1937), were the extension of settlement to the limits of the Bet Shean Valley, and the settlement of Ein Gev, east of the Lake of Kinnereth. Sharett, although preoccupied with policy and strategy, never failed to emphasize that settlement, far from being reduced to a means, was and would remain a major Zionist end and ideal in itself.

## THE DEBATE IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT ON BI-NATIONALISM

(An Essay in the Interpretation of Zionism)

*by Elkana Margalit*

The article surveys and analyzes the debate within the Jewish Labour Movement in the nineteen-forties on bi-nationalism and Jewish statehood. In the course of the debate, various political solutions for peaceful Jewish—Arab co-existence were suggested by Jewish Labour leaders — ranging from a mandatory system to a Jewish state. The article describes and discusses the bi-national schemes of Sh. Kaplanski and Hashomer Hatzair, the formulae of Ben-Gurion and other Mapai leaders, the Biltmore resolution and various proposals aiming at an international mandatory and supervisory system as suggested by Ahdut Ha'avoda and Left Poalei Zion.

The political groups mentioned differed in their interpretation of Zionist aims, and evolved different solutions in accord with their socio-cultural structures and historical traditions.

During the period surveyed and within the framework of these solutions, Zionist Labour leaders evinced considerable readiness to experiment and compromise.

The author's conclusion is that the objective conditions and economic potentialities of Palestine could have accommodated both Jewish and Arab national claims.

## CHURCHILL AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR CABINET COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE APRIL—JULY 1943

*by Gabriel Cohen*

The author describes and analyses the background to the War Cabinet decision, in July 1943, to seek a new policy for Palestine destined to replace the policy laid down in the White Paper of May 1939, and to set up a special Cabinet Committee for this purpose. He deals with a variety of assessments and attitudes towards the future of Palestine then prevailing in British Government circles: in Whitehall as well as in the Middle East and Palestine; among ministers, politicians,

diplomats and civil servants; among the military on the one hand and the civil authorities on the other.

Special attention is paid to Churchill's attitude and his views, his controversies with his colleagues with regard to the Palestine issue, and the *modus vivendi* eventually reached. Three phases of Churchill's attitudes and activities are dealt with: a) His term of office as First Lord of the Admiralty, b) The first period of his premiership (up to the winter of 1942/43), c) The months following the turn of the tide in the war, in particular April—July 1943.

### THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE EXPULSION OF 'ILLEGAL' IMMIGRANTS FROM PALESTINE AND THEIR DETENTION IN CYPRUS

by David Shaary

The author analyses the Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, in Palestine from which the British authorities derived the authority to expel 'illegal' immigrants from the country, and the special legislation introduced by the British authorities in Cyprus in order to provide legal sanction for maintenance of detention camps there. He surveys the campaigns conducted in Jerusalem and Cyprus by representatives of the Yishuv in order to undermine the legal basis of these acts of expulsion and detention. The British did provide some sort of legal justification for their acts, but neither the legal status of the detained immigrants nor the British obligation to satisfy their needs, were ever clearly defined. The Yishuv's legal harassment of the British authorities was tardy: in Palestine it commenced some four months after the first expulsion, and in Cyprus — two years after the opening of the camps. Only three attempts were made in Palestine (regarding the immigrant ships *Latrun*, *Knesset Israel*, and *Arlozoroff*) and only twice was legal action taken in Cyprus. No attempt was made to initiate legal proceedings in London under the Offences against Persons Act. The arguments were based on marginal defects in the British regulations and no attempt was made to undermine their basic validity. Furthermore, the cases were not pursued vigorously.

The author concludes that the inadequacy of the Yishuv's reaction resulted, at first, from the absence of the political leaders (most of

whom, including the legal adviser of the Jewish Agency, Dr. B. Joseph, were detained at Latrun), and later from their preoccupation with the political and military struggle for statehood. A contributory factor was the fairly correct and humane attitude of the British authorities in charge of the detention camps, which made the representatives of the Yishuv and of the Jewish organizations which aided the detainees averse to continuous legal wrangling. Without claiming that intensive legal action would have met with certain success, the author argues that the leaders of the Yishuv neglected a possible propaganda sphere, which could have elicited international response.

NAPHTALI HERZ IMBER — AN UNPUBLISHED  
CORRESPONDENCE

by Yitzhak Enav (Winchouse)

The letters of N.H. Imber to Israel Zangwill, the introductory essay and the footnotes verify the anecdotal image of 'the first Jewish Beatnik'. The letters show Imber the scrounger, ladies man, pseudo-scholar, hypochondriac, gossip and drinker and yet, however ironic the matter, the writer of the poem *Hatikva*, the Jewish national anthem.

THE MINUTES OF THE IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI (I.Z.L.),  
JULY—NOVEMBER 1944

by Shlomo Lev-Ami

The minutes cover part of the year during which the I.Z.L. resumed its armed struggle against the British Mandatory regime. They include:

- 1) Twelve minutes of meetings of the I.Z.L. Command.
- 2) Four minutes of meetings of the Command with the council of district commanders and general-staff officers.
- 3) Minutes of a meeting of a special Command sub-committee which served as a military tribunal.
- 4) Minutes of a meeting of representatives of the Command with representatives of the Jewish Agency Executive and the Haganah.
- 5) The text of a letter from Menahem Begin to Nathan Friedmann-Yellin, appended to the minutes of September 1, 1944.

The minutes cover a wide range of subjects, including the planning and evaluation of operations, questions of organization and finance, relations with the National (Revisionist) Movement and with the other underground organizations, especially in the light of the threatening confrontation with the Haganah.

# תמצית המאמרים באנגלית