

TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY
THE CHAIM ROSENBERG SCHOOL OF JEWISH STUDIES
THE INSTITUTE FOR ZIONIST RESEARCH
FOUNDED IN MEMORY OF CHAIM WEIZMANN



Editor: Daniel Carpi
Assistant Editor: Raya Adler
Editorial Board: Gavriel Cohen, Yosef Gorni,
Michael Heymann, Anita Shapira, Ronald Zweig

The Institute for Zionist Research founded in memory of Chaim Weitzmann was set up in 1962 at Tel-Aviv University through the initiative and with the assistance of the Executive of the World Zionist Organization, with the aim of furthering the research and the teaching of the history of the Zionist idea, the Zionist movement and the Land of Israel in modern times.

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SUMMARIES

The following summaries are based on the reports of the authors, and are intended to provide a general overview of the work. The full reports are available in the original language and are available on request.

The first summary is by [Name], who has been working on the problem of [Topic] for several years. The work is based on a series of experiments which have shown that [Result]. The results are consistent with the theory proposed by [Author], and suggest that [Conclusion].

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BETWEEN PILSUDSKY AND MICKIEWICZ: POLICY AND
MESSIANISM IN ZIONIST REVISIONISM

by Yaacov Shavit

It is impossible to separate ideological developments within the Zionist Revisionist movement in Poland from the influence of the cultural and political milieu of Poland in the 1930s. Additionally, changes in political positions were influenced by developments in Poland's domestic and international politics during the Josef Pilsudski period (1925–1939) and that of his successors.

The history of contacts between the Revisionist movement and the Polish Republic are characterized by two outstanding features:

1) The political reliance of institutions of the Revisionists on various circles within the Polish government. This reliance was not only due to the fact that Poland was the largest center of Revisionism (and of Zionism) in the Diaspora, but was also based on the Revisionist belief in Poland's military and political power internationally, and on the premise that Poland could be relied upon to exert diplomatic pressure on Britain.

2) The linkage to Polish political culture. A review of declarations of various Revisionist circles reveals that Poland was regarded as an example of national political culture worthy of emulation, which had much in common with the new Jewish nationalism.

Revisionists believed that the romantic-messianic poet Adam Mickiewicz and the statesman Josef Pilsudski were exemplary and complementary figures. Mickiewicz was regarded as a Polish national prophet, a figure indispensable for a revolutionary and messianic movement. Pilsudski was seen as a pragmatic national statesman who had built a new national state, and who knew how to deploy political terror, a regular army and politics in the service of nationalist goals.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ODESSA COMMITTEE, THE
ZIONIST MOVEMENT AND HERZL: LIKE FATHER,
LIKE SON?

by Yosef Goldstein

In the late 1890s, leaders of the Odessa Committee (the vanguard of the first national Zionist movement, the Russian Hibbat Zion), Theodor Herzl, founder and leader of the international Zionist Organization, and the Russian Zionist movement (then the main component of the Organization) underwent a number of shifting liaisons and interrelationships.

The Odessa Committee and Herzl alternatively approached and then rejected a working solidarity with each other. In the period mid-1897 to mid-1899, Russian Zionist leaders, with few exceptions, regarded Herzl as their leader. Relations of this leadership with members of the Odessa Committee were antagonistic at this stage.

Not long thereafter, however, the situation was reversed. The heads of the Russian Zionist movement no longer believed in Herzl and his plans, and overtures to the Odessa Committee were initiated.

A combination of ideological, psychological and practical factors stimulated these radical positional shifts. Ultimately, the resulting alliances generated a new constellation of power relations, and catalyzed radical developments within the Zionist Organization and Zionist movement as a whole.

GERMAN ZIONISTS AND THE STRUGGLE OF
LANGUAGES

by Yehuda Eloni

The growing influence of the German Zionists on Jewish life at the beginning of the twentieth century drew a strongly negative response from "liberal," Germanic-oriented Jews. In 1912, extremists of this orientation founded the Anti-Zionist Committee.

By March 1913, this committee was able to foment the expulsion of the Zionists from the Centralverein deutscher Staatsbuerger juedischen Glaubens. Grounds for expulsion included a Zionist lack of "German consciousness".

No area of Jewish public life remained free from confrontation between the rival camps. Late in 1913, the philanthropic organization Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden decided to found a secondary school in Haifa, whose official instructional language would be German. The Hilfsverein had been working to improve the educational system in Palestine for years; in some of its institutions, Hebrew had already been introduced.

The Yishuv of Palestine opposed the decision in favor of the German language, and gained the support of the world Zionist movement. German Zionists regarded the struggle for the Hebrew language not only as a matter of prime national importance but as a second front in the battle against extreme anti-Zionists. In February 1914, when it seemed the Hilfsverein board of directors would cancel its ruling in favor of German, the Anti-Zionist Committee enlisted hundreds of Jewish notables to publish a general ban on Zionists.

The proclamation did not achieve its aim. German Zionists came to regard their struggle for the Hebrew language as their finest hour. For the first time, the reality of the Palestine situation had presented Zionists with a tangible, collective challenge which helped define their status in German Jewry.

GENERAL ZIONISTS IN PALESTINE DURING THE 1920s

by Yigal Drori

Even after the 1924 establishment of the Federation of General Zionists in Palestine, General Zionism was no more than a loose framework of factions and groups which failed to maintain middle class solidarity within the Yishuv.

In 1927, most of the conservative wing of the Federation broke away to form the National Civil Association; the Federation thereafter only comprised what had been its liberal wing. In 1928,

even this remainder split into liberal and conservative factions.

Other groups within the Zionist movement, to the political right and left, had reached a high level of ideological cohesion and political organization, which had increased their power and influence beyond their actual number of adherents. The labor and religious movements had organized around clearly defined ideologies, while the General Zionist constituency had an undifferentiated ideology, consisting only of a few general principles, such as support for personal initiative, which stemmed from practical rather than more abstract considerations.

There were a number of factions within the General Zionists, the most important of which was led by Meir Dizengoff. In retrospect, it is evident that there were only minor distinctions between them, largely of a personal nature. It is appropriate to speak of two main wings within the General Zionists throughout the 1920s: the anti-socialist conservative wing, mainly industrialists, artisans and merchants; and the liberal wing, mainly members of the free professions, teachers, journalists and men of letters. A review of the documents of the period sometimes creates the impression that the conflict between these two wings was no less stubborn and bitter than the conflict between the "civilian" groups as a whole and the labor movement.

CHURCHILL AND PALESTINE: AT THE EXCHEQUER, 1928

by Michael J. Cohen

This article considers a little-known episode in Winston Churchill's tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924–1929). Churchill insisted that the Palestine budget, in healthy surplus as the result of revenues derived from the Zionists, pay for no less than one-half the administrative costs of its insolvent neighbor, Transjordan.

In 1928, the Treasury demanded that Palestine not only pay the lion's share of the newly-created Transjordanian Frontier Force, but also pay one-half of Transjordan's share. In response, Lord

Plumer, the British High Commissioner for Palestine, tendered his resignation; later in the year Plumer did, in fact, resign, ostensibly because of ill-health.

The article also considers the Zionist request for a British loan guarantee, to finance the establishment of additional Jewish settlements. Although Britain derived a surplus from its administration of Palestine, the Yishuv that produced this surplus was not considered to be of sufficient promise to warrant such a guarantee, and it was not granted.

UNITY AND DIVISION IN THE GENERAL ZIONIST CAMP, AUGUST 1934 – JUNE 1935

by David Shaari

During the first stage in the history of the World Union of General Zionists (1931–1935), General Zionism experienced both unity and division. At the founding congress of the Union, which convened during the 17th Zionist Congress in Basle during 1931, two disparate blocs, known as Aleph and Bet, could already be distinguished. In analyzing the two world congresses of the World Union of General Zionists, which met in Cracow in August 1934 and in June 1935, factors are identifiable within the Zionist Executive, national Zionist organizations, and the Palestine-Diaspora interaction, which would send tremors through the ideologically amorphous General Zionist camp, and which would prevent the Union from crystallizing.

OBSTACLES TO AN ARAB-JEWISH AGREEMENT

by Yoram Nimrod

This article is the final third of a series concerning Palestinian policy-making following approval of the Partition Plan in the summer of 1937. A reconstruction of the options actually considered reveals the existence of several secret coalitions among Jewish, Arab and British statesmen at the policy-making level.

When the Partition Plan became public knowledge, the Husseini party of Palestinian Arab nationalists developed contacts with non-Zionist elements in the Council and Executive Directorate of the Jewish Agency. Jewish opponents of partition were prepared not only to deter the plan of the Peel Commission within the Agency and the United Jewish Appeal; they were also willing to cooperate with the Pan-Arab nationalist movement to defeat aspirations for a Jewish National Home in a part of Mandatory Palestine.

On the other hand, the Zionist Executive Council conferred with three Arab states bordering Palestine, and obtained the tacit agreement of the fourth, Egypt, in favor of partition. Finally, non-Zionists in the Jewish communities of London, Paris and New York were found to have actively participated in the formulation of the 1939 British White Paper, which imposed very restrictive limits on Jewish immigration to Palestine, and which erased partition from the list of viable policy options in the period immediately preceding the World War.

POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN JEWS, THE KING OF
TRANSJORDAN AND THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT RE
AGREEMENT ON THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE,

1946-1947

by Avraham Sela

During the latter half of 1946, the Jewish Agency initiated political contacts with Abdallah, King of Transjordan, and with the Egyptian government headed by Ismail Tzidki. The Zionist diplomatic initiative was directed at the two foci of Arab power which, it seemed, would be interested in advancing the idea of partition. Both Abdallah and Tzidki were known to unofficially support the partition of Palestine, and to personally admire the Zionist enterprise and its achievements. Abdallah also supported partition to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state under the leadership of Ibn Haj Amin el-Husseini, and to annex the Arab part of the country to his kingdom as part of his plan for the

unification of "Greater Syria" under his crown. Tzidki saw partition as the only viable solution to the Palestine problem. It quickly became evident, however, that Abdallah and Tzidki were too weak to actively support partition in the face of expected opposition within their own countries; against the collective Arab position calling for an independent Arab state in Palestine in which Jews would be a tolerated minority; and despite Britain's determined opposition. Britain feared that adverse Islamic reaction to partition would severely damage her prestige and standing in the Middle East. The failure of the London Conference, and Britain's declaration that it would bring the Palestine question before the United Nations, ended this episode of Jewish-Arab commonality. However, basic agreement with Abdallah over partition continued, and was to serve as a keystone of his special relationship with the Jewish Agency prior to the establishment of the State of Israel and during the War of Independence.

PREDICTIONS OF THE JEWISH STATE AND ITS FOUNDING, 1941-1949

by Amitzur Ilan

During World War Two, prominent Zionists made a series of predictions to the effect that a Jewish state would eventually be established in Palestine. These confident predictions, accompanied by rational argument, were announced during the early stages of the war, when a whole set of decisive factors remained unclear. A comparison of the content of these predictions with concurrent historical events suggests that they were a projection of inner beliefs and messianic yearnings, to which political scenarios were appended.

Prominent Zionists made decisive contributions to the founding of the state, but for reasons other than their predictive authoritativeness. Namely, their determination to advance their cause and their talent for situational improvisation tipped the historical scale in favor of statehood, albeit by the tiniest of margins. Nonetheless, the inclination to predict statehood had an important influence on

preparations made by the Jewish people following the war, preparations for the struggle to come: an instance of prophecy fulfilling itself.

תמצית המאמרים באנגלית